{"title":"Epistemology as Pragmatic Inquiry: Rorty, Haack, and Academic Relativism in Education","authors":"Kenneth Driggers, Deron Boyles","doi":"10.1007/s11217-023-09909-0","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>In a post-Trump, post-Covid-19 world, it is clear that truth is contested by fake news outlets and misinformation. Less clear is how to navigate the vicissitudes of intersectional discourse without devolving into a Richard Rortyan relativism that denies truth altogether. This paper considers the epistemic commitments of foundationalism and coherentism before turning to pragmatist Susan Haack to explore whether there are convergences between the two. The goal of this paper is three-fold: (1) to clarify how truth and fact feature in foundationalist and coherentist epistemic thinking; (2) to offer a pragmatist “foundherentist” intersection between foundationalism and coherentism; and (3) to use (1) and (2) to highlight the untenable position Rortyan relativism represents, specifically in relation to education formally understood.</p>","PeriodicalId":47069,"journal":{"name":"Studies in Philosophy and Education","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9000,"publicationDate":"2023-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Studies in Philosophy and Education","FirstCategoryId":"95","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11217-023-09909-0","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"EDUCATION & EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
In a post-Trump, post-Covid-19 world, it is clear that truth is contested by fake news outlets and misinformation. Less clear is how to navigate the vicissitudes of intersectional discourse without devolving into a Richard Rortyan relativism that denies truth altogether. This paper considers the epistemic commitments of foundationalism and coherentism before turning to pragmatist Susan Haack to explore whether there are convergences between the two. The goal of this paper is three-fold: (1) to clarify how truth and fact feature in foundationalist and coherentist epistemic thinking; (2) to offer a pragmatist “foundherentist” intersection between foundationalism and coherentism; and (3) to use (1) and (2) to highlight the untenable position Rortyan relativism represents, specifically in relation to education formally understood.
期刊介绍：
Studies in Philosophy and Education is an international peer-reviewed journal that focuses on the philosophical, theoretical, normative and conceptual problems and issues in educational research, policy and practice. As such, Studies in Philosophy and Education is not the expression of any one philosophical or theoretical school or cultural tradition. Rather, the journal promotes exchange and collaboration among philosophers, philosophers of education, educational and social science researchers, and educational policy makers throughout the world. Contributions that address this wide audience, while clearly presenting a philosophical argument and reflecting standards of academic excellence, are encouraged.
Topics may range widely from important methodological issues in educational research as shaped by the philosophy of science to substantive educational policy problems as shaped by moral and social and political philosophy and educational theory. In addition, single issues of the journal are occasionally devoted to the critical discussion of a special topic of educational and philosophical importance. There is also a frequent Reviews and Rejoinders’ section, featuring book review essays with replies from the authors.
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