ASEAN and Ambiguity

IF 1.3
Mathew Davies
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Further, whereas the term ambiguity is often deployed negatively or derisively as a trait ASEAN should be faulted for and endeavor to overcome, this essay adopts a more nuanced position. Ambiguity is a risk mitigation strategy, and it can be a positive factor for the realization of goals. Very often, it is far from being unintentional or uninformed. At least for some of ASEAN's core goals, ambiguity has been a productive and intentional strategy; removing ambiguity through specification, especially when accompanied by growing regulation, is a governance misstep. This is not to say, of course, that ambiguity is only ever positive, and this essay also identifies the ways in which it both weakens regional governance and produces significant overconfidence. [End Page 22] The Origins and Growth of ASEAN Meeting in Bangkok in 1967 to sign the ASEAN Declaration (also known at the Bangkok Declaration), the foreign ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand most likely had the risks of failure uppermost in their minds. Previous attempts to establish a regional body, including the Association of Southeast Asia and MAPHILINDO, had been unsuccessful, and the five abovementioned states were dangerously vulnerable to the vagaries of domestic insurrection and global political competition.2 Failure would exacerbate the insecurities, material and ontological, of the region. Yet, the foreign ministers that met in Bangkok faced daunting obstacles to success. Most fundamentally, the five countries they represented neither liked nor trusted one another, and their diplomatic relations were marred by tensions, disagreements, and overlapping sovereignty claims. At least in part, these tensions were the product of centuries of colonial rule and the resulting political dislocations and silencing that accompanied first European colonialization and then, far more briefly, the Japanese occupation of the region. The ASEAN framework that was crafted was a response to the necessity of coexisting in similar circumstances, with similar economic and geopolitical needs, absent a common understanding, let alone mutual trust.3 In this circumstance, specificity was an obstacle to coexistence, as the disagreements, lack of knowledge, and mutual suspicions meant that any substantial goal would reveal those disagreements in unhelpful ways. No wonder, then, that the Bangkok Declaration itself was deeply ambiguous in purpose and meaning. The declaration committed the five states to no more than cooperating on a range of economic, social, and cultural measures and institutionalizing various meetings and committees.4 Ambiguity of both purpose and meaning is evident in the creation of ASEAN. In terms of purpose, it is not clear why ASEAN itself has to exist, as states could cooperate on the issues raised in the Bangkok Declaration [End Page 23] in a plethora of ways without a regional organization to facilitate that cooperation. Similarly, some of the original goals of ASEAN that are most often relayed to me in discussions with regional representatives have yet to be realized despite being crucial parts of the reasoning behind the organization's establishment. Perhaps the most notable substantive goals of ASEAN as expressed by regional leaders and diplomats are to facilitate mutual comprehension and for leaders to embed themselves in common standards of diplomacy toward each other, in particular not pushing each other too much in public and accepting that all have a right to resist any problematic regional conclusions. 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引用次数: 0

Abstract

ASEAN and Ambiguity Mathew Davies (bio) Perhaps more than any other regional organization, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and ambiguity seem to go hand in hand. Since the establishment of ASEAN more than 50 years ago, it has been easy to point to the region on a map but harder to say what the organization is for, and harder still to say what it does. This essay identifies the origins, workings, and consequences of this ambiguity in Southeast Asian regionalism. While the term ambiguity has been widely and often used in discussions of ASEAN, it has not been analyzed or dissected as its own analytical lens.1 To address this issue, I identify two types of ambiguity in this essay—an ambiguity of purpose (i.e., What is ASEAN for?) and an ambiguity of meaning (i.e., What values does ASEAN embody, promote, and protect?). Further, whereas the term ambiguity is often deployed negatively or derisively as a trait ASEAN should be faulted for and endeavor to overcome, this essay adopts a more nuanced position. Ambiguity is a risk mitigation strategy, and it can be a positive factor for the realization of goals. Very often, it is far from being unintentional or uninformed. At least for some of ASEAN's core goals, ambiguity has been a productive and intentional strategy; removing ambiguity through specification, especially when accompanied by growing regulation, is a governance misstep. This is not to say, of course, that ambiguity is only ever positive, and this essay also identifies the ways in which it both weakens regional governance and produces significant overconfidence. [End Page 22] The Origins and Growth of ASEAN Meeting in Bangkok in 1967 to sign the ASEAN Declaration (also known at the Bangkok Declaration), the foreign ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand most likely had the risks of failure uppermost in their minds. Previous attempts to establish a regional body, including the Association of Southeast Asia and MAPHILINDO, had been unsuccessful, and the five abovementioned states were dangerously vulnerable to the vagaries of domestic insurrection and global political competition.2 Failure would exacerbate the insecurities, material and ontological, of the region. Yet, the foreign ministers that met in Bangkok faced daunting obstacles to success. Most fundamentally, the five countries they represented neither liked nor trusted one another, and their diplomatic relations were marred by tensions, disagreements, and overlapping sovereignty claims. At least in part, these tensions were the product of centuries of colonial rule and the resulting political dislocations and silencing that accompanied first European colonialization and then, far more briefly, the Japanese occupation of the region. The ASEAN framework that was crafted was a response to the necessity of coexisting in similar circumstances, with similar economic and geopolitical needs, absent a common understanding, let alone mutual trust.3 In this circumstance, specificity was an obstacle to coexistence, as the disagreements, lack of knowledge, and mutual suspicions meant that any substantial goal would reveal those disagreements in unhelpful ways. No wonder, then, that the Bangkok Declaration itself was deeply ambiguous in purpose and meaning. The declaration committed the five states to no more than cooperating on a range of economic, social, and cultural measures and institutionalizing various meetings and committees.4 Ambiguity of both purpose and meaning is evident in the creation of ASEAN. In terms of purpose, it is not clear why ASEAN itself has to exist, as states could cooperate on the issues raised in the Bangkok Declaration [End Page 23] in a plethora of ways without a regional organization to facilitate that cooperation. Similarly, some of the original goals of ASEAN that are most often relayed to me in discussions with regional representatives have yet to be realized despite being crucial parts of the reasoning behind the organization's establishment. Perhaps the most notable substantive goals of ASEAN as expressed by regional leaders and diplomats are to facilitate mutual comprehension and for leaders to embed themselves in common standards of diplomacy toward each other, in particular not pushing each other too much in public and accepting that all have a right to resist any problematic regional conclusions. Yet this goal is not textually present in the...
东盟与模糊性
东南亚国家联盟(ASEAN,简称东盟)与模糊性的关系似乎比其他任何地区组织都密切。自50多年前东盟成立以来,在地图上指出该地区很容易,但要说这个组织的目的是什么就更难了,要说它的作用就更难了。本文确定了东南亚地区主义中这种模糊性的起源、运作和后果。虽然“歧义”一词在讨论东盟时被广泛和经常使用,但它并没有作为它自己的分析视角被分析或剖析为了解决这个问题,我在本文中确定了两种类型的模糊性——目的的模糊性(即,东盟是为了什么?)和意义的模糊性(即,东盟体现、促进和保护什么价值观?)。此外,尽管“模棱两可”一词经常被消极或嘲笑地用作东盟应该受到指责并努力克服的特点,但本文采取了更微妙的立场。模糊性是一种风险缓解策略,它可以成为实现目标的积极因素。通常情况下,这远不是无意或不知情。至少对于东盟的一些核心目标来说,模棱两可是一种富有成效和有意为之的策略;通过规范消除歧义,尤其是在伴随着不断增长的监管的情况下,是一种治理失误。当然,这并不是说,模棱两可永远都是积极的,本文还指出了它既削弱了地区治理,又产生了严重的过度自信的方式。1967年在曼谷举行的签署《东盟宣言》(又称《曼谷宣言》)的会议上,印尼、马来西亚、菲律宾、新加坡和泰国的外交部长们最担心的可能是失败的风险。以前建立一个区域机构的尝试,包括东南亚联盟和南亚联盟,都是不成功的,而且上述五个国家很容易受到国内叛乱和全球政治竞争的影响失败将加剧该地区的物质和本体不安全。然而,在曼谷会晤的各国外长面临着取得成功的巨大障碍。最根本的是,他们所代表的五个国家既不喜欢也不信任对方,他们的外交关系因紧张、分歧和重叠的主权主张而受到损害。至少在某种程度上,这些紧张局势是几个世纪的殖民统治以及随之而来的政治混乱和沉默的产物,这些混乱和沉默先是伴随着欧洲殖民统治,然后是日本对该地区的占领,时间要短得多。精心设计的东盟框架是对在类似情况下共存的必要性的回应,具有类似的经济和地缘政治需求,缺乏共同的理解,更不用说相互信任了在这种情况下,特殊性是共存的障碍,因为分歧、缺乏知识和相互猜疑意味着任何实质性目标都会以无益的方式揭示这些分歧。因此,难怪《曼谷宣言》本身在目的和意义上非常含糊不清。宣言承诺五国将在一系列经济、社会和文化措施上进行合作,并将各种会议和委员会制度化在创建东盟的过程中,目的和意义的模糊性是显而易见的。就目的而言,目前尚不清楚为什么东盟本身必须存在,因为各国可以在没有区域组织促进合作的情况下,以多种方式就曼谷宣言提出的问题进行合作。同样,在与区域代表的讨论中,我最常提到的一些东盟最初的目标,尽管是该组织成立背后的关键原因,但至今仍未实现。也许,正如地区领导人和外交官所表达的那样,东盟最显著的实质性目标是促进相互理解,并使各国领导人将自己置于彼此之间的共同外交标准中,特别是不要在公开场合过分催促对方,并接受各方都有权抵制任何有问题的地区结论。然而,这个目标并没有在文本中出现。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Asia Policy
Asia Policy Arts and Humanities-History
CiteScore
0.80
自引率
0.00%
发文量
55
期刊介绍: Asia Policy is a peer-reviewed scholarly journal presenting policy-relevant academic research on the Asia-Pacific that draws clear and concise conclusions useful to today’s policymakers.
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