The Dialogic Nature of Legal Communication and the Problem of Measuring the Legitimacy of Law

I. L. Chestnov, E. G. Samokhina
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Abstract

Communication can be monologic or dialogical. Only the latter forms are an essential characteristic of legal reality. At the same time, dialogue is conceived as an immanent feature of sociality as such. In the process of identity formation and personality socialization, dialogue is necessary and inevitable. The process of dialogic socialization ensures the reproduction of any society. Society exists only in case if there is recognition of mutual legal claims, i.e., legitimacy of law. The principle of universal trust as a constitutive foundation of sociality is at the same time the fundamental principle of a legal system. These initial philosophical and legal provisions require explication in the actual legal refraction. Designation of social situations as legal, attributing legal features to them, involves correlation of personal intention with the legal status of the Self and the counterparty in a legal relationship or in a simple form of realization of law. Thus, the relation I-You is mediated by the legal instance of It. However, it is quite difficult to measure the reciprocity of recognition of the Other as a bearer of legal status in empirical reality, especially in the field of public law. The criteria of “extreme injustice” (G. Radbruch’s formula) and “aggressive violence” (in the terminology of V.A. Chetvernin) can be used to explicate the legitimacy of law and can be specified in sociological and legal studies. This paper states the paradox of measuring of the legitimacy of law, which consists in the difference between trust in an empirically given countersubject in a legal relationship, and impersonal status of a legal institution. Trust in the institution, according to the authors, extends, among other things, to a critical attitude towards it, however, with the condition if there is a recognition of the need for its existence. Another paradox of the legitimacy of law, considered in the article, is associated with the antinomy “the ideal — the real.” Violations (non-observance) of legal norms, if they are not widespread, do not put into question the legitimacy of the legal system as a whole. In general, the recognition of law is determined not by the average result of a sociological survey, but by the understanding of the necessity and the inevitability of the Other as a carrier of a typified legal status (for example, in criminal proceedings: in recognizing the interdependence of the Self from Others as carriers of the status of subjects of law).
法律传播的对话性与法律合法性的衡量问题
交流可以是独白式的,也可以是对话式的。只有后一种形式才是法律现实的本质特征。与此同时,对话被认为是社会性的内在特征。在身份形成和人格社会化的过程中,对话是必要的,也是必然的。对话社会化的过程保证了任何社会的再生产。只有承认相互的法律要求,即法律的合法性,社会才会存在。普遍信任原则作为社会的构成基础,同时也是法律制度的基本原则。这些最初的哲学和法律规定需要在实际的法律折射中加以解释。将社会情况指定为合法的,赋予其法律特征,涉及个人意图与法律关系中自我和交易对手的法律地位或简单形式的法律实现的关联。因此,我与你的关系是以它的法律实例为中介的。然而,在经验现实中,特别是在公法领域,很难衡量承认他者作为法律地位承担者的互惠性。“极端不公正”(G. Radbruch的公式)和“侵略性暴力”(V.A. Chetvernin的术语)的标准可以用来解释法律的合法性,并且可以在社会学和法律研究中加以具体说明。本文阐述了衡量法律合法性的悖论,即法律关系中对经验给定的对立人的信任与法律制度的非人格化地位之间的差异。根据作者的说法,对该机构的信任,除其他外,延伸到对它的批评态度,但有一个条件,即承认其存在的必要性。本文所考虑的法律合法性的另一个悖论与“理想-现实”的二律背反有关。违反(不遵守)法律规范的行为,如果不是普遍存在,并不会使整个法律制度的合法性受到质疑。一般来说,对法律的承认不是由社会学调查的平均结果决定的,而是由对他者作为典型法律地位载体的必要性和必然性的理解决定的(例如,在刑事诉讼中:承认自我与他者作为法律主体地位载体的相互依存关系)。
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