Quasi-Insider Shareholder Activism: Corporate Governance at the Periphery of Control

IF 1.9 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Review of Corporate Finance Studies Pub Date : 2023-07-14 DOI:10.1093/rcfs/cfad016

Jonathan Cohn, Mitch Towner, Aazam Virani

引用次数: 0

Abstract

We analyze shareholder activism by “quasi-insiders”: founders, former executives, and other individuals tangentially connected to a firm. These individuals seek control in their campaigns, use aggressive tactics, and target smaller, poorly performing firms. Their campaigns are associated with positive announcement returns. Former CEOs who engage in campaigns often depart from the target under negative circumstances before launching their campaigns soon afterward. Our results suggest that insiders at the periphery of control may intervene in firms too small for traditional activists to target.

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准内部人股东激进主义:控制边缘的公司治理

我们分析了“准内部人士”的股东行动主义:创始人、前高管和其他与公司有密切关系的个人。这些人在他们的活动中寻求控制，使用激进的策略，并瞄准规模较小，表现不佳的公司。他们的活动与积极的公告回报有关。参与竞选活动的前首席执行官通常会在不利的情况下离开目标，然后很快发起竞选活动。我们的研究结果表明，处于控制边缘的内部人士可能会对规模太小的公司进行干预，而传统的激进投资者无法将其作为目标。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Review of Corporate Finance Studies BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

17.80

自引率

1.80%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Review of Corporate Finance Studies (RCFS) is dedicated to publishing high-quality research in the expansive field of Corporate Finance. The journal seeks original contributions, reviewing papers based on their unique insights into Corporate Finance. This encompasses a wide spectrum, including a firm's interactions with stakeholders, capital markets, internal organization structure, compensation mechanisms, corporate governance, and capital management. RCFS also welcomes research in financial intermediation, financial institutions, microstructure, and the implications of asset pricing for Corporate Finance. The journal considers theoretical, empirical, and experimental papers for review.