{"title":"A Case of the Highest Authority… So What Does It Mean?","authors":"David Eady","doi":"10.26686/vuwlr.v54i1.8439","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"There has been for some time a widespread view that anyone under investigation with regard to suspected wrongdoing should be entitled to anonymity prior to charge. Yet no attempt has been made to legislate. The matter is governed currently by the recently developed law of privacy, deriving from such cases as Campbell v MGN Ltd and culminating in the decision of the Supreme Court in ZXC v Bloomberg LP. It seems to be accepted, not only in England but under human rights law generally, that such information should be regarded as \"private\". This has not seriously been undermined in any of the leading cases. There is surely a serious question as to whether a suspect does indeed have a reasonable expectation that there should be such a blanket over his or her identity. This information is not purely personal. It relates to suspected wrongdoing – information which legitimately concerns not only any individual under suspicion but also, for example, \"victims\" and no doubt other fellow citizens interested in getting to the truth and in the administration of justice. Naturally, if a suspect's name leaks out, that individual's reputation may be seriously damaged. Some take the view that compensation should be recoverable specifically for injury to reputation – even though the claim would not be brought in defamation. Yet privacy and libel are distinct causes of action with different purposes to fulfil. If damages are to be sought to vindicate reputation, it is hard to see why a defendant should not have available the traditional defences and other principles applying in defamation. If a claimant wishes to demonstrate that the allegations are false, as well as intrusive, why should he not be subject to the same disciplines and risks as one who sues in libel?","PeriodicalId":426444,"journal":{"name":"Victoria University of Wellington law review","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Victoria University of Wellington law review","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.26686/vuwlr.v54i1.8439","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
There has been for some time a widespread view that anyone under investigation with regard to suspected wrongdoing should be entitled to anonymity prior to charge. Yet no attempt has been made to legislate. The matter is governed currently by the recently developed law of privacy, deriving from such cases as Campbell v MGN Ltd and culminating in the decision of the Supreme Court in ZXC v Bloomberg LP. It seems to be accepted, not only in England but under human rights law generally, that such information should be regarded as "private". This has not seriously been undermined in any of the leading cases. There is surely a serious question as to whether a suspect does indeed have a reasonable expectation that there should be such a blanket over his or her identity. This information is not purely personal. It relates to suspected wrongdoing – information which legitimately concerns not only any individual under suspicion but also, for example, "victims" and no doubt other fellow citizens interested in getting to the truth and in the administration of justice. Naturally, if a suspect's name leaks out, that individual's reputation may be seriously damaged. Some take the view that compensation should be recoverable specifically for injury to reputation – even though the claim would not be brought in defamation. Yet privacy and libel are distinct causes of action with different purposes to fulfil. If damages are to be sought to vindicate reputation, it is hard to see why a defendant should not have available the traditional defences and other principles applying in defamation. If a claimant wishes to demonstrate that the allegations are false, as well as intrusive, why should he not be subject to the same disciplines and risks as one who sues in libel?
一段时间以来,人们普遍认为,任何因涉嫌不法行为而接受调查的人在受到指控之前都应有权匿名。然而,没有人试图立法。这一问题目前由最近制定的隐私法管辖,源于Campbell v MGN Ltd等案件,并最终以最高法院在ZXC v Bloomberg LP中的决定而告终。不仅在英国,而且在一般人权法下,人们似乎都接受这种信息应被视为“私人”。在任何主要案例中,这一点都没有受到严重破坏。一个严重的问题是,嫌疑犯是否确实有合理的期望,认为他或她的身份上应该有这样一层毯子。这些信息不完全是个人信息。它涉及可疑的不法行为- -合法地不仅关系到任何受到怀疑的个人,而且也关系到例如“受害者”,当然也关系到其他有兴趣了解真相和参与司法的同胞。当然,如果嫌疑人的名字泄露出去,这个人的声誉可能会受到严重损害。有些人认为,赔偿应该是专门针对名誉损害的,即使索赔不会以诽谤的形式提出。然而,隐私和诽谤是不同的诉讼原因,有不同的目的要实现。如果要寻求损害赔偿来维护声誉,很难理解为什么被告不应该使用传统的辩护和适用于诽谤的其他原则。如果申索人希望证明指控是虚假的,而且是侵入性的,为什么他不应该受到与诽谤罪原告相同的纪律和风险呢?