Towards a Value-Neutral Definition of Sport

Abstract

ABSTRACTIn this paper I argue that philosophers of sport should avoid value-laden definitions of sport; that is, they should avoid building into the definition of sport that they are inherently worthwhile activities. Sports may very well often be worthwhile as a contingent matter, but this should not be taken to be a core feature included in the definition of sport. I start by outlining what I call the ‘legitimacy-conferring’ element of the category ‘sport’. I then argue that we ought not to include such a dimension in our definition of sport, on the grounds that it confuses issues of description with issues of definition: the issue of what sport does with what sport is. Following this, I consider a Wittgensteinian family resemblance approach to defining sport; Kevin Schieman’s argument that sports are necessarily good games; and the oft-cited wide-following and institutional criteria, as arguments for including an evaluative dimension in the definition of sport. I conclude that none succeed, for similar reasons: they either fail to track our common sense intuitions about what does or does not count as a sport; and/or they make it impossible for us to ever describe something a ‘bad’ sport (or instance of sport). Just as a good definition of, say, art, shouldn’t make it impossible for us to describe something as ‘bad art’, I argue that our definition of sport shouldn’t build in a necessarily positive evaluation. I conclude by discussing some of the practical reasons why supporters of activities about which there is currently debate as to their status as sports might want to see those activities included under the sports umbrella, but suggest that this on its own isn’t a good reason for modifying a philosophical definition of sport to include them.KEYWORDS: value-neutraldefining sportlegitimacy AcknowledgmentsI would like to thank Don Oxtoby for his comments on a draft of this paper, as well as the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful feedback.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. Realising that you made a definitional mistake like this is not the same as extending a chain of family resemblances. Whereas extending a chain of family resemblances continues to take the original feature as definitionally central to some instances of sport—s1, say, even if we now realise that it doesn’t apply to s2, s3, etc., – realising that you’ve made a definitional mistake is a matter of appreciating that you should never have taken that element to be definitionally important in the first place.2. Again putting aside the question of physicality, which is important to Schieman’s definition, but somewhat tangential to our discussion here.