U.S.-China Great-Power Politics and Strategic Ambiguities in an Evolving Indo-Pacific Security Architecture

IF 1.3
Beverley Loke, Ralf Emmers
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However, these inclusive and multilateral ASEAN-led platforms have in recent years been challenged by the rise of exclusive minilateral arrangements driven by U.S.-China great-power politics. China's influence-building measures include the Belt and Road Initiative, the Xiangshan Forum, and, more recently, the Global Security Initiative. U.S.-led minilaterals include the Quad, which brings together Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, and AUKUS, a trilateral security pact signed in September 2021 by Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These developments have reinvigorated debates over the form, purpose, and effectiveness of the Indo-Pacific security architecture.1 They have also contributed to the emergence of additional ambiguity in the regional architecture at the level of embedded regional alignments. Institutions like the EAS are structured around ASEAN's impartiality in the rise of great-power competition and seek to institutionalize regional relations by promoting diplomatic rules of engagement that are acceptable to all. In contrast, the Quad and AUKUS are arrangements that openly exclude China and seek to balance its rising power. [End Page 52] While it might seem counterintuitive, we claim that constructive and purposeful strategic ambiguity in the regional architecture can help maintain regional stability, especially in light of the intensifying U.S.-China hegemonic ordering. Indeed, we posit that it is precisely when states are narrowly aligned on specific economic, security, or ideological grounds that perceptions become hardened, thereby cementing \"us/them\" binaries and heightening regional instabilities. In short, this essay argues that inclusive and exclusive forms of cooperation enhance stability by generating strategic ambiguities in an evolving Indo-Pacific security architecture. The argument is laid out in two sections. The first section describes how ASEAN's inclusive platforms—discussed here through the EAS—have lost momentum and how the regional architecture has in recent years been characterized by an exclusive approach that omits one of the great powers. The next section claims that inclusive and exclusive approaches to security cooperation are not incompatible, as they enable flexibility and fluidity in regional alignments. The Evolving Security Architecture ASEAN's centrality in regional order–building has been widely debated. Although some analysts claim that ongoing great-power rivalries and mistrust have resulted in ASEAN's centrality \"by default,\" others highlight far greater agency on the part of Southeast Asian states to shape the regional security architecture. 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引用次数: 0

Abstract

U.S.-China Great-Power Politics and Strategic Ambiguities in an Evolving Indo-Pacific Security Architecture Beverley Loke (bio) and Ralf Emmers (bio) A complex regional security architecture exists today in the Indo-Pacific, comprising overlapping multilateral and minilateral arrangements. Resulting from an incremental process of cooperation, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its associated forums such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN +3, and the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting–Plus (ADMM-Plus) have become important multilateral venues for regional countries to exchange strategic perspectives. However, these inclusive and multilateral ASEAN-led platforms have in recent years been challenged by the rise of exclusive minilateral arrangements driven by U.S.-China great-power politics. China's influence-building measures include the Belt and Road Initiative, the Xiangshan Forum, and, more recently, the Global Security Initiative. U.S.-led minilaterals include the Quad, which brings together Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, and AUKUS, a trilateral security pact signed in September 2021 by Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These developments have reinvigorated debates over the form, purpose, and effectiveness of the Indo-Pacific security architecture.1 They have also contributed to the emergence of additional ambiguity in the regional architecture at the level of embedded regional alignments. Institutions like the EAS are structured around ASEAN's impartiality in the rise of great-power competition and seek to institutionalize regional relations by promoting diplomatic rules of engagement that are acceptable to all. In contrast, the Quad and AUKUS are arrangements that openly exclude China and seek to balance its rising power. [End Page 52] While it might seem counterintuitive, we claim that constructive and purposeful strategic ambiguity in the regional architecture can help maintain regional stability, especially in light of the intensifying U.S.-China hegemonic ordering. Indeed, we posit that it is precisely when states are narrowly aligned on specific economic, security, or ideological grounds that perceptions become hardened, thereby cementing "us/them" binaries and heightening regional instabilities. In short, this essay argues that inclusive and exclusive forms of cooperation enhance stability by generating strategic ambiguities in an evolving Indo-Pacific security architecture. The argument is laid out in two sections. The first section describes how ASEAN's inclusive platforms—discussed here through the EAS—have lost momentum and how the regional architecture has in recent years been characterized by an exclusive approach that omits one of the great powers. The next section claims that inclusive and exclusive approaches to security cooperation are not incompatible, as they enable flexibility and fluidity in regional alignments. The Evolving Security Architecture ASEAN's centrality in regional order–building has been widely debated. Although some analysts claim that ongoing great-power rivalries and mistrust have resulted in ASEAN's centrality "by default," others highlight far greater agency on the part of Southeast Asian states to shape the regional security architecture. Despite calls for various other regionalist projects, such as an "Asia-Pacific community" and an "East Asian community," unsuccessfully promoted by former Australian prime minister Kevin Rudd and Japanese prime minister Yukio Hatoyama, respectively, ASEAN has proved resilient in diffusing its norms to other regional states and driving wider cooperation. In this context, ASEAN's accomplishments include the establishment of inclusive institutionalized platforms for great-power engagement, thereby ensuring that ASEAN remains pivotal to the region's broader order-building project.2 As Hiro Katsumata has noted, ASEAN has managed to "actively construct a social environment which defines itself as the legitimate leader of East Asian community building."3 [End Page 53] The EAS, first held in 2005 with the ten ASEAN countries, Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea, represented one such attempt at constructing a region-wide multilateral institution. Prior to its inception, Indonesia, Japan, and Singapore were of the view that membership should be wide and inclusive, while other members, especially China and Malaysia, stressed that the EAS should be exclusively limited to East Asian countries. The eventual inclusion of Australia, India, and New Zealand—countries that are located outside the East Asian region—was therefore a diplomatic concession to a more inclusive approach to cooperation. Moreover...
演变中的印太安全架构中的美中大国政治和战略歧义
美中大国政治和不断演变的印太安全架构中的战略模糊性今天,印太地区存在着一个复杂的地区安全架构,包括重叠的多边和多边安排。随着合作的逐步推进,东南亚国家联盟(ASEAN)及其相关论坛,如东亚峰会(EAS)、东盟地区论坛(ARF)、东盟+3和东盟国防部长扩大会议(ADMM-Plus),已成为地区国家交流战略观点的重要多边场所。然而,这些由东盟主导的包容性和多边平台近年来受到中美大国政治推动下排他性多边安排兴起的挑战。中国的影响力建设措施包括“一带一路”倡议、香山论坛,以及最近的全球安全倡议。由美国主导的多边对话包括由澳大利亚、印度、日本和美国组成的四方对话,以及澳大利亚、英国和美国于2021年9月签署的三边安全协议AUKUS。这些事态发展重新激发了关于印太安全架构的形式、目的和有效性的辩论它们还导致区域架构在嵌入式区域联盟一级出现更多的模糊性。像东亚峰会这样的机构是围绕着东盟在大国竞争中保持中立的原则建立起来的,并寻求通过促进各方都能接受的外交接触规则来使地区关系制度化。相比之下,四方防务对话和太平洋安全联盟是公开排除中国并寻求平衡其崛起力量的安排。虽然这似乎有悖常理,但我们认为,在地区架构中,建设性和有目的的战略模糊性有助于维护地区稳定,尤其是在美中霸权秩序日益加剧的情况下。事实上,我们认为,正是当国家在特定的经济、安全或意识形态基础上狭隘地结盟时,观念才会变得更加顽固,从而巩固了“我们/他们”的二元对立,加剧了地区不稳定。简而言之,本文认为,包容和排他性的合作形式通过在不断演变的印太安全架构中产生战略模糊性来增强稳定。这个论点分为两个部分。第一部分描述了东盟的包容性平台(这里通过东盟讨论)是如何失去动力的,以及近年来区域架构是如何以排除大国之一的排他性方式为特征的。下一节声称,包容性和排他性的安全合作方法并非不相容,因为它们使区域联盟具有灵活性和流动性。东盟在地区秩序建设中的中心地位一直备受争议。尽管一些分析人士声称,持续的大国竞争和不信任导致了东盟“默认”的中心地位,但也有人强调,东南亚国家在塑造地区安全架构方面发挥了更大的作用。尽管澳大利亚前总理陆克文(Kevin Rudd)和日本前首相鸠山由纪夫(Yukio Hatoyama)分别呼吁建立“亚太共同体”(Asia-Pacific community)和“东亚共同体”(East Asian community)等其他各种地区主义项目,但都未能成功,但东盟在向其他地区国家传播其规范并推动更广泛合作方面表现出了弹性。在此背景下,东盟的成就包括为大国接触建立包容性的制度化平台,从而确保东盟在更广泛的地区秩序建设项目中仍然发挥关键作用正如胜俣弘所指出的那样,东盟成功地“积极构建了一种社会环境,使自己成为东亚共同体建设的合法领导者”。东亚峰会于2005年首次由东盟十国(澳大利亚、中国、印度、日本、新西兰和韩国)举行,代表了建立一个区域性多边机构的一次尝试。在成立之前,印度尼西亚、日本和新加坡认为成员应该广泛和包容,而其他成员,特别是中国和马来西亚,强调东亚峰会应该仅限于东亚国家。最终将澳大利亚、印度和新西兰——这些位于东亚地区之外的国家纳入其中——因此是对更包容的合作方式的外交让步。此外……
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来源期刊
Asia Policy
Asia Policy Arts and Humanities-History
CiteScore
0.80
自引率
0.00%
发文量
55
期刊介绍: Asia Policy is a peer-reviewed scholarly journal presenting policy-relevant academic research on the Asia-Pacific that draws clear and concise conclusions useful to today’s policymakers.
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