{"title":"Misreporting of second liens in portfolio mortgages and privately securitized mortgages","authors":"Abdullah Yavas, Shuang Zhu","doi":"10.1111/1540-6229.12464","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Using a unique nationwide mortgage servicing dataset, this paper investigates the underreporting of second liens in portfolio mortgages and compares underreporting in portfolio versus privately securitized mortgages. Portfolio loans have more than 40% of the second liens underreported. Low documentation securitized loans have a 47% (in relative terms) <i>lower</i> misreporting rate than observably similar portfolio loans. The portfolio setting allows us to provide strong evidence that misreporting happens in the early stages of intermediation by lenders. The decreased occurrence of misreporting in sold loans subjected to more rigorous screening indicates the effectiveness of MBS issuers' screening, though its overall effect remains limited. Further, we show that the lender-MBS issuer affiliation also plays a role in misreporting.","PeriodicalId":47731,"journal":{"name":"Real Estate Economics","volume":"24 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Real Estate Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.12464","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Abstract
Using a unique nationwide mortgage servicing dataset, this paper investigates the underreporting of second liens in portfolio mortgages and compares underreporting in portfolio versus privately securitized mortgages. Portfolio loans have more than 40% of the second liens underreported. Low documentation securitized loans have a 47% (in relative terms) lower misreporting rate than observably similar portfolio loans. The portfolio setting allows us to provide strong evidence that misreporting happens in the early stages of intermediation by lenders. The decreased occurrence of misreporting in sold loans subjected to more rigorous screening indicates the effectiveness of MBS issuers' screening, though its overall effect remains limited. Further, we show that the lender-MBS issuer affiliation also plays a role in misreporting.
期刊介绍:
As the official journal of the American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, Real Estate Economics is the premier journal on real estate topics. Since 1973, Real Estate Economics has been facilitating communication among academic researchers and industry professionals and improving the analysis of real estate decisions. Articles span a wide range of issues, from tax rules to brokers" commissions to corporate real estate including housing and urban economics, and the financial economics of real estate development and investment.