Institutional trading around repurchase announcements: An uphill battle

IF 2.6 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Vinh Huy Nguyen, Suchismita Mishra, Pankaj K. Jain
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Highly sophisticated institutional investors are generally not profitable when trading around share repurchase announcements because they are pitted against better-informed entities such as the firm and its insiders. The firm and its insiders know the announcement's intention and timing and enjoy regulatory exemptions regarding the timing and pricing of repurchase implementation or lack thereof. Institutions do not have the same advantages or information ex ante, but they do have access to the trades of insiders 2 days after the transaction date. We find that some institutions are profitable but only when insiders’ buying signal matches the firm's repurchase signal.

围绕回购公告的机构交易:一场艰苦的战斗
在围绕股票回购公告进行交易时,经验丰富的机构投资者通常不会获利,因为他们面临的竞争对手是消息更灵通的实体,比如该公司及其内部人士。公司及其内部人士知道公告的意图和时间,并且在回购实施的时间和定价方面享有监管豁免。机构在事前没有相同的优势或信息,但他们确实可以在交易日2天后获得内幕人士的交易信息。我们发现,只有当内部人士的买入信号与公司的回购信号相匹配时,一些机构才会盈利。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
FINANCIAL REVIEW
FINANCIAL REVIEW BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
3.30
自引率
28.10%
发文量
39
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