Vittorio Orbinato, Marco Carlo Feliciano, Domenico Cotroneo, Roberto Natella
{"title":"Laccolith: Hypervisor-Based Adversary Emulation with Anti-Detection","authors":"Vittorio Orbinato, Marco Carlo Feliciano, Domenico Cotroneo, Roberto Natella","doi":"arxiv-2311.08274","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) represent the most threatening form of\nattack nowadays since they can stay undetected for a long time. Adversary\nemulation is a proactive approach for preparing against these attacks. However,\nadversary emulation tools lack the anti-detection abilities of APTs. We\nintroduce Laccolith, a hypervisor-based solution for adversary emulation with\nanti-detection to fill this gap. We also present an experimental study to\ncompare Laccolith with MITRE CALDERA, a state-of-the-art solution for adversary\nemulation, against five popular anti-virus products. We found that CALDERA\ncannot evade detection, limiting the realism of emulated attacks, even when\ncombined with a state-of-the-art anti-detection framework. Our experiments show\nthat Laccolith can hide its activities from all the tested anti-virus products,\nthus making it suitable for realistic emulations.","PeriodicalId":501333,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - CS - Operating Systems","volume":"154 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"arXiv - CS - Operating Systems","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2311.08274","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) represent the most threatening form of
attack nowadays since they can stay undetected for a long time. Adversary
emulation is a proactive approach for preparing against these attacks. However,
adversary emulation tools lack the anti-detection abilities of APTs. We
introduce Laccolith, a hypervisor-based solution for adversary emulation with
anti-detection to fill this gap. We also present an experimental study to
compare Laccolith with MITRE CALDERA, a state-of-the-art solution for adversary
emulation, against five popular anti-virus products. We found that CALDERA
cannot evade detection, limiting the realism of emulated attacks, even when
combined with a state-of-the-art anti-detection framework. Our experiments show
that Laccolith can hide its activities from all the tested anti-virus products,
thus making it suitable for realistic emulations.