Save more with less: The impact of employer defaults and match rates on retirement saving

David Blanchett, Michael Finke, Zhikun Liu
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Employers control two primary levers that can motivate retirement savings among defined contribution plan participants—default savings rates and match rates. Setting a higher default savings rate can increase plan contributions among passive savers who accept the default. A higher match rate incentivizes active savers to increase contributions. This study uses a large sample of defined contribution participants to estimate the interaction between employer match and default rates on savings outcomes among new participants. Selecting a higher default rate has the largest impact on employee savings rates. Plans with low default savings rates that match a high percentage of employee earnings induce higher-income participants to actively move away from the low default savings rate, resulting in a wider savings gap between higher- and lower-income employees. When employees are defaulted in at a higher rate, fewer move away from the default savings rate and the default investment choice (e.g., a target-date fund). A higher default savings rate results in higher and more equal savings rates among employees, and higher acceptance of professionally managed defaults investments.

用更少的钱省更多的钱:雇主违约和匹配率对退休储蓄的影响
雇主控制着两个主要杠杆,可以激励固定缴款计划参与者的退休储蓄——违约储蓄率和匹配率。设定较高的默认储蓄率可以增加接受默认的被动储蓄者的计划缴款。较高的匹配率会激励活跃的储蓄者增加存款。本研究使用一个大的固定缴款参与者样本来估计雇主匹配和新参与者储蓄结果违约率之间的相互作用。选择较高的违约率对员工储蓄率的影响最大。低违约储蓄率的计划与员工收入的高比例相匹配,会诱使高收入的参与者积极远离低违约储蓄率,从而导致高收入和低收入员工之间的储蓄差距扩大。当雇员以较高的利率违约时,很少有人会放弃默认的储蓄率和默认的投资选择(例如,目标日期基金)。较高的违约储蓄率会导致员工之间更高、更平等的储蓄率,以及对专业管理的违约投资的更高接受度。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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