Does the politics matter? Legal and political economy analysis of contracting decisions in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry

Stephens T, Acheampong T.
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Abstract
Ghana is often cited as one of Africa’s most stable democracies. Since 2004, the country has awarded 18 petroleum agreements to various international oil companies (IOCs) and their local partners to explore for hydrocarbons in its offshore basins. In 2010, Ghana became an oil-producing country following earlier commercial discoveries in 2007. Nevertheless, the likelihood of the Ghanaian State getting its fair share of petrodollar revenues primarily depends on its ability to negotiate good petroleum contracts and effectively regulate the industry. This article examines the legal and political economy factors that influence contract outcomes in Ghana’s oil and gas industry. It sheds light on how the inner workings of the political economy, especially in a competitive clientelist setup involving intense electoral competition between two dominant parties in an emerging oil-producing country, influence contractual outcomes—an area less explored in the literature. We find that the country's emerging oil and gas industry has become deeply intertwined with the pervasive, entrenched and clientelist multi-party politics of the day. As such, entrenched rentier social groups—business and political elites—have sometimes sabotaged institutional reform to create conditions that favour rent capture. This is evident, for example, in the award of oil and gas licensing and other supply chain contracts. Ghana’s post-1992 ‘winner takes all’ political mindset and the perceived big financial bonanzas the oil industry offers, resulted in suspicions of impropriety regarding the award of some oil acreages. We argue that if the laws were allowed to work, as they should in practice, Ghana’s oil and gas industry would be better regulated, and better outcomes would arise from the contracting process. Discretionary power should be limited as much as possible and, where granted, subject to a high level of scrutiny.
政治因素重要吗?加纳上游石油和天然气行业合同决策的法律和政治经济分析
加纳经常被认为是非洲最稳定的民主国家之一。自2004年以来,该国已与各种国际石油公司(ioc)及其当地合作伙伴签订了18项石油协议,以勘探其海上盆地的碳氢化合物。加纳在2007年发现了早期的商业油田,2010年成为石油生产国。然而,加纳国家获得其公平份额的石油美元收入的可能性主要取决于其谈判良好的石油合同和有效管理该工业的能力。本文考察了影响加纳石油和天然气行业合同结果的法律和政治经济因素。它揭示了政治经济的内部运作是如何影响契约结果的,尤其是在一个新兴的石油生产国,两个主要政党之间激烈的选举竞争中,竞争的客户主义设置是如何影响契约结果的——这是一个文献中较少探讨的领域。我们发现,这个国家新兴的石油和天然气行业已经与当今无处不在、根深蒂固、唯客户主义的多党政治深深交织在一起。因此,根深蒂固的社会食利者群体——商业和政治精英——有时会破坏制度改革,以创造有利于攫取租金的条件。例如,在油气许可和其他供应链合同的授予中,这一点就很明显。加纳1992年后“赢家通吃”的政治心态,以及人们认为石油行业会带来巨大的金融财富,导致人们怀疑在授予一些油田面积方面存在不当行为。我们认为,如果允许法律发挥作用,就像它们在实践中应该发挥的那样,加纳的石油和天然气行业将得到更好的监管,承包过程将产生更好的结果。自由裁量权应尽可能受到限制,如果被授予,则应受到高度审查。
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