Cartel leniency programme in India—why no race here?

IF 0.6 Q2 LAW
Somashekar T.S., Praveen Tripathi
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

This article evaluates the implementation of the cartel leniency programme by the Competition Commission of India (CCI) using comprehensive data covering all related decisions of the CCI from 2009 to 2021. All other things remaining the same prima facie discoveries of cartels should have resulted in a ‘shock’ to ex ante expected returns of cartels, thereby encouraging more leniency applications. But, we find no such results or rather no ‘race’ to the agency. A successful leniency programme requires a transparent and deterrent penalty, plus consistency in applying leniency provisions. However, inconsistencies in the choice of penalty base and uncertainties in determining final penalties while using mitigating and aggravating factors have led to a poor correlation of penalties with cartel gain or harm. Strategic or otherwise, this has encouraged appeals to the appellate authority, thereby reducing the effective penalty to levels below deterrence. Many acts of bid rigging have been penalized using less stringent criteria and, in a few circumstances, also provided the benefit of leniency. Further, while individuals concerned in leniency cases have always been penalized, the CCI has not been so consistent in non-leniency cartel cases. These asymmetries and ‘other’ costs create disincentives for exercising the leniency option. We offer suggestions for enhancing the possibility of a race to the agency.
印度的卡特尔宽大处理计划——为什么这里没有种族歧视?
本文使用涵盖2009年至2021年印度竞争委员会所有相关决策的综合数据,评估了印度竞争委员会(CCI)对卡特尔宽大处理计划的实施情况。所有其他因素保持不变,对卡特尔的初步发现应该会导致对卡特尔预期回报的“冲击”,从而鼓励更多的宽大申请。但是,我们没有发现这样的结果,或者更确切地说,没有对该机构的“竞争”。一个成功的宽大处理方案需要一个透明和具有威慑力的刑罚,以及宽大处理规定的一致性。然而,处罚基数的选择不一致,以及在使用减轻和加重因素时确定最终处罚的不确定性,导致处罚与卡特尔利益或损害的相关性较差。无论是否具有战略意义,这都鼓励了向上诉当局提出上诉,从而将有效惩罚减少到低于威慑的水平。许多操纵投标的行为都是用不那么严格的标准来处罚的,在少数情况下,还提供了宽大处理的好处。此外,虽然在宽大处理的案件中有关的个人总是受到惩罚,但在非宽大处理的卡特尔案件中,CCI并没有如此一致。这些不对称和“其他”成本阻碍了宽大选择权的行使。我们向该机构提出了提高竞争可能性的建议。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.30
自引率
14.30%
发文量
28
期刊介绍: The journal covers a wide range of enforcement related topics, including: public and private competition law enforcement, cooperation between competition agencies, the promotion of worldwide competition law enforcement, optimal design of enforcement policies, performance measurement, empirical analysis of enforcement policies, combination of functions in the competition agency mandate, and competition agency governance. Other topics include the role of the judiciary in competition enforcement, leniency, cartel prosecution, effective merger enforcement, competition enforcement and human rights, and the regulation of sectors.
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