Is Full Price the Full Story When Consumers Have Time and Budget Constraints?

IF 4.8 3区 管理学 Q1 MANAGEMENT
Simin Li, Martin A. Lariviere, Achal Bassamboo
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Problem definition: A canonical model in service management assumes that consumers base the purchase of a service on its full price, that is, a linear combination of the monetary price and the expected time commitment. Although analytically convenient, when this assumption holds is an unexplored question. Methodology/results: We present a model of consumers allocating their time and money between working, overhead activities that do not provide utility, one continuous leisure activity, and one discrete service. Both continuous leisure activity and discrete service increase utility. Consumers can allocate any nonnegative amount of time or money to the leisure activity. Consumption of the discrete service requires a specific amount of time and money. We examine when the decision to purchase the discrete service depends only on its full price. We show that the full-price assumption does hold in specific cases. To be precise, it depends on how consumers are paid. If consumers completely control the amount of time that they work and earn a constant wage, they base their purchase decision on the full price. If, however, they must work a fixed shift length, then the assumption fails, and the full price is not sufficient to determine the consumer’s action. This leads to systematic differences in sellers’ strategies when they serve consumers with different compensation structures. If the consumers must work longer than would be optimal if they controlled their schedule and earned the same hourly wage, that is, the consumers are overemployed shift workers, then a seller restricts sales (relative to selling to consumers who control their work hours), and the system is less congested. The reverse holds if the consumers would prefer to work longer at the offered wage; that is, the consumers are underemployed shift workers. Managerial implications: We show that sellers who fail to take prevailing compensation structures of the community they serve into consideration experience significant revenue loss. In some cases, we see losses in consumer surplus and social welfare as well. Supplemental Material: The e-companion is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2022.0357 .
当消费者有时间和预算限制时,全价就是全部吗?
问题定义:服务管理中的规范模型假设消费者购买服务的基础是其全部价格,即货币价格和预期时间承诺的线性组合。虽然在分析上很方便,但这个假设何时成立是一个尚未探索的问题。方法/结果:我们提出了一个消费者在工作、不提供效用的间接活动、一个连续的休闲活动和一个离散的服务之间分配时间和金钱的模型。连续的休闲活动和离散的服务都增加了效用。消费者可以将任何非负的时间或金钱分配到休闲活动中。离散服务的消费需要一定数量的时间和金钱。我们考察购买离散服务的决定何时仅取决于其全价。我们证明,在特定情况下,全价假设确实成立。准确地说,这取决于消费者如何获得报酬。如果消费者完全控制自己的工作时间,并且工资不变,他们就会基于全价做出购买决定。然而,如果他们必须工作一个固定的轮班长度,那么这个假设就不成立了,而且全价也不足以决定消费者的行为。这就导致了销售者在以不同的补偿结构服务消费者时,其策略的系统性差异。如果消费者必须工作更长时间,而不是控制自己的时间表并赚取相同的小时工资,也就是说,消费者是过度雇佣的轮班工人,那么卖家限制销售(相对于向控制工作时间的消费者销售),系统就不那么拥挤了。如果消费者愿意在提供的工资水平上工作更长时间,情况就会相反;也就是说,消费者是未充分就业的轮班工人。管理启示:我们表明,没有考虑到他们所服务的社区的现行薪酬结构的卖家会经历重大的收入损失。在某些情况下,我们也看到了消费者剩余和社会福利的损失。补充材料:电子伴侣可在https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2022.0357上获得。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
M&som-Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
M&som-Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 管理科学-运筹学与管理科学
CiteScore
9.30
自引率
12.70%
发文量
184
审稿时长
12 months
期刊介绍: M&SOM is the INFORMS journal for operations management. The purpose of the journal is to publish high-impact manuscripts that report relevant research on important problems in operations management (OM). The field of OM is the study of the innovative or traditional processes for the design, procurement, production, delivery, and recovery of goods and services. OM research entails the control, planning, design, and improvement of these processes. This research can be prescriptive, descriptive, or predictive; however, the intent of the research is ultimately to develop some form of enduring knowledge that can lead to more efficient or effective processes for the creation and delivery of goods and services. M&SOM encourages a variety of methodological approaches to OM research; papers may be theoretical or empirical, analytical or computational, and may be based on a range of established research disciplines. M&SOM encourages contributions in OM across the full spectrum of decision making: strategic, tactical, and operational. Furthermore, the journal supports research that examines pertinent issues at the interfaces between OM and other functional areas.
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