Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness

IF 16.4 1区 化学 Q1 CHEMISTRY, MULTIDISCIPLINARY
Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Federico Fusco, Philip Lazos, Stefano Leonardi, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

We consider the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods to a set of strategic agents with additive valuation functions. We assume no monetary transfers, and therefore, a mechanism in our setting is an algorithm that takes as input the reported—rather than the true—values of the agents. Our main goal is to explore whether there exist mechanisms that have pure Nash equilibria for every instance and, at the same time, provide fairness guarantees for the allocations that correspond to these equilibria. We focus on two relaxations of envy-freeness, namely, envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) and envy-freeness up to any good (EFX), and we positively answer the preceding question. In particular, we study two algorithms that are known to produce such allocations in the nonstrategic setting: round-robin (EF1 allocations for any number of agents) and a cut-and-choose algorithm of Plaut and Roughgarden (EFX allocations for two agents). For round-robin, we show that all of its pure Nash equilibria induce allocations that are EF1 with respect to the underlying true values, whereas for the algorithm of Plaut and Roughgarden, we show that the corresponding allocations not only are EFX, but also satisfy maximin share fairness, something that is not true for this algorithm in the nonstrategic setting! Further, we show that a weaker version of the latter result holds for any mechanism for two agents that always has pure Nash equilibria, which all induce EFX allocations.Funding: This work was supported by the Horizon 2020 European Research Council Advanced “Algorithmic and Mechanism Design Research in Online Markets” [Grant 788893], the Ministero dell’Università e della Ricerca Research project of national interest (PRIN) “Algorithms, Games, and Digital Markets,” the Future Artificial Intelligence Research project funded by the NextGenerationEU program within the National Recovery and Resilience Plan (PNRR-PE-AI) scheme [M4C2, investment 1.3, line on Artificial Intelligence], the National Recovery and Resilience Plan-Ministero dell’Università e della Ricerca (PNRR-MUR) project IR0000013-SoBigData.it, the Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek Veni Project [Grant VI.Veni.192.153], and the National Recovery and Resilience Plan Greece 2.0 funded by the European Union under the NextGenerationEU Program [Grant MIS 5154714].
不可分割物品分配给战略代理人:纯纳什均衡与公平
研究了一组不可分割的商品公平分配给一组具有可加性估价函数的战略代理的问题。我们假设没有货币转移,因此,我们设置中的机制是一种算法,它将代理的报告值(而不是真实值)作为输入。我们的主要目标是探索是否存在一种机制,在每种情况下都有纯纳什均衡,同时,为这些均衡对应的分配提供公平保证。我们着重讨论了嫉妒自由的两种松弛状态,即对一种善的嫉妒自由(EF1)和对任何善的嫉妒自由(EFX),并积极地回答了前面的问题。特别是,我们研究了两种已知在非策略设置中产生这种分配的算法:round-robin(对任意数量的代理进行EF1分配)和Plaut和Roughgarden的cut-and-choose算法(对两个代理进行EFX分配)。对于round-robin,我们表明其所有的纯纳什均衡诱导分配是EF1相对于潜在的真值,而对于Plaut和Roughgarden的算法,我们表明,相应的分配不仅是EFX,而且还满足最大份额公平,这在非战略设置的算法中是不正确的!进一步,我们证明了后一种结果的较弱版本适用于总是具有纯纳什均衡的两个代理的任何机制,它们都诱导EFX分配。资助:这项工作得到了地平线2020欧洲研究委员会高级“在线市场的算法和机制设计研究”[Grant 788893]、墨西哥大学部长国家利益研究项目(PRIN)“算法、游戏和数字市场”的支持。未来人工智能研究项目由国家恢复和恢复计划(PNRR-PE-AI)计划[M4C2,投资1.3,人工智能线]下的下一代欧盟计划资助,国家恢复和恢复计划-墨西哥德拉里卡多大学部长(PNRR-MUR)项目IR0000013-SoBigData。它,荷兰组织voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek Veni项目[Grant VI.Veni.192.153],以及欧盟在下一代欧盟计划下资助的希腊国家恢复和弹性计划2.0 [Grant MIS 5154714]。
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来源期刊
Accounts of Chemical Research
Accounts of Chemical Research 化学-化学综合
CiteScore
31.40
自引率
1.10%
发文量
312
审稿时长
2 months
期刊介绍: Accounts of Chemical Research presents short, concise and critical articles offering easy-to-read overviews of basic research and applications in all areas of chemistry and biochemistry. These short reviews focus on research from the author’s own laboratory and are designed to teach the reader about a research project. In addition, Accounts of Chemical Research publishes commentaries that give an informed opinion on a current research problem. Special Issues online are devoted to a single topic of unusual activity and significance. Accounts of Chemical Research replaces the traditional article abstract with an article "Conspectus." These entries synopsize the research affording the reader a closer look at the content and significance of an article. Through this provision of a more detailed description of the article contents, the Conspectus enhances the article's discoverability by search engines and the exposure for the research.
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