Rational intuitions: How reason underlies deontological moral judgments

IF 1.4 3区哲学 Q2 ETHICS

Philosophical Psychology Pub Date : 2023-11-30 DOI:10.1080/09515089.2023.2290172

Arjan S. Heir

引用次数: 0

Abstract

Joshua Greene’s dual process account contends that deontological moral judgments are the result of intuitions that are automatic, emotional and arational. Deontological intuitions cannot be trusted...

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理性直觉:理性如何成为义务论道德判断的基础

约书亚·格林的双重过程理论认为，义务论道德判断是直觉的结果，直觉是自动的、情绪化的和非理性的。义务论直觉是不可信的……

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来源期刊

Philosophical Psychology Multiple-

CiteScore

2.40

自引率

14.30%

发文量

120

期刊介绍： Philosophical Psychology is an international journal devoted to developing and strengthening the links between philosophy and the psychological sciences, both as basic sciences and as employed in applied settings, by publishing original, peer-refereed contributions to this expanding field of study and research. Published articles deal with issues that arise in the cognitive and brain sciences, and in areas of applied psychology.