Economic voting goes local: evidence from the Italian regions

IF 1.7 Q2 POLITICAL SCIENCE
Stefano Rombi, Marco Valbruzzi
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Abstract This article investigates the pattern of economic voting at the regional level in Italy. It focuses on the elections held in 18 out of 20 Italian regions from 1995 to 2020. Retrospective voting is examined by using the theory of economic voting, measured at the subnational level. By providing some inferential models and controlling for the impact of phases of recession, this article tests the hypothesis whereby the incumbent regional government is rewarded (or punished) by voters in the event of a good (or poor) state of the regional economy. It mainly considers macroeconomic variables, focusing on the relationship between the unemployment rate (at both national and regional levels) and the electoral performance of the incumbent executive. The empirical analysis shows that, particularly during periods of ‘quiet politics’, economic voting also occurs at the local level and thus the regional unemployment rate affects regional rulers' electoral outcomes.
经济投票是地方性的:来自意大利地区的证据
摘要本文研究了意大利地区层面的经济投票模式。它的重点是1995年至2020年在意大利20个地区中18个地区举行的选举。追溯投票是通过使用经济投票理论来检验的,在次国家层面进行测量。通过提供一些推理模型和控制衰退阶段的影响,本文检验了在地区经济状况良好(或糟糕)的情况下,选民对现任地区政府的奖励(或惩罚)的假设。它主要考虑宏观经济变量,侧重于失业率(在国家和地区两级)与现任行政长官的选举表现之间的关系。实证分析表明,特别是在“安静政治”时期,经济投票也发生在地方层面,因此地区失业率影响地区统治者的选举结果。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.00
自引率
10.00%
发文量
34
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