Kelsen’s Metaethics

IF 0.6 Q2 LAW
Ratio Juris Pub Date : 2022-05-23 DOI:10.1111/raju.12343
Torben Spaak
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

In this article, I argue, inter alia, that Kelsen’s mature view—as expressed in, and around the time of, the second edition of Reine Rechtslehre—was that of a metaethical relativist, and that the commitment to metaethical relativism was the reason why Kelsen defended democracy as well as tolerance in the shape of a constitutionally guaranteed freedom of thought. I also consider the possibility that in his post-1960 phase Kelsen abandoned metaethical relativism for moral fictionalism, but argue that, on the whole, a relativist interpretation of Kelsen’s late legal philosophy is to be preferred to a fictionalist interpretation.
在这篇文章中,我认为,除其他外,凯尔森的成熟观点——在《Reine rechtsleh3》第二版中表达的观点——是一个元伦理相对主义者的观点,而对元伦理相对主义的承诺是凯尔森捍卫民主和宽容的原因,因为民主和宽容是以宪法保障的思想自由的形式存在的。我也考虑到凯尔森在1960年后阶段放弃元伦理相对主义而转向道德虚构主义的可能性,但我认为,总的来说,对凯尔森晚期法律哲学的相对主义解释比虚构主义解释更可取。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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CiteScore
0.80
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0.00%
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