Crowdsourcing routines: the behavioral and motivational underpinnings of expert participation

IF 2.8 4区管理学 Q2 BUSINESS

Industrial and Corporate Change Pub Date : 2023-10-27 DOI:10.1093/icc/dtad056

Mehdi Bagherzadeh, Andrei Gurca, Rezvan Velayati

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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Abstract As different crowdsourcing routines (metaphorically labeled as “fishing” and “hunting” in this study) are available to address highly technical problems, solution-seeking organizations need to mindfully design, select, and deploy crowdsourcing routines that account for the behavior and motivation of experts. Drawing on a survey involving 260 experts in science, technology, engineering, and math fields, we found that elite experts (individuals with seniority, aged over 40, and a proven track record in the field with numerous publications and patents) are generally less inclined to search for crowdsourcing open calls and prefer to be contacted by solution seekers. In contrast, non-elite experts (early career experts, aged under 40, and with fewer patents and publications) actively search to find open calls. Regarding their motivational underpinnings, our findings suggest that elite experts are motivated more by non-financial incentives than non-elite experts. Furthermore, as the frequency with which they are contacted increases, non-elite experts tend to prefer more non-financial over financial incentives. These results indicate that the fishing crowdsourcing routine generally elicits solutions from unproven, non-elite experts who demand more financial rewards. However, the hunting routine taps a pool of elite experts with proven capabilities who are less financially oriented and thus may provide better, yet less expensive solutions.

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众包惯例:专家参与的行为和动机基础

由于不同的众包程序(在本研究中隐喻地标记为“钓鱼”和“狩猎”)可用于解决高度技术性的问题，寻求解决方案的组织需要谨慎地设计、选择和部署众包程序，以解释专家的行为和动机。我们对260名科学、技术、工程和数学领域的专家进行了调查，发现精英专家(年龄在40岁以上，在该领域拥有大量出版物和专利的资深人士)通常不太倾向于搜索众包公开电话，而是更愿意与寻求解决方案的人联系。相比之下，非精英专家(职业生涯初期的专家，年龄在40岁以下，专利和出版物较少)会积极寻找公开招聘。关于他们的动机基础，我们的研究结果表明，精英专家比非精英专家更容易受到非经济激励的激励。此外，随着与他们接触频率的增加，非精英专家往往更喜欢非经济激励而不是经济激励。这些结果表明，捕鱼众包通常会从未经证实的非精英专家那里获得解决方案，这些专家要求更多的经济回报。然而，这种狩猎程序利用了一群精英专家，他们的能力得到了证明，他们不太以财务为导向，因此可能会提供更好、更便宜的解决方案。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Industrial and Corporate Change Multiple-

CiteScore

5.10

自引率

4.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The journal covers the following: the internal structures of firms; the history of technologies; the evolution of industries; the nature of competition; the decision rules and strategies; the relationship between firms" characteristics and the institutional environment; the sociology of management and of the workforce; the performance of industries over time; the labour process and the organization of production; the relationship between, and boundaries of, organizations and markets; the nature of the learning process underlying technological and organizational change.