The longer the worse? The case of populism, anti-pluralism, and constitutional compliance

Abstract

ABSTRACTAlthough compliance with constitutions is undoubtedly one of the most essential topics in the current public debate, there are still a lot of questions about its determinants that have to be addressed. What is the impact of the populistic and anti-pluralistic character of ruling political parties on constitutional compliance of the government and does it depend on how long such parties have been in power? In our study, based on data for 147 countries during the period between 1990 and 2019, we aim to investigate the relationships between populism, anti-pluralism, and constitutional compliance, with a special focus on the years of the populist or anti-pluralistic ruling parties in office. In a series of panel regressions, we find that the longer anti-pluralists remain in power, the worse the effect they may have on constitutional compliance of the government. These results suggest that the respect for a constitution shown by government representatives is dependent on the nature of the party from which they originate and that anti-pluralism entrenched in the political scene for many years can be a real peril.KEYWORDS: constitutional economicspopulismanti-pluralismilliberalisminstitutional economics AcknowledgementsWe are grateful to two anonymous reviewers for the comments on our manuscript. We also give thanks to Christian Bjørnskov, Niclas Berggren, Jan Fałkowski, Jerg Gutmann, Bernd Hayo, Jarosław Kantorowicz, Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska, and Stefan Voigt for the feedback. The support of the Foundation for Polish Science (FNP) is gratefully acknowledged.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Urbinati, “Political Theory of Populism”; Guriev and Papaioannou, “The Political Economy of Populism.”2 North, “Institutions, Transaction Costs”; Trebilcock and Leng, “The Role of Formal Contract Law”; Lewkowicz and Lewczuk, “Civil Society and Compliance with Constitutions.”3 Voigt, “Mind the Gap”; Metelska-Szaniawska, Economic Effects of Post Socialist Constitutions; Chilton and Versteeg, “Rights Without Resources”; Bjoernskov and Mchangama, “Do Social Rights Affect Social Outcomes?”; Gutmann and Voigt, “Judicial Independence in the EU.”4 Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard, “Economic Development”; Gavison, “What Belongs in a Constitution?”; Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton, The Endurance of National Constitutions.5 Voigt, “Mind the Gap”; Alesina, Troiano, and Cassidy, “Old and Young Politicians”; Dal Bó et al., “Who Becomes a Politician?”6 Voigt, “Mind the Gap.”7 Guriev and Papaioannou, “The Political Economy of Populism.”8 Mudde and Kaltwasser, Populism.9 Ibid.10 Tushnet and Bugaric, Power to the People.11 Guriev and Papaioannou, “The Political Economy of Populism”; Bonikowski et al., “Populism and Nationalism.”12 Urbinati, “Political Theory of Populism”; Guriev and Papaioannou, “The Political Economy of Populism.”13 Gutmann and Rode, Are Populists Constitutionalists?14 Ibid.15 Celico, Rode, and Carreño, “Everybody is Populist to Some Extent.”16 V-Dem, V-Party and Comparative Constitutional Compliance Database.17 Müller, “Towards a Political Theory of Populism”; Aslanidis, “Is Populism an Ideology”; Mudde and Kaltwasser, Populism.18 Urbinati, “Political Theory of Populism.”19 Hawkins, “Is Chávez Populist?”20 Mudde and Kaltwasser, Populism.21 Scheppele, “The Opportunism of Populists.”22 Guriev and Papaioannou, “The Political Economy of Populism.”23 Norris and Inglehart, Cultural Backlash.24 Madrid, “The Rise of Ethnopopulism”; Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin, “A Political Theory of Populism.”25 Dombusch and Edwards, The Macroeconomics of Populism.26 Ibid.27 Guriev and Papaioannou, “The Political Economy of Populism.”28 Gest, Reny, and Mayer, “Roots of the Radical Right.”29 Noury and Roland, “Identity Politics and Populism.”30 See Algan et al., “The European Trust Crisis”; Boeri et al., Populism and Civil Society.31 Guriev and Papaioannou, “The Political Economy of Populism.”32 Giuliano and Wacziarg, “Who Voted for Trump?”33 Vasilopoulou, Halikiopoulou, and Exadaktylos, “Greece in Crisis.”34 Palonen, “Political Polarisation and Populism”; Lacey, “Populism and the Rule of Law.”35 Bugaric, “Populism, Liberal Democracy.”36 Gutmann and Rode, Are Populists Constitutionalists?37 Ibid.38 As defined by Tushnet and Bugaric, Power to the People; or Bugaric, “Could Populism Be Good?”39 Lührmann, Medzihorsky, and Lindberg, “Walking the Talk.”40 See Pappas, “The Specter Haunting Europe”; Lührmann, Medzihorsky, and Lindberg, “Walking the Talk”; Riedel, “Populism and its Potential.”41 Bugaric, “Could Populism Be Good?”42 Norris and Inglehart, Cultural Backlash.43 Bugaric, “Could Populism Be Good?”44 Johnson, “In Defense of Democratic Populism.”45 Scheppele, “The Opportunism of Populists.”46 Lührmann, Medzihorsky, and Lindberg, “Walking the Talk.”47 Lacey, “Populism and the Rule of Law.”48 Müller, What is Populism?; Huq, “The People Against the Constitution.”49 Urbinati, “The Populist Phenomenon.”50 Bugaric, “Populism, Liberal Democracy.”51 Müller, What is Populism?52 Huq and Ginsburg, “How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy.”53 Ibid.54 Ginsburg, Huq, and Versteeg, “The Coming Demise of Liberal Constitutionalism?”55 Núñez, Close, and Bedock, “Changing Democracy?”56 Junius et al., “Is It Interests, Ideas or Institutions?”57 Tavits and Letki, “When Left Is Right.”58 Schamis, “A ‘Left Turn’ in Latin America?”59 Tavits and Letki, “When Left Is Right.”60 See Rigobon and Rodrik, “Rule of Law, Democracy”; Boettke and Subrick, “Rule of Law, Development, and Human Capabilities”; Lewczuk, “Civil Liberties and Socio-Economic Development.”61 Chang, “Institutions and Economic Development.”62 Lewkowicz and Lewczuk, “Civil Society and Compliance with Constitutions”; Daniel, Covenant and Civil Society; Arato, Civil Society, Constitution, and Legitimacy; Voigt, “Mind the Gap”; Bugaric, “Populism, Liberal Democracy.”63 Bugaric, “Populism, Liberal Democracy.”64 Barnett and Finnemore, “The Politics, Power, and Pathologies.”65 Møller and Skaaning, “Regime Types and Democratic Sequencing”; Whitten-Woodring, “Watchdog or Lapdog?”66 Ruling parties were identified as those with a head of government and the most seats in the lower chamber. In this way the selected parties reflect the characteristics of the government of the given country.67 The upper time restriction was imposed due to data availability in the V-Party dataset.68 Gutmann, Metelska-Szaniawska, and Voigt, “The Comparative Constitutional Compliance Database.”69 Coppedge et al., V-Dem: 2022.70 Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton, “Characteristics of National Constitutions, Version 3.0.”71 Noury and Roland, “Identity Politics and Populism in Europe.”72 Bjørnskov and Rode, “Regime Types and Regime Change.”73 Alesina, Troiano, and Cassidy, “Old and Young Politicians.”74 Baltagi, Econometric Analysis of Panel Data.75 Fariss et al., “New Estimates of Over 500 Years of Historic GDP and Population Data.”76 Gutmann and Rode, Are Populists Constitutionalists?77 The output of this exercise is available upon request.78 Gutmann and Rode, Are Populists Constitutionalists?79 Voigt, “Mind the Gap.”Additional informationFundingThis research is part of a Beethoven project funded by the Polish National Science Centre (NCN, #2016/23/G/HS4/04371) and the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, #381589259). The views, thoughts, and opinions expressed in the text belong solely to the authors, and not necessarily to the authors’ employer, organization, committee, or other group or individual; Narodowe Centrum Nauki.Notes on contributorsJacek LewkowiczJacek Lewkowicz is an Associate Professor at the Faculty of Economic Sciences of the University of Warsaw. His research interests include political economy, institutional economics, and law and economics.Rafał WoźniakRafał Woźniak is an Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Economic Sciences of the University of Warsaw. His research focuses on panel data methods and endogeneity in econometric models.Anna LewczukAnna Lewczuk is an Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Economic Sciences of the University of Warsaw. Her research interests are in law and economics, constitutional economics, and institutional economics.Mateusz MarcolMateusz Marcol is an undergraduate student at the Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences at the University of Bonn. His research interests are in institutional economics, political economy, and mathematical logic.