Margaret Macdonald on the Argument from Dreaming

IF 1.1 2区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY Pub Date : 2023-09-20 DOI:10.1093/pq/pqad093

Oliver Thomas Spinney

引用次数: 0

Abstract

Abstract In this article, I offer a detailed examination of Margaret Macdonald's response to the Cartesian sceptical argument from dreaming. I show that Macdonald's views were not well understood by her contemporaries, and I suggest that this misunderstanding has led to her omission from subsequent discussions of this subject. I end with a brief demonstration of the fact that Macdonald's central claims have re-emerged in contemporary epistemology.

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玛格丽特·麦克唐纳论梦的论证

在这篇文章中，我提供了一个详细的检查玛格丽特·麦克唐纳的回应笛卡尔从做梦怀疑的论点。我认为麦克唐纳的观点并没有被她同时代的人很好地理解，我认为这种误解导致了她在随后的讨论中遗漏了这个主题。最后，我简要地论证了麦克唐纳的核心主张在当代认识论中重新出现的事实。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

1.70

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Philosophical Quarterly is one of the most highly regarded and established academic journals in philosophy. In an age of increasing specialism, it remains committed to publishing high-quality articles from leading international scholars across the range of philosophical study. Accessibility of its content for all philosophers - including students - is an editorial priority. The Philosophical Quarterly regularly publishes articles, discussions and reviews, and runs an annual Essay Prize. Its distinguished international contributors engage with both the established and the new, for example, through reflection on cognitive psychology, decision theory, quantum mechanics.