The Survival of Mobile Firepower: An Uncertain Factor in Taiwan's Asymmetrical Defense

IF 1.3
Shang-su Wu
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Abstract

executive summary: This article considers the strategic importance of mobile firepower for Taiwan's asymmetrical defense and analyzes the geostrategic threats to the survival of Taiwan's mobile surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and standoff firepower. main argumentIn the face of China's military superiority, Taiwan has adopted an asymmetrical approach to its defense that relies significantly on mobile SAMs and standoff firepower to deny People's Liberation Army (PLA) platforms, such as transport aircraft and landing ships, access to the island. Mobility presents a tactical advantage for Taiwan, as it renders Chinese surveillance more difficult. However, Taiwan's mobile units could be constrained or rendered immobile given the geographic environment in Taiwan, especially in urban regions like the Taipei metropolitan area. At the outbreak of a potential war with China, Taiwan's mobile units could face preemptive strikes, and concealing the deployed units for an indeterminate time while awaiting a PLA invasion would also be challenging. The amount of mobile firepower that Taipei can retain after PLA attacks may determine whether Beijing's invasion is successful, but with a narrow margin for losses and an incomplete buildup, Taiwan's mobile firepower may nevertheless not be adequate to redress the island's military inferiority. To consolidate the status quo in the strait, Taipei should strengthen its mobile firepower and Washington should offer critical support. policy implications • Although there is no clear minimum level of firepower that Taipei would need to retain in an attack scenario, the current margin is narrow. If the PLA efficiently neutralizes Taiwan's mobile units, Taiwan's asymmetrical defense would be significantly undermined or even fail. • Moving and hiding mobile units around Taiwan could be challenging, given that suitable routes in urban and mountainous areas are predictable and could be cut off. To thwart a potential PLA invasion, the mobile units would also need to be hidden for an indeterminate period, which could be difficult. The necessity of defending Taipei would further reduce the tactical flexibility of the mobile units. • China has various surveillance and attack means that could be used to neutralize Taiwan's mobile units and defensive means to lower the threat from mobile firepower. The efficacy of these measures and the extent to which Beijing could concentrate them for this mission is uncertain. • Third parties, particularly the U.S., are crucial in strengthening Taiwan's mobile firepower, especially in terms of quantity and evaluation.
机动火力的生存:台湾非对称防御的不确定因素
摘要:本文考虑了机动火力对台湾非对称防御的战略重要性,并分析了台湾机动地对空导弹(sam)和对峙火力生存的地缘战略威胁。面对中国的军事优势,台湾采取了一种不对称的防御方式,主要依靠机动地对空导弹和对峙火力来阻止解放军(PLA)的平台,如运输机和登陆舰进入台湾。机动性为台湾提供了战术优势,因为它使中国大陆的监视变得更加困难。然而,考虑到台湾的地理环境,特别是在像台北大都市区这样的城市地区,台湾的机动部队可能会受到限制或无法移动。在与中国大陆爆发潜在战争时,台湾的机动部队可能面临先发制人的打击,在等待解放军入侵的不确定时间内隐藏部署的部队也将是一项挑战。在解放军进攻后,台北可以保留的机动火力数量可能决定北京的入侵是否成功,但由于损失幅度很小,而且建设不完全,台湾的机动火力可能仍不足以弥补台湾的军事劣势。为了巩固台海现状,台北应加强其机动火力,华盛顿应提供关键支持。•虽然没有明确的最低火力水平,台北需要在攻击情景中保持,目前的差距很小。如果解放军有效地压制台湾的机动部队,台湾的不对称防御将受到严重破坏甚至失败。•在台湾周围移动和隐藏机动部队可能具有挑战性,因为城市和山区的合适路线是可预测的,可能会被切断。为了阻止潜在的解放军入侵,机动单位也需要隐藏一段不确定的时间,这可能是困难的。保卫台北的必要性将进一步降低机动部队的战术灵活性。•中国拥有各种监视和攻击手段,可以用来压制台湾的机动部队,以及降低机动火力威胁的防御手段。这些措施的效力,以及中国政府将在多大程度上集中这些措施来完成这项任务,都是不确定的。•第三方,特别是美国,在加强台湾的移动火力方面至关重要,特别是在数量和评估方面。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Asia Policy
Asia Policy Arts and Humanities-History
CiteScore
0.80
自引率
0.00%
发文量
55
期刊介绍: Asia Policy is a peer-reviewed scholarly journal presenting policy-relevant academic research on the Asia-Pacific that draws clear and concise conclusions useful to today’s policymakers.
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