A Systematic Analysis of the Capital One Data Breach: Critical Lessons Learned

IF 3 4区 计算机科学 Q2 COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS
Shaharyar Khan, Ilya Kabanov, Yunke Hua, Stuart Madnick
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

The 2019 Capital One data breach was one of the largest data breaches impacting the privacy and security of personal information of over a 100 million individuals. In most reports about a cyberattack, you will often hear that it succeeded because a single employee clicked on a link in a phishing email or forgot to patch some software, making it seem like an isolated, one-off, trivial problem involving maybe one person, committing a mistake or being negligent. But that is usually not the complete story. By ignoring the related managerial and organizational failures, you are leaving in place the conditions for the next breach. Using our Cybersafety analysis methodology, we identified control failures spanning control levels, going from rather technical issues up to top management, the Board of Directors, and Government regulators. In this analysis, we reconstruct the Capital One hierarchical cyber safety control structure, identify what parts failed and why, and provide recommendations for improvements. This work demonstrates how to discover the true causes of security failures in complex information systems and derive systematic cybersecurity improvements that likely apply to many other organizations. It also provides an approach that individuals can use to evaluate and better secure their organizations.

第一资本数据泄露的系统分析:吸取的重要教训
2019年Capital One数据泄露事件是影响超过1亿人个人信息隐私和安全的最大数据泄露事件之一。在大多数关于网络攻击的报道中,你经常会听到攻击之所以成功,是因为一名员工点击了网络钓鱼邮件中的链接,或者忘记给某些软件打补丁,这让它看起来像是一个孤立的、一次性的、微不足道的问题,可能只是一个人犯了错误或疏忽所致。但这通常不是故事的全部。如果忽视相关的管理和组织失误,你就会为下一次违规行为留下条件。使用我们的网络安全分析方法,我们确定了跨越控制级别的控制故障,从相当技术性的问题一直到最高管理层、董事会和政府监管机构。在本分析中,我们重建了Capital One的分层网络安全控制结构,确定了失败的部分及其原因,并提出了改进建议。这项工作演示了如何发现复杂信息系统中安全故障的真正原因,并推导出可能适用于许多其他组织的系统网络安全改进。它还提供了一种方法,个人可以使用它来评估和更好地保护他们的组织。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security
ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security Computer Science-General Computer Science
CiteScore
5.20
自引率
0.00%
发文量
52
期刊介绍: ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security (TOPS) (formerly known as TISSEC) publishes high-quality research results in the fields of information and system security and privacy. Studies addressing all aspects of these fields are welcomed, ranging from technologies, to systems and applications, to the crafting of policies.
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