Have heads cooled? Changes in radical partisanship from 2020–2022

IF 2 3区 社会学 Q2 POLITICAL SCIENCE
Evan W. Sandlin
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

ABSTRACTRecent polling shows significant levels of radical partisanship among the US public in the form of violent partisan schadenfreude and violent partisan attitudes. Previous research shows that the partisan intensity underlying these sentiments increases around presidential elections and when political actors use violent rhetoric. Has lethal mass partisanship declined in the years after the 2020 election, especially now that one of the main purveyors of violent rhetoric has left office? This paper uses panel data from the Understanding America Study (UAS) to show how levels of radical partisanship have changed from the post-election period of 2020 to the same time period in 2021 and 2022. The results demonstrate that rates of violent partisan attitudes have declined in 2021 and 2022 compared to 2020, especially amongst those who were most supportive of former President Donald Trump. However, changes in partisan schadenfreude have no discernable pattern. The results demonstrate both that radical partisanship is not on a uniformly upward trajectory but likely decreases and increases with changes in political context, and that elements of radical partisanship do not vary in parallel. Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Kalmoe and Mason (Citation2019) originally termed the attitudes that make up the focus of this paper as “lethal mass partisanship.” Kalmoe and Mason (Citation2022) have since referred to these attitudes as “radical partisanship.” For the sake of clarity, I use their more recent terminology.2 The UAS received all necessary ethics approvals (approval number: BRANY IRB # 22-065-1044).3 Exact question wording and coding details can be found in the appendix.4 All schadenfreude and violence question items were only asked of those who had a Republican or Democrat partisan affiliation.5 See appendix for demographics.6 Statistical significance was ascertained using a weighted difference in means test.7 These results do not change substantially when including all participants.8 While variables such as race and gender may be seen as time invariant, data for these variables is collected on a quarterly basis for UAS respondents with the opportunity to update past answers.9 The question on approval for Trump (post-November 3rd) comes from a UAS post-election survey (UAS 318). The survey had 7,279 respondents with a response rate of 80.91%(USC Dornsife Center for Economic and Social Research Citation2020) .10 These models are not estimated with fixed effects since the question about Trump support was only asked in 2020 and is therefore time-invariant.11 See appendix for this and other robustness checks.
头脑冷静了吗?2020-2022年激进党派关系的变化
摘要最近的民意调查显示,在美国公众中,激进的党派关系表现为暴力的党派幸灾乐祸和暴力的党派态度。先前的研究表明,在总统选举期间,当政治人物使用暴力言论时,这些情绪背后的党派强度会增加。在2020年大选后的几年里,致命的大规模党派之争是否有所减少,尤其是现在,暴力言论的主要传播者之一已经离任?本文使用了解美国研究(UAS)的面板数据来显示激进党派关系的水平如何从2020年选举后时期到2021年和2022年的同一时期发生变化。结果显示,与2020年相比,2021年和2022年,暴力党派态度的比例有所下降,尤其是在那些最支持前总统唐纳德·特朗普的人中。然而,党派幸灾乐祸的变化并没有明显的规律。结果表明,激进的党派倾向并没有统一的上升轨迹,而是可能随着政治环境的变化而减少或增加,而且激进党派倾向的要素并没有平行变化。披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。注1 Kalmoe和Mason (Citation2019)最初将构成本文重点的态度称为“致命的大规模党派之争”。卡尔莫和梅森(Citation2022)后来将这些态度称为“激进的党派之争”。为了清楚起见,我使用他们最新的术语2 . UAS获得了所有必要的伦理批准(批准号:BRANY IRB # 22-065-1044)准确的问题措辞和编码细节可在附录中找到所有幸灾乐祸和暴力的问题只问那些有共和党或民主党党派关系的人人口统计资料见附录统计显著性是使用加权差异在经济状况调查中确定的当包括所有参与者时,这些结果并没有实质性的变化虽然种族和性别等变量可能被视为时间不变,但这些变量的数据是按季度收集的,为UAS受访者提供了更新过去答案的机会关于特朗普的支持率(11月3日之后)的问题来自usas选后调查(usas 318)。该调查有7279名受访者,回复率为80.91%(USC Dornsife经济和社会研究中心Citation2020)。10这些模型不是固定效应的估计,因为关于特朗普支持的问题只在2020年被问到,因此是时不变的参见附录,了解这个和其他健壮性检查。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.00
自引率
5.60%
发文量
21
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