India's Foreign Policy and the Ethic of Responsibility

IF 1.3
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This time, however, it is faced by India, a rising power whose foreign policy is \"periodically afflicted\" by \"uncertainty and indecisiveness\" (p. 1). Basrur's concern is the mismatch between India's ambition and its mixed record of success in the post–Cold War world. He argues the problems stem from domestic political constraints and the \"limitations\" of India's policies and policymakers (p. xi). If the postwar classical realists looked at India today, they would likely agree. They also blamed subpar foreign policies on domestic politics, which in democracies can empower poor leaders and flimsy ideas. They pointed to strategies like isolationism and appeasement, championed by popular politicians and widely supported in the interwar years but which undermined the capacity of democratic states to deter aggression and defend [End Page 116] their citizens when conflict eventually erupted.3 Even when it comes to their own security, the classical realists complained, democratic leaders and peoples can be feckless and reckless. Sometimes they were naive. At other times, they were prone to crusading moralism and ideological dogmatism, which could have even worse effects on national security and international order than simple idealism.4 For Basrur, the shortcomings with foreign policymaking in India—in particular, the causes of \"policy drift,\" in which necessary action is not taken or is performed suboptimally—are more quotidian. He shows how they can and do arise from the messiness of coalition politics, the complexities of federalism, and elite irresponsibility. But the consequences of these shortcomings, as his book shows, are still serious, and analysts and policymakers need to understand them properly if they are to remedy them effectively. Subcontinental Drift contributes to this effort by examining four episodes in India's foreign policy with the help of neoclassical realism, which draws inspiration from its classical forebear to explain state behavior in international relations.5 Each case study is impeccably argued. Basrur finds evidence for what he terms \"involuntary drift\" in the long struggle to secure support for the U.S.-India nuclear deal and in New Delhi's mishandling of the bilateral relationship with Colombo in the latter stages of Sri Lanka's civil war. In both cases, he argues that New Delhi's freedom of action was constrained by circumstances largely beyond its control: principally, a fragmented parliament that gives small parties outsized influence. In the second two cases, Basrur detects signs of \"voluntary drift\" in the unresolved saga of India's nuclear strategy and in its failure to adequately prepare for mass casualty terrorist attacks prior to the assault on Mumbai in November 2008. Here, he thinks, leaders had sufficient control to make the changes needed but failed to act responsibly (p. 111). India's politicians have long had the means, he argues, to establish a clear nuclear strategy but have not done so, allowing inconsistencies to emerge between stated doctrine and evolving capabilities. Similarly, Basrur claims, India's leaders could and should have heeded warnings about the threat posed by militant Islamist [End Page 117] groups harbored in Pakistan. They did not act to address clear weaknesses in internal security, however, concentrating instead on fruitless attempts at coercing Islamabad into ending its covert sponsorship of terror. These arguments are finely crafted and convincing. Yet the theoretical innovation of Subcontinental Drift is also worth discussing. In particular, Basrur reintroduces a normative dimension to the analysis of policymaking and implementation, something that was always present in the work...","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3000,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Asia Policy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.a911622","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

India's Foreign Policy and the Ethic of Responsibility Ian Hall (bio) Classical realism was formulated in the United States in the 1940s and 1950s to tackle a pressing problem: how to reconcile democratic politics with power politics. Most classical realists valued democracy as the form of government most likely to protect rights, uphold freedoms, and enable a majority of citizens to flourish.1 But at the same time, they observed that democracies often pursue foreign policies that are ill-conceived or downright dangerous.2 For this reason, classical realists lamented that democratic leaders are frequently outmaneuvered by authoritarians better schooled in the dark arts of international relations. Rajesh Basrur's excellent book Subcontinental Drift: Domestic Politics and India's Foreign Policy responds to a similar challenge. This time, however, it is faced by India, a rising power whose foreign policy is "periodically afflicted" by "uncertainty and indecisiveness" (p. 1). Basrur's concern is the mismatch between India's ambition and its mixed record of success in the post–Cold War world. He argues the problems stem from domestic political constraints and the "limitations" of India's policies and policymakers (p. xi). If the postwar classical realists looked at India today, they would likely agree. They also blamed subpar foreign policies on domestic politics, which in democracies can empower poor leaders and flimsy ideas. They pointed to strategies like isolationism and appeasement, championed by popular politicians and widely supported in the interwar years but which undermined the capacity of democratic states to deter aggression and defend [End Page 116] their citizens when conflict eventually erupted.3 Even when it comes to their own security, the classical realists complained, democratic leaders and peoples can be feckless and reckless. Sometimes they were naive. At other times, they were prone to crusading moralism and ideological dogmatism, which could have even worse effects on national security and international order than simple idealism.4 For Basrur, the shortcomings with foreign policymaking in India—in particular, the causes of "policy drift," in which necessary action is not taken or is performed suboptimally—are more quotidian. He shows how they can and do arise from the messiness of coalition politics, the complexities of federalism, and elite irresponsibility. But the consequences of these shortcomings, as his book shows, are still serious, and analysts and policymakers need to understand them properly if they are to remedy them effectively. Subcontinental Drift contributes to this effort by examining four episodes in India's foreign policy with the help of neoclassical realism, which draws inspiration from its classical forebear to explain state behavior in international relations.5 Each case study is impeccably argued. Basrur finds evidence for what he terms "involuntary drift" in the long struggle to secure support for the U.S.-India nuclear deal and in New Delhi's mishandling of the bilateral relationship with Colombo in the latter stages of Sri Lanka's civil war. In both cases, he argues that New Delhi's freedom of action was constrained by circumstances largely beyond its control: principally, a fragmented parliament that gives small parties outsized influence. In the second two cases, Basrur detects signs of "voluntary drift" in the unresolved saga of India's nuclear strategy and in its failure to adequately prepare for mass casualty terrorist attacks prior to the assault on Mumbai in November 2008. Here, he thinks, leaders had sufficient control to make the changes needed but failed to act responsibly (p. 111). India's politicians have long had the means, he argues, to establish a clear nuclear strategy but have not done so, allowing inconsistencies to emerge between stated doctrine and evolving capabilities. Similarly, Basrur claims, India's leaders could and should have heeded warnings about the threat posed by militant Islamist [End Page 117] groups harbored in Pakistan. They did not act to address clear weaknesses in internal security, however, concentrating instead on fruitless attempts at coercing Islamabad into ending its covert sponsorship of terror. These arguments are finely crafted and convincing. Yet the theoretical innovation of Subcontinental Drift is also worth discussing. In particular, Basrur reintroduces a normative dimension to the analysis of policymaking and implementation, something that was always present in the work...
印度的外交政策与责任伦理
经典现实主义在20世纪40年代和50年代在美国形成,以解决一个紧迫的问题:如何调和民主政治与强权政治。大多数古典现实主义者认为民主是最有可能保护权利、维护自由和使大多数公民富裕的政府形式但与此同时,他们也注意到,民主国家的外交政策往往考虑不周,甚至是彻头彻尾的危险出于这个原因,古典现实主义者哀叹,民主领导人经常被在国际关系的黑暗艺术中受过更好教育的独裁者所打败。拉杰什•巴斯鲁的优秀著作《次大陆漂移:国内政治与印度外交政策》回应了类似的挑战。然而,这一次,它面对的是印度,一个正在崛起的大国,其外交政策“周期性地受到”“不确定性和优柔寡断”的折磨(第1页)。Basrur关注的是印度的雄心与其在后冷战世界中喜忧参半的成功记录之间的不匹配。他认为,这些问题源于国内政治约束以及印度政策和决策者的“局限性”。如果战后的古典现实主义者看看今天的印度,他们可能会同意这一观点。他们还将低劣的外交政策归咎于国内政治,因为在民主国家,国内政治可能会让糟糕的领导人和脆弱的想法获得权力。他们指出了孤立主义和绥靖政策等策略,这些策略受到流行政治家的拥护,并在两次世界大战之间的年代得到广泛支持,但当冲突最终爆发时,这些策略削弱了民主国家遏制侵略和保护公民的能力古典现实主义者抱怨说,即使涉及到自己的安全问题,民主国家的领导人和人民也可能无能为力,不计后果。有时他们很天真。在其他时候,他们倾向于十字军般的道德主义和意识形态教条主义,这对国家安全和国际秩序的影响比单纯的理想主义更严重对于Basrur来说,印度外交政策制定的缺点——特别是“政策漂移”的原因,即没有采取必要的行动或执行得不够理想——是司空见惯的。他展示了这些问题是如何从混乱的联合政治、复杂的联邦制和精英的不负责任中产生的。但正如他在书中所指出的,这些缺陷的后果仍然很严重,分析师和政策制定者如果要有效地补救这些问题,就需要正确地理解它们。《次大陆漂移》在新古典现实主义的帮助下研究了印度外交政策的四个片段,从而有助于这一努力,新古典现实主义从其古典前辈那里获得灵感,以解释国际关系中的国家行为每个案例研究都有无可挑剔的论证。巴斯鲁发现了他所说的“非自愿漂移”的证据,包括在争取美印核协议获得支持的长期斗争中,以及在斯里兰卡内战后期,新德里对与科伦坡的双边关系处理不当。他认为,在这两种情况下,新德里的行动自由都受到了很大程度上超出其控制范围的环境的限制:主要是一个四分五裂的议会,给了小党派过大的影响力。在后两个案例中,Basrur发现了印度核战略悬而未决的故事中“自愿漂移”的迹象,以及在2008年11月孟买袭击之前,印度未能为大规模伤亡的恐怖袭击做好充分准备。他认为,在这里,领导者有足够的控制权来进行必要的变革,但未能负责任地行事(第111页)。他认为,印度的政客们早就有办法建立一个明确的核战略,但却没有这样做,这导致了既定原则与不断发展的能力之间出现了不一致。同样,Basrur声称,印度领导人可以也应该注意到藏在巴基斯坦的激进伊斯兰组织所构成的威胁的警告。然而,他们并没有采取行动解决国内安全的明显弱点,而是把精力集中在迫使伊斯兰堡停止秘密支持恐怖主义的徒劳尝试上。这些论点精雕细琢,令人信服。然而,次大陆漂移的理论创新也值得探讨。特别是,Basrur重新引入了对政策制定和执行的分析的规范维度,这是工作中一直存在的……
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来源期刊
Asia Policy
Asia Policy Arts and Humanities-History
CiteScore
0.80
自引率
0.00%
发文量
55
期刊介绍: Asia Policy is a peer-reviewed scholarly journal presenting policy-relevant academic research on the Asia-Pacific that draws clear and concise conclusions useful to today’s policymakers.
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