Empirical Models of Lobbying

IF 6.8 2区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

Annual Review of Economics Pub Date : 2020-08-02 DOI:10.1146/annurev-economics-082019-024350

Matilde Bombardini, Francesco Trebbi

引用次数: 0

Abstract

This article offers a review of the recent empirical literature on lobbying within political economy. In surveying extant research, we emphasize quid pro quo and informational issues in special int...

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游说的实证模型

本文对政治经济学中最近关于游说的实证文献进行了回顾。在对现有研究的调查中，我们特别强调交换条件和信息问题。

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来源期刊

Annual Review of Economics ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

9.70

自引率

3.60%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Annual Review of Economics covers significant developments in the field of economics, including macroeconomics and money; microeconomics, including economic psychology; international economics; public finance; health economics; education; economic growth and technological change; economic development; social economics, including culture, institutions, social interaction, and networks; game theory, political economy, and social choice; and more.