Generals in the classroom: Joint professional national security education in Israel and the United States

Q3 Social Sciences

Comparative Strategy Pub Date : 2023-10-16 DOI:10.1080/01495933.2023.2263337

Anat Stern, Illai Z. Saltzman

{"title":"Generals in the classroom: Joint professional national security education in Israel and the United States","authors":"Anat Stern, Illai Z. Saltzman","doi":"10.1080/01495933.2023.2263337","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"AbstractThe national security realm poses great challenges to senior military officers and civilian officials. These leaders oftentimes attend designated Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) institutions as a prerequisite for their futrue appointments. The article examines how these colleges and universities instill in their graduates the intellectual capacity to effectively engage and solve macro-level and acute strategic challenges as well as employ critical thinking skills to ensure intellectual agility and flexibility. The article compares the Israel National Defense College (INDC) and the National Defense University (NDU) to identify the differences and similarities between the two institutions and explain what it says about the Israeli and the American strategic culture and approach to the future of national security. Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Barış Seçkin, “Cohesion of NATO Reinforced by Russian President,” Anadolu Agency, March 4, 2022. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/russia-ukraine-crisis/cohesion-of-nato-reinforced-by-russian-president-defense-college-commandant/2524426 (accessed March 6, 2022).2 “Given their gravity, Henry Kissinger Had jointly addressed the two consequential events,” in Crisis: The Anatomy of Two Major Foreign Policy Crises (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2003).3 Carl von Clausewitz (ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret), On War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 146.4 John B. Hattendorf, “The Conundrum of Military Education in Historical Perspective,” in Military Education: Past, Present, and Future, edited by Gregory C. Kennedy, Greg Kennedy, and Keith Neilson (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 7.5 John Wesley Masland and Laurence I. Radway, Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education and National Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), 50.6 Martin Dempsey, Joint Education: White Paper (July 2012), 4. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/concepts/cjcs_wp_education.pdf?ver=2017-12-28-162044-527 (accessed April 18, 2020).7 Joan Johnson-Freese, Educating America's Military (London: Routledge, 2013), 2–3.8 We define “senior military officers” as Lt. Col. and above as well as their civilian equivalents.9 Correlli Barnett, “The Education of Military Elites,” Journal of Contemporary History 2, no. 3 (July 1967): 28.10 Karen Guttieri, “Professional Military Education in Democracies,” in Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations, edited by Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), 244.11 Royal College of Defence Studies, https://www.da.mod.uk/colleges-and-schools/royal-college-of-defence-studies/ (accessed August 5, 2021).12 Victoria Syme-Taylor and Duraid Jalili, “Professional Military Education,” in Routledge Handbook of Defence Studies, edited by David J. Galbreath and John R. Deni (London: Routledge, 2018), 98.13 Joan Johnson-Freese, Educating America's Military (London: Routledge, 2013), 90.14 Howard J.Wiarda, A Clash of Cultures: Military Brass vs. Civilian Academics at the National War College (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2011), 42.15 See for example Wiarda, A Clash of Cultures, chap. 7.16 Quoted in Brian J. Doyle, Integrating Critical Thinking in the Curriculum of the Command and General Staff College (Unpublished Master’s Thesis: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2008), 51–2.17 The classification of retired military officers that now work as civilian instructors is not without criticism given they tend to lack terminal degrees or experience teaching in univerities or colleges outside the military. See for example Jennifer Mittelstadt, “Too Much War, Not Enough College,” War Room, June 20, 2018. https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/too-much-war-not-enough-college/ (accessed March 5, 2023).18 Florina C. Matei, “NATO, the Demand for Democratic Control, and Military Effectiveness, Romania,” in The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations, edited by Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina C. Matei (London: Routledge, 2013), 326.19 Authors’ email correspondence with the New Zealand Command and Staff College, April 21, 2020.20 On origins and evolution of the INDC, see Shlomit Keren, “The National Defense College in Historical Perspective,” National Defense Studies 1 (2001): 129–63 (in Hebrew).21 This criticism appeared in the report that was prepared prior to the reopening of the College in 1976. See Keren “The National Defense College in Historical Perspective,” 146–7.22 “The National Defense College Reopened,” Maariv, September 2, 1977 (in Hebrew).23 Keren, “The National Defense College in Historical Perspective,” 156–60.24 Interview with Professor Gabriel Ben-Dor and Professor Arnon Sofer, August 11, 2021.25 Yosi Peled, Soldier (Tel-Aviv: Ma’ariv, 1993), 247. (in Hebrew)26 Interview with Professor Gabriel Ben-Dor and Professor Arnon Sofer, August 11, 2021.27 See for example Zeev Schiff, Ehud Yaari, Israel's Lebanon War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984).28 The intensity of the military component of the program only allowed students to earn half of the academic credits needed but they were allowed to complete their studies at any Israeli university after their graduation.29 Doron Rubin, My Own Way On (Hevel Modi’in: Kinneret, Zmora Bitan, 2018), 133–7; Peled, Soldier, 273.30 Moshe Shamir, “The Barak Program for Field Commanders from Early Beginnings until Today,” in 50 Years Jubilee to the IDF Command and General Staff College, edited by Hagai Golan (Tel-Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 2004), 26–8 (in Hebrew); Zeev Drory, Dan Shomron—Subtle Leadership (Rishon Le’Zion, Yediot Achronot, 2016), 323–32; Authors interview with Prof. Arnon Sofer, August 11, 2021.31 Keren, “The National Defense College in Historical Perspective”; Martin Van Creveld, The Sword and the Olive: A Critical History of the Israeli Defense Force (New York : Public Affairs, 1998), 251. Authors’ interview with Gabriel Ben-Dor, August 11th, 2021.32 Amir Rapaport, “There Is Room for Concern,” Israel Defense, September 12, 2013 (in Hebrew).33 Gershon Hacohen, “The Curriculum in the Israel National Defense College: What Should Be Studied?” Journal of National Security 14 (September 2011), 14–15 (in Hebrew).34 Sofer served in various positions at the INDC, including leading the study tours program, and head of the research division for several years. See Arnon Sofer, The Privilege and Attempt to Influence in Tempestuous Times (Haifa: Heiken Geostrategy Cathedra, 2017), 103–4. (in Hebrew)35 Arnon Sofer, “INDC Program: What Should Be Learned? An Answer to Maj .Gen. Hacohen,” Journal of National Security, no. 18 (September 2012): 5–20.36 Yossi Baidatz, “Strategy as a learning Process: An Israeli Case Study for the New Administration,” Markaz, Brooking Institute, November 29, 2016 available online at https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/11/29/strategy-as-a-learning-process-an-israeli-case-study-for-the-new-administration/ (Accesses March 5, 2023)37 Yossi Baidatz, “Thoughts about Learning in National Security,” Israel National Security Doctrine in honor of 25 years of security programming at Haifa University\" May 21st, 2013. (in Hebrew)38 “Goals of the INDC”, INDC Handbook, No. 43–No. 47 (2015–2020).39 INDC, Call for Applications, January 11, 2023. (in Hebrew) Available online: https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/reports/national-security-college-course-na/he/national-security-college-course-na.pdf (accessed September 26, 2023).40 “Goals of the INDC”, INDC Handbook No. 47 (2020).41 Collected from the Israel National Defense College Alumni Association (INDCAA) database. See https://www.amutatmabal.org.il/?CategoryID=161 (accessed May 9, 2022).42 On the “special relationship” as a national security asset, see: Charles D. Freilich, “Can Israel Survive Without America?” Survival 59, no. 4 (August–September 2017), 135–50.43 The current CMC recently addressed this kind of complex learning in a short speech he gave during a reception in honor of the academic journal “Society, Military and National Security” (in Hebrew). A recording of the comments is available online https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qNWlQtJ3g0g&t=375s, (accessed June 1, 2022)44 Interview with authors, May 12, 2022.45 Ibid.46 Yaacov Amidror, Introduction to National Security (Ben Shemen: Modan and Ministry of Defense, 2002), 9–10.47 On the broad societal dimensions of Israeli national security, see Charles D. Freilich, Israeli National Security: A New Strategy for an Era of Change (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), chap. 5. On the connection between Israel’s multiethnic society and national security, see for example Sammy Smooha, “Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution: National Security and the Arab Minority,” in National Security and Democracy in Israel, edited by Avner Yaniv (Boulder: Lynn Rienner, 1993), 105–27.48 Yizhak Rabin, Israeli Parliament Minutes, July 13, 1992 (in Hebrew).49 The report remains classified but some of its content can be found in Dan Meridor and Ron Eldadi, Israel’s National Security Doctrine: The Report of the Committee on the Formulation of the National Security Doctrine (Meridor Committee), Ten Years Later (Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, 2019).50 Ze’ev Schiff, “Top Secret Report: Iran Could Tempt Other Mideast States to Go Nuclear,” Ha’aretz, April 24, 2006. Shaul Mofaz, My Israeli Journey (Tel-Aviv: Yediot Books, 2022), 350–1.51 Office of the Chief of the General Staff, IDF Strategy (August 2015) (in Hebrew). https://www.idf.il/media/cdqpafku/%D7%90%D7%A1%D7%98%D7%A8%D7%98%D7%92%D7%99%D7%99%D7%AA-%D7%A6%D7%94%D7%9C.pdf. The English translation is available online at: https://www.inss.org.il/he/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2017/04/IDF-Strategy.pdf (accessed September 26, 2023).52 Ben Caspit, “Eisenkot Diaries,” Maariv, January 21, 2022. [in Hebrew]. https://www.maariv.co.il/news/military/Article-892274 (accessed February 12, 2022).53 Office of the Chief of the General Staff, IDF Strategy (April 2018) (in Hebrew). https://www.idf.il/%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%95%D7%A2%D7%93%D7%9B%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%90%D7%95%D7%93%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%90%D7%A1%D7%98%D7%A8%D7%98%D7%92%D7%99%D7%99%D7%AA-%D7%A6%D7%94-%D7%9C/ (accessed September 26, 2023).54 IDF strategy, 2015; IDF Strategy 2018, Ibid. For the English version, see https://www.belfercenter.org/israel-defense-forces-strategy-document#!chapter-i (accessed September 26, 2023).55 Amir Oren, “Israeli Army Chief Eisenkot: Iran Isn’t the Main Threat to Israel,” Ha’aretz, August 15, 2015.56 Yaacov Amidror, Introduction to National Security (Ben Shemen: Modan and Ministry of Defense, 2002), 10.57 See for example: Janine Davidson, Lifting the Fog of Peace: How Americans Learned to Fight Modern War (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2010), chap. 3.58 U.S. Department of Defense, Committee on Excellence in Education. The Senior Services Colleges: Conclusions and Initiatives (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), 18.59 Marmaduke G. Bayne, “The National Defense University–A Strategic Asset,” Strategic Review 4 (Fall 1976), 28.60 Interview with authors, August 17, 2021.61 NDU, “Padilla Becomes 15th President of National Defense University,” November 19, 2014. https://www.ndu.edu/News/Article-View/Article/572648/padilla-becomes-15th-president-of-national-defense-university/ (accessed August 18, 2022).62 Federal Register, The United States Government Manual, 1984/85 (Washington, DC: General Services Administration, 1984), 234.63 National Defense University, Vision and Mission. https://www.ndu.edu/About/Vision-Mission/ (accessed October 10, 2021).64 Emphasis added. See National Defense University, Vision and Mission. https://www.ndu.edu/About/Vision-Mission/ (accessed October 30, 2021).65 Change announced in FY 2015 and implemented in FY 2017.66 “Joint Force Development,” https://www.jcs.mil/Directorates/J7-Joint-Force-Development/ (accessed August 18, 2021). JPME is a subset of PME that reflects a focus on interservice and interagency jointness and collaboration.67 JCS, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015 (June 2015), 14. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/2015_National_Military_Strategy.pdf (accessed August 18, 2021)68 H.R.3622—Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Sec. 603.69 10 U.S. Code § 153. See also JCS, Joint Planning, December 1, 2020, II-1. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp5_0.pdf (accessed August 19, 2021).70 Aaron Mehta, “The Pentagon’s National Military Strategy Is Done, and It’s Unclear If the Public Will Ever See It,” Defense News, February 13, 2019. https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2019/02/13/the-pentagons-national-military-strategy-is-done-and-its-unclear-if-the-public-will-ever-see-it/ (accessed August 21, 2021).71 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, Officer Professional Military Education Policy (May 2015), E-D-1. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/Instructions/1800_01a.pdf (accessed April 22, 2020).72 Joint Staff, National Defense University Policy, 2.73 Ibid., D-B-2.74 Department of Defense, 2018 National Defense Strategy (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018), 8.75 CJCS, “Officer Joint Professional Military Education Policy,” December 1, 2018. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/education/jf2030/cjcsi_1800_01_opmep.pdf?ver=2018-11-30-094145-917 (accessed September 1, 2021).76 David Stegon, “New National Defense University president Assumes Command,” FedScoop, July 12, 2012. https://www.fedscoop.com/new-national-defense-university-president-assumes-command/ (accessed August 27, 2021).77 Gregg F. Martin and John W. Yaeger, ““Break Out”: A Plan for Better Equipping the Nation’s Future Strategic Leaders,” Joint Foreces Quarterly 73 (2014), 39–43.78 Office of the Provost, “Policy Guidance for AY 2020-2021 Curriculum,” February 6, 2020, p. 2. https://www.ndu.edu/Portals/59/Documents/BOV_Documents/2020/NDU%20Provost%20Memo%20For%20Deans%20of%20Faculty%20Feb%206%202020.pdf?ver=2020-05-11-110745-077 (accessed September 2, 2021).79 CJCS, “Special Areas of Emphasis for Joint Professional Military Education in Academic Years 2020 and 2021,” May 6, 2019. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/education/jpme_sae_2020_2021.pdf (accessed August 17, 2021).80 Office of the Provost, “Policy Guidance for AY 2020–2021 Curriculum,” February 6, 2020, p. 1.81 National Defense University, Electives Program Catalog (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2014–2015, 2016–2017, 2020–2021, 2021–2022).82 Office of the Provost, “Policy Guidance for AY 2020–2021 Curriculum,” February 6, 2020, p. 3.83 National Defense University, Joint Education Transformation Initiative (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2014), 3.84 Office of the Provost, “Policy Guidance for AY 2020–2021 Curriculum,” February 6, 2020, p. 3.85 On the contribution of interagency to national security in general and operations in particular, see: Joint Staff J7, Interorganizational Cooperation (Suffolk, VA: Deployable Training Division, April 2018).86 Joint Staff, National Defense University Policy, A-7.87 National Defense University, Annual Report for Academic Year 2016-2017 (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2017), 27, 34, 44, 51, 57. National Defense University, Annual Report for Academic Year 2012–2013, 6.88 Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work, “National Defense University Convocation,” August 5, 2014. https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Article/605598/national-defense-university-convocation/ (accessed September 22, 2021).89 JCS, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2018, 3. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/UNCLASS_2018_National_Military_Strategy_Description.pdf (accessed September 21, 2021).90 Thomas A. Keany, “The War Colleges and Joint Education in the United States,” in Military Education, edited by Kennedy and Neilson, 161.91 Kate Exley and Reg Dennick, Small Group Teaching: Tutorials, Seminars and Beyond (London: RoutledgeFalmer, 2004), 3.92 JCS, Developing Today's Joint Officers for Tomorrow's Ways of War (May 2020), 6. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/education/jcs_pme_tm_vision.pdf?ver=2020-05-15-102429-817 (accessed November 1, 2021).93 Email correspondence with authors, October 19, 2021.94 Interview with authors, October 18, 2021.95 National Defense University, Annual Report for Academic Year 2016-2017, 18.96 See the data in the various annual reports released by the NDU. https://www.ndu.edu/About/Institutional-Data/ (accesses September 27, 2021)97 John T. Fishel, American National Security Policy: Authorities, Institutions, and Cases (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017).98 Charles D. Freilich, Zion's Dilemmas: How Israel Makes National Security Policy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012), 3.99 Yaakov Amidror, “Israel’s National Security Doctrine,” July 18, 2021. https://jiss.org.il/en/amidror-israels-national-security-doctrine/ (accessed May 12, 2022).Additional informationNotes on contributorsAnat SternDr. Anat Stern (anatstern1@gmail.com) is a teaching faculty member at Department of History, Philosophy and Judaic Studies, The Open University of Israel’s. She specializes in IDF legal and military history. Her research interests and teaching focus on military history, national security and civil-military relations in Israel. Between the years 2012–2020, Dr. Stern served as an Academic Adviser and Head of Research at the Israel National Defense College and the IDF Command and Staff College. She was also a Visiting Mosse Professor at the University of Wisconsin-Madison history department (2012). Her recently published book titled Combatants on Trial: Military Jurisdiction in Israel during the 1948 War (Hebrew), is the winner of the Yad Ben Zvi—Ish-Shalom best first book in Israel Studies and was awarded an honorable distinction for best book in Israel Studies by the Association of Israel Studies (2021).Illai Z. SaltzmanDr. Ilai Z. Saltzman (saltzman@umd.edu) is the Director of the Gildenrhon Institute for Israel Studies at the University of Maryland at Collge Park. His scholarship and teaching focus on international security, Israeli foreign and security policy, US foreign policy, and political psychology. Dr. Saltzman is the author of Securitizing Balance of Power Theory: A Polymorphic Reconceptualization (2012). He is also the author of numerous scholarly articles and book chapters, and of commentaries in the Los Angeles Times, Ha’aretz, The Jerusalem Post, and other prominent outlets. Dr. Saltzman earned his Ph.D. in International Relations in 2010 from the University of Haifa, and was a postdoctoral research fellow at the International Security Program (ISP), Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (2009–2010).","PeriodicalId":35161,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Strategy","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Comparative Strategy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2023.2263337","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"Social Sciences","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Abstract

AbstractThe national security realm poses great challenges to senior military officers and civilian officials. These leaders oftentimes attend designated Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) institutions as a prerequisite for their futrue appointments. The article examines how these colleges and universities instill in their graduates the intellectual capacity to effectively engage and solve macro-level and acute strategic challenges as well as employ critical thinking skills to ensure intellectual agility and flexibility. The article compares the Israel National Defense College (INDC) and the National Defense University (NDU) to identify the differences and similarities between the two institutions and explain what it says about the Israeli and the American strategic culture and approach to the future of national security. Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Barış Seçkin, “Cohesion of NATO Reinforced by Russian President,” Anadolu Agency, March 4, 2022. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/russia-ukraine-crisis/cohesion-of-nato-reinforced-by-russian-president-defense-college-commandant/2524426 (accessed March 6, 2022).2 “Given their gravity, Henry Kissinger Had jointly addressed the two consequential events,” in Crisis: The Anatomy of Two Major Foreign Policy Crises (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2003).3 Carl von Clausewitz (ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret), On War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 146.4 John B. Hattendorf, “The Conundrum of Military Education in Historical Perspective,” in Military Education: Past, Present, and Future, edited by Gregory C. Kennedy, Greg Kennedy, and Keith Neilson (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 7.5 John Wesley Masland and Laurence I. Radway, Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education and National Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), 50.6 Martin Dempsey, Joint Education: White Paper (July 2012), 4. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/concepts/cjcs_wp_education.pdf?ver=2017-12-28-162044-527 (accessed April 18, 2020).7 Joan Johnson-Freese, Educating America's Military (London: Routledge, 2013), 2–3.8 We define “senior military officers” as Lt. Col. and above as well as their civilian equivalents.9 Correlli Barnett, “The Education of Military Elites,” Journal of Contemporary History 2, no. 3 (July 1967): 28.10 Karen Guttieri, “Professional Military Education in Democracies,” in Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations, edited by Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), 244.11 Royal College of Defence Studies, https://www.da.mod.uk/colleges-and-schools/royal-college-of-defence-studies/ (accessed August 5, 2021).12 Victoria Syme-Taylor and Duraid Jalili, “Professional Military Education,” in Routledge Handbook of Defence Studies, edited by David J. Galbreath and John R. Deni (London: Routledge, 2018), 98.13 Joan Johnson-Freese, Educating America's Military (London: Routledge, 2013), 90.14 Howard J.Wiarda, A Clash of Cultures: Military Brass vs. Civilian Academics at the National War College (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2011), 42.15 See for example Wiarda, A Clash of Cultures, chap. 7.16 Quoted in Brian J. Doyle, Integrating Critical Thinking in the Curriculum of the Command and General Staff College (Unpublished Master’s Thesis: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2008), 51–2.17 The classification of retired military officers that now work as civilian instructors is not without criticism given they tend to lack terminal degrees or experience teaching in univerities or colleges outside the military. See for example Jennifer Mittelstadt, “Too Much War, Not Enough College,” War Room, June 20, 2018. https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/too-much-war-not-enough-college/ (accessed March 5, 2023).18 Florina C. Matei, “NATO, the Demand for Democratic Control, and Military Effectiveness, Romania,” in The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations, edited by Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina C. Matei (London: Routledge, 2013), 326.19 Authors’ email correspondence with the New Zealand Command and Staff College, April 21, 2020.20 On origins and evolution of the INDC, see Shlomit Keren, “The National Defense College in Historical Perspective,” National Defense Studies 1 (2001): 129–63 (in Hebrew).21 This criticism appeared in the report that was prepared prior to the reopening of the College in 1976. See Keren “The National Defense College in Historical Perspective,” 146–7.22 “The National Defense College Reopened,” Maariv, September 2, 1977 (in Hebrew).23 Keren, “The National Defense College in Historical Perspective,” 156–60.24 Interview with Professor Gabriel Ben-Dor and Professor Arnon Sofer, August 11, 2021.25 Yosi Peled, Soldier (Tel-Aviv: Ma’ariv, 1993), 247. (in Hebrew)26 Interview with Professor Gabriel Ben-Dor and Professor Arnon Sofer, August 11, 2021.27 See for example Zeev Schiff, Ehud Yaari, Israel's Lebanon War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984).28 The intensity of the military component of the program only allowed students to earn half of the academic credits needed but they were allowed to complete their studies at any Israeli university after their graduation.29 Doron Rubin, My Own Way On (Hevel Modi’in: Kinneret, Zmora Bitan, 2018), 133–7; Peled, Soldier, 273.30 Moshe Shamir, “The Barak Program for Field Commanders from Early Beginnings until Today,” in 50 Years Jubilee to the IDF Command and General Staff College, edited by Hagai Golan (Tel-Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 2004), 26–8 (in Hebrew); Zeev Drory, Dan Shomron—Subtle Leadership (Rishon Le’Zion, Yediot Achronot, 2016), 323–32; Authors interview with Prof. Arnon Sofer, August 11, 2021.31 Keren, “The National Defense College in Historical Perspective”; Martin Van Creveld, The Sword and the Olive: A Critical History of the Israeli Defense Force (New York : Public Affairs, 1998), 251. Authors’ interview with Gabriel Ben-Dor, August 11th, 2021.32 Amir Rapaport, “There Is Room for Concern,” Israel Defense, September 12, 2013 (in Hebrew).33 Gershon Hacohen, “The Curriculum in the Israel National Defense College: What Should Be Studied?” Journal of National Security 14 (September 2011), 14–15 (in Hebrew).34 Sofer served in various positions at the INDC, including leading the study tours program, and head of the research division for several years. See Arnon Sofer, The Privilege and Attempt to Influence in Tempestuous Times (Haifa: Heiken Geostrategy Cathedra, 2017), 103–4. (in Hebrew)35 Arnon Sofer, “INDC Program: What Should Be Learned? An Answer to Maj .Gen. Hacohen,” Journal of National Security, no. 18 (September 2012): 5–20.36 Yossi Baidatz, “Strategy as a learning Process: An Israeli Case Study for the New Administration,” Markaz, Brooking Institute, November 29, 2016 available online at https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/11/29/strategy-as-a-learning-process-an-israeli-case-study-for-the-new-administration/ (Accesses March 5, 2023)37 Yossi Baidatz, “Thoughts about Learning in National Security,” Israel National Security Doctrine in honor of 25 years of security programming at Haifa University" May 21st, 2013. (in Hebrew)38 “Goals of the INDC”, INDC Handbook, No. 43–No. 47 (2015–2020).39 INDC, Call for Applications, January 11, 2023. (in Hebrew) Available online: https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/reports/national-security-college-course-na/he/national-security-college-course-na.pdf (accessed September 26, 2023).40 “Goals of the INDC”, INDC Handbook No. 47 (2020).41 Collected from the Israel National Defense College Alumni Association (INDCAA) database. See https://www.amutatmabal.org.il/?CategoryID=161 (accessed May 9, 2022).42 On the “special relationship” as a national security asset, see: Charles D. Freilich, “Can Israel Survive Without America?” Survival 59, no. 4 (August–September 2017), 135–50.43 The current CMC recently addressed this kind of complex learning in a short speech he gave during a reception in honor of the academic journal “Society, Military and National Security” (in Hebrew). A recording of the comments is available online https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qNWlQtJ3g0g&t=375s, (accessed June 1, 2022)44 Interview with authors, May 12, 2022.45 Ibid.46 Yaacov Amidror, Introduction to National Security (Ben Shemen: Modan and Ministry of Defense, 2002), 9–10.47 On the broad societal dimensions of Israeli national security, see Charles D. Freilich, Israeli National Security: A New Strategy for an Era of Change (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), chap. 5. On the connection between Israel’s multiethnic society and national security, see for example Sammy Smooha, “Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution: National Security and the Arab Minority,” in National Security and Democracy in Israel, edited by Avner Yaniv (Boulder: Lynn Rienner, 1993), 105–27.48 Yizhak Rabin, Israeli Parliament Minutes, July 13, 1992 (in Hebrew).49 The report remains classified but some of its content can be found in Dan Meridor and Ron Eldadi, Israel’s National Security Doctrine: The Report of the Committee on the Formulation of the National Security Doctrine (Meridor Committee), Ten Years Later (Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, 2019).50 Ze’ev Schiff, “Top Secret Report: Iran Could Tempt Other Mideast States to Go Nuclear,” Ha’aretz, April 24, 2006. Shaul Mofaz, My Israeli Journey (Tel-Aviv: Yediot Books, 2022), 350–1.51 Office of the Chief of the General Staff, IDF Strategy (August 2015) (in Hebrew). https://www.idf.il/media/cdqpafku/%D7%90%D7%A1%D7%98%D7%A8%D7%98%D7%92%D7%99%D7%99%D7%AA-%D7%A6%D7%94%D7%9C.pdf. The English translation is available online at: https://www.inss.org.il/he/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2017/04/IDF-Strategy.pdf (accessed September 26, 2023).52 Ben Caspit, “Eisenkot Diaries,” Maariv, January 21, 2022. [in Hebrew]. https://www.maariv.co.il/news/military/Article-892274 (accessed February 12, 2022).53 Office of the Chief of the General Staff, IDF Strategy (April 2018) (in Hebrew). https://www.idf.il/%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%95%D7%A2%D7%93%D7%9B%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%90%D7%95%D7%93%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%90%D7%A1%D7%98%D7%A8%D7%98%D7%92%D7%99%D7%99%D7%AA-%D7%A6%D7%94-%D7%9C/ (accessed September 26, 2023).54 IDF strategy, 2015; IDF Strategy 2018, Ibid. For the English version, see https://www.belfercenter.org/israel-defense-forces-strategy-document#!chapter-i (accessed September 26, 2023).55 Amir Oren, “Israeli Army Chief Eisenkot: Iran Isn’t the Main Threat to Israel,” Ha’aretz, August 15, 2015.56 Yaacov Amidror, Introduction to National Security (Ben Shemen: Modan and Ministry of Defense, 2002), 10.57 See for example: Janine Davidson, Lifting the Fog of Peace: How Americans Learned to Fight Modern War (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2010), chap. 3.58 U.S. Department of Defense, Committee on Excellence in Education. The Senior Services Colleges: Conclusions and Initiatives (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), 18.59 Marmaduke G. Bayne, “The National Defense University–A Strategic Asset,” Strategic Review 4 (Fall 1976), 28.60 Interview with authors, August 17, 2021.61 NDU, “Padilla Becomes 15th President of National Defense University,” November 19, 2014. https://www.ndu.edu/News/Article-View/Article/572648/padilla-becomes-15th-president-of-national-defense-university/ (accessed August 18, 2022).62 Federal Register, The United States Government Manual, 1984/85 (Washington, DC: General Services Administration, 1984), 234.63 National Defense University, Vision and Mission. https://www.ndu.edu/About/Vision-Mission/ (accessed October 10, 2021).64 Emphasis added. See National Defense University, Vision and Mission. https://www.ndu.edu/About/Vision-Mission/ (accessed October 30, 2021).65 Change announced in FY 2015 and implemented in FY 2017.66 “Joint Force Development,” https://www.jcs.mil/Directorates/J7-Joint-Force-Development/ (accessed August 18, 2021). JPME is a subset of PME that reflects a focus on interservice and interagency jointness and collaboration.67 JCS, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015 (June 2015), 14. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/2015_National_Military_Strategy.pdf (accessed August 18, 2021)68 H.R.3622—Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Sec. 603.69 10 U.S. Code § 153. See also JCS, Joint Planning, December 1, 2020, II-1. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp5_0.pdf (accessed August 19, 2021).70 Aaron Mehta, “The Pentagon’s National Military Strategy Is Done, and It’s Unclear If the Public Will Ever See It,” Defense News, February 13, 2019. https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2019/02/13/the-pentagons-national-military-strategy-is-done-and-its-unclear-if-the-public-will-ever-see-it/ (accessed August 21, 2021).71 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, Officer Professional Military Education Policy (May 2015), E-D-1. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/Instructions/1800_01a.pdf (accessed April 22, 2020).72 Joint Staff, National Defense University Policy, 2.73 Ibid., D-B-2.74 Department of Defense, 2018 National Defense Strategy (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018), 8.75 CJCS, “Officer Joint Professional Military Education Policy,” December 1, 2018. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/education/jf2030/cjcsi_1800_01_opmep.pdf?ver=2018-11-30-094145-917 (accessed September 1, 2021).76 David Stegon, “New National Defense University president Assumes Command,” FedScoop, July 12, 2012. https://www.fedscoop.com/new-national-defense-university-president-assumes-command/ (accessed August 27, 2021).77 Gregg F. Martin and John W. Yaeger, ““Break Out”: A Plan for Better Equipping the Nation’s Future Strategic Leaders,” Joint Foreces Quarterly 73 (2014), 39–43.78 Office of the Provost, “Policy Guidance for AY 2020-2021 Curriculum,” February 6, 2020, p. 2. https://www.ndu.edu/Portals/59/Documents/BOV_Documents/2020/NDU%20Provost%20Memo%20For%20Deans%20of%20Faculty%20Feb%206%202020.pdf?ver=2020-05-11-110745-077 (accessed September 2, 2021).79 CJCS, “Special Areas of Emphasis for Joint Professional Military Education in Academic Years 2020 and 2021,” May 6, 2019. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/education/jpme_sae_2020_2021.pdf (accessed August 17, 2021).80 Office of the Provost, “Policy Guidance for AY 2020–2021 Curriculum,” February 6, 2020, p. 1.81 National Defense University, Electives Program Catalog (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2014–2015, 2016–2017, 2020–2021, 2021–2022).82 Office of the Provost, “Policy Guidance for AY 2020–2021 Curriculum,” February 6, 2020, p. 3.83 National Defense University, Joint Education Transformation Initiative (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2014), 3.84 Office of the Provost, “Policy Guidance for AY 2020–2021 Curriculum,” February 6, 2020, p. 3.85 On the contribution of interagency to national security in general and operations in particular, see: Joint Staff J7, Interorganizational Cooperation (Suffolk, VA: Deployable Training Division, April 2018).86 Joint Staff, National Defense University Policy, A-7.87 National Defense University, Annual Report for Academic Year 2016-2017 (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2017), 27, 34, 44, 51, 57. National Defense University, Annual Report for Academic Year 2012–2013, 6.88 Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work, “National Defense University Convocation,” August 5, 2014. https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Article/605598/national-defense-university-convocation/ (accessed September 22, 2021).89 JCS, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2018, 3. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/UNCLASS_2018_National_Military_Strategy_Description.pdf (accessed September 21, 2021).90 Thomas A. Keany, “The War Colleges and Joint Education in the United States,” in Military Education, edited by Kennedy and Neilson, 161.91 Kate Exley and Reg Dennick, Small Group Teaching: Tutorials, Seminars and Beyond (London: RoutledgeFalmer, 2004), 3.92 JCS, Developing Today's Joint Officers for Tomorrow's Ways of War (May 2020), 6. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/education/jcs_pme_tm_vision.pdf?ver=2020-05-15-102429-817 (accessed November 1, 2021).93 Email correspondence with authors, October 19, 2021.94 Interview with authors, October 18, 2021.95 National Defense University, Annual Report for Academic Year 2016-2017, 18.96 See the data in the various annual reports released by the NDU. https://www.ndu.edu/About/Institutional-Data/ (accesses September 27, 2021)97 John T. Fishel, American National Security Policy: Authorities, Institutions, and Cases (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017).98 Charles D. Freilich, Zion's Dilemmas: How Israel Makes National Security Policy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012), 3.99 Yaakov Amidror, “Israel’s National Security Doctrine,” July 18, 2021. https://jiss.org.il/en/amidror-israels-national-security-doctrine/ (accessed May 12, 2022).Additional informationNotes on contributorsAnat SternDr. Anat Stern (anatstern1@gmail.com) is a teaching faculty member at Department of History, Philosophy and Judaic Studies, The Open University of Israel’s. She specializes in IDF legal and military history. Her research interests and teaching focus on military history, national security and civil-military relations in Israel. Between the years 2012–2020, Dr. Stern served as an Academic Adviser and Head of Research at the Israel National Defense College and the IDF Command and Staff College. She was also a Visiting Mosse Professor at the University of Wisconsin-Madison history department (2012). Her recently published book titled Combatants on Trial: Military Jurisdiction in Israel during the 1948 War (Hebrew), is the winner of the Yad Ben Zvi—Ish-Shalom best first book in Israel Studies and was awarded an honorable distinction for best book in Israel Studies by the Association of Israel Studies (2021).Illai Z. SaltzmanDr. Ilai Z. Saltzman (saltzman@umd.edu) is the Director of the Gildenrhon Institute for Israel Studies at the University of Maryland at Collge Park. His scholarship and teaching focus on international security, Israeli foreign and security policy, US foreign policy, and political psychology. Dr. Saltzman is the author of Securitizing Balance of Power Theory: A Polymorphic Reconceptualization (2012). He is also the author of numerous scholarly articles and book chapters, and of commentaries in the Los Angeles Times, Ha’aretz, The Jerusalem Post, and other prominent outlets. Dr. Saltzman earned his Ph.D. in International Relations in 2010 from the University of Haifa, and was a postdoctoral research fellow at the International Security Program (ISP), Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (2009–2010).

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课堂上将:以色列和美国联合专业国家安全教育

摘要国家安全领域对高级军官和文职官员提出了巨大的挑战。这些领导人经常参加指定的联合专业军事教育(JPME)机构，作为他们未来任命的先决条件。本文考察了这些高校如何向毕业生灌输有效参与和解决宏观层面和尖锐战略挑战的智力能力，以及如何运用批判性思维技能来确保智力的敏捷性和灵活性。本文对以色列国防学院(INDC)和国防大学(NDU)进行了比较，以确定这两个机构之间的异同，并解释了以色列和美国的战略文化以及对未来国家安全的态度。披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。注1 Barış sekin，“俄罗斯总统加强北约凝聚力”，阿纳多卢通讯社，2022年3月4日。https://www.aa.com.tr/en/russia-ukraine-crisis/cohesion-of-nato-reinforced-by-russian-president-defense-college-commandant/2524426(2022年3月6日访问《危机:剖析两大外交政策危机》(纽约:西蒙和舒斯特出版社，2003年)卡尔·冯·克劳塞维茨(编译)迈克尔·霍华德和彼得·帕雷特)，《战争论》(普林斯顿:普林斯顿大学出版社，1976年)，146.4约翰·海登多夫，《历史视角下的军事教育难题》，《军事教育:过去、现在和未来》，由格雷戈里·c·肯尼迪、格雷格·肯尼迪和基思·尼尔森编辑(西港，康涅狄格州:普雷格出版社，2002年)，7.5约翰·韦斯利·马斯兰德和劳伦斯·i·拉德韦，《士兵和学者:军事教育和国家政策》(普林斯顿，新泽西州)。马丁·邓普西:《联合教育:白皮书》(2012年7月)，第4页。https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/concepts/cjcs_wp_education.pdf?ver=2017-12-28-162044-527(2020年4月18日访问)Joan Johnson-Freese，《美国军事教育》(伦敦:Routledge出版社，2013)，第2-3.8页。我们将“高级军官”定义为中校及以上级别，以及同等级别的文职人员Correlli Barnett，“军事精英的教育”，《当代史杂志》第2期。3(1967年7月):28.10 Karen Guttieri，“民主国家的专业军事教育”，出自Thomas C. Bruneau和Scott D. Tollefson编辑的《谁守护守护者以及如何守护:民主军民关系》(奥斯汀:德克萨斯大学出版社，2006年)，244.11皇家国防研究学院，https://www.da.mod.uk/colleges-and-schools/royal-college-of-defence-studies/(访问日期:2021年8月5日)Victoria Syme-Taylor和Duraid Jalili，“专业军事教育”，《劳特利奇国防研究手册》，由David J. Galbreath和John R. Deni编辑(伦敦:劳特利奇出版社，2018)，98.13 Joan Johnson-Freese，《美国军事教育》(伦敦:劳特利奇出版社，2013)，90.14 Howard J. wiarda，《文化冲突:国家战争学院的军事Brass vs.平民学者》(马里兰州兰厄姆)。参见Wiarda, A Clash of Cultures，第7.16章，引自Brian J. Doyle，《将批判性思维融入指挥与参谋学院课程》(未发表的硕士论文:美国陆军指挥与总参谋部学院，2008)，51-2.17鉴于他们往往缺乏最终学位或在军队以外的大学或学院教学的经验，现在担任文职教官的退休军官的分类并非没有批评。参见Jennifer Mittelstadt，“太多战争，没有足够的大学”，《作战室》，2018年6月20日。https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/too-much-war-not-enough-college/(2023年3月5日访问)弗洛里纳·c·马泰，“北约，对民主控制的需求和军事效能，罗马尼亚”，见托马斯·c·布鲁诺和弗洛里纳·c·马泰主编的《劳特利奇军民关系手册》(伦敦:劳特利奇出版社，2013年)，326.19作者与新西兰指挥与参谋学院的电子邮件通信，2020年4月21日。129-63(希伯来语这一批评出现在1976年学院重新开放之前编写的报告中。见Keren“历史视角下的国防学院”146-7.22“国防学院重新开放”，Maariv, 1977年9月2日(希伯来文)Keren，“历史视角下的国防学院”，156-60.24对Gabriel Ben-Dor教授和Arnon Sofer教授的采访，2021.8月11日。(希伯来语)26采访教授加布里埃尔本多和教授阿农Sofer, 2021年8月11日。 28 .参见Zeev Schiff, Ehud Yaari，以色列的黎巴嫩战争(纽约:Simon and Schuster, 1984)该方案的军事部分的强度只允许学生获得所需学分的一半，但他们被允许在毕业后在任何以色列大学完成学业多伦·鲁宾，《我自己的路》(Hevel Modi 'in: Kinneret, Zmora Bitan, 2018)， 133-7;Moshe Shamir，“从早期开始到今天的战地指挥官巴拉克计划”，以色列国防军指挥和总参谋部学院50周年庆典，Hagai Golan编辑(特拉维夫:国防部，2004年)，第26-8页(希伯来语);Zeev Drory, Dan Shomron-Subtle Leadership (Rishon Le’zion, Yediot Achronot, 2016)， 323-32;作者专访Arnon Sofer教授，2012.1年8月11日《剑与橄榄:以色列国防军的批判史》(纽约:公共事务出版社，1998)，第251页。33 .作者对Gabriel Ben-Dor的采访，2021.8月11日。Amir Rapaport，“有关注的空间”，以色列国防，2013年9月12日(希伯来文)Gershon Hacohen，《以色列国防学院的课程设置:应该研究什么?》国家安全杂志(2011年9月)，14 - 15(希伯来文).34Sofer曾在国家自主研发中心担任多个职位，包括领导游学项目，并担任研究部门负责人数年。参见阿农·索弗:《动荡时代的特权与影响力尝试》(海法:海肯地缘战略博物馆，2017)，第103-4页。(希伯来文)35阿农·索弗，《国家自主贡献计划:我们应该学习什么?》对奥巴马少将的回答。哈科恩，《国家安全杂志》，第2期。Yossi Baidatz，“作为学习过程的战略:37 Yossi Baidatz，《关于国家安全学习的思考》，《以色列国家安全理论——纪念海法大学25年的安全规划》，2013年5月21日。(希伯来文)38《国家自主贡献的目标》，《国家自主贡献手册》，第43 - 43号。47(2015 - 2020)点国家自主研发中心，2023年1月11日开放申请。(希伯来文)可在线获取:https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/reports/national-security-college-course-na/he/national-security-college-course-na.pdf(2023年9月26日访问)《国家自主贡献目标》，《国家自主贡献手册》第47期(2020)来自以色列国防学院校友会(INDCAA)数据库。参见https://www.amutatmabal.org.il/?CategoryID=161(访问日期为2022年5月9日)关于作为国家安全资产的“特殊关系”，参见:查尔斯·d·弗雷里奇的《以色列能在没有美国的情况下生存吗?》生存59号，不。最近，现任中央军委在《社会、军事与国家安全》学术期刊的招待会上发表了简短的讲话，谈到了这种复杂的学习。44对作者的采访，2022.5月12日同上46 Yaacov Amidror，《国家安全概论》(Ben Shemen: Modan and Ministry of Defense, 2002)， 9-10.47关于以色列国家安全的广泛社会维度，见Charles D. Freilich，《以色列国家安全:变革时代的新战略》(牛津:牛津大学出版社，2018)，第5章。关于以色列多民族社会与国家安全之间的关系，参见萨米·斯穆哈，“部分问题或部分解决方案:国家安全和阿拉伯少数民族”，载于阿夫纳·亚尼夫编辑的《以色列国家安全和民主》(博尔德:林恩·里纳出版社，1993年)，105-27.48该报告仍然是保密的，但其部分内容可以在丹·梅里多尔和罗恩·埃尔达迪的《以色列的国家安全主义:国家安全主义制定委员会(梅里多尔委员会)的报告》中找到，十年后(特拉维夫:国家安全研究所，2019)Ze 'ev Schiff，“绝密报告:伊朗可能诱使其他中东国家发展核武”，《国土报》，2006年4月24日。Shaul Mofaz，我的以色列之旅(特拉维夫:Yediot Books, 2022)， 350-1.51，总参谋长办公室，以色列国防军战略(2015年8月)(希伯来文)。https://www.idf.il/media/cdqpafku/%D7%90%D7%A1%D7%98%D7%A8%D7%98%D7%92%D7%99%D7%99%D7%AA-%D7%A6%D7%94%D7%9C.pdf。英文译本可在网上查阅:https://www.inss.org.il/he/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2017/04/IDF-Strategy.pdf(2023年9月26日访问)Ben Caspit，“Eisenkot日记”，marariv, 2022年1月21日。(希伯来)。https://www.maariv.co。 53 . il/news/military/Article-892274(于2022年2月12日访问)总参谋长办公室，以色列国防军战略(2018年4月)(希伯来文)。访问https://www.idf.il/%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%95%D7%A2%D7%93%D7%9B%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%90%D7%95%D7%93%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%90%D7%A1%D7%98%D7%A8%D7%98%D7%92%D7%99%D7%99%D7%AA-%D7%A6%D7%94-%D7%9C/(2023年9月26日)点国防军战略，2015年;《IDF战略2018》，同上，英文版见https://www.belfercenter.org/israel-defense-forces-strategy-document#!55 .第一章(2023年9月26日查阅)Yaacov Amidror，《国家安全导论》(Ben Shemen: Modan and Ministry of Defense, 2002)， 10.57参见:Janine Davidson，《解除和平的迷雾:美国人如何学会打现代战争》(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2010)，第3.58章，美国国防部，卓越教育委员会。高级服务学院:结论和倡议(华盛顿特区:美国政府印刷局，1975年)，18.59 Marmaduke G. Bayne，“国防大学-战略资产”，战略评论4(1976年秋季)，28.60对作者的采访，2021.61 NDU，“帕迪拉成为国防大学第15任校长”，2014年11月19日。https://www.ndu.edu/News/Article-View/Article/572648/padilla-becomes-15th-president-of-national-defense-university/(访问日期:2022年8月18日)《联邦公报》，《美国政府手册》，1984/85(华盛顿特区:总务管理局，1984)，234.63国防大学，《愿景与使命》。64 . https://www.ndu.edu/About/Vision-Mission/(2021年10月10日访问)重点补充道。见国防大学，愿景与使命。65 . https://www.ndu.edu/About/Vision-Mission/(2021年10月30日访问)变更于2015财年公布，并于2017.66财年实施，“联合部队发展”https://www.jcs.mil/Directorates/J7-Joint-Force-Development/(于2021年8月18日访问)。JPME是PME的一个子集，反映了对服务间和机构间联合和协作的关注JCS，《2015年美国国家军事战略》(2015年6月)，第14页。https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/2015_National_Military_Strategy.pdf(于2021年8月18日查阅)68 H.R.3622-Goldwater-Nichols《1986年国防部重组法案》，第603.69节，美国法典第153节。另见JCS，联合规划，2020年12月1日，II-1。https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp5_0.pdf(2021年8月19日访问)Aaron Mehta，“五角大楼的国家军事战略已经完成，目前还不清楚公众是否会看到它”，国防新闻，2019年2月13日。https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2019/02/13/the-pentagons-national-military-strategy-is-done-and-its-unclear-if-the-public-will-ever-see-it/(2021年8月21日访问)参谋长联席会议主席指令，军官专业军事教育政策(2015年5月)，E-D-1。https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/Instructions/1800_01a.pdf(2020年4月22日访问)联合参谋，国防大学政策，2.73同上，D-B-2.74国防部，2018年国防战略(华盛顿特区:国防部，2018年)，8.75 CJCS，“军官联合专业军事教育政策”，2018年12月1日。https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/education/jf2030/cjcsi_1800_01_opmep.pdf?ver=2018-11-30-094145-917(访问日期:2021年9月1日)David Stegon，“新任国防大学校长上任”，FedScoop, 2012年7月12日。77 . https://www.fedscoop.com/new-national-defense-university-president-assumes-command/(2021年8月27日访问)Gregg F. Martin和John W. Yaeger，““爆发”:更好地装备国家未来战略领导者的计划”，联合部队季刊73(2014)，39-43.78教务长办公室，“AY 2020-2021课程的政策指导”，2020年2月6日，第2页。https://www.ndu.edu/Portals/59/Documents/BOV_Documents/2020/NDU%20Provost%20Memo%20For%20Deans%20of%20Faculty%20Feb%206%202020.pdf?ver=2020-05-11-110745-077(2021年9月2日访问)。79CJCS，“2020和2021学年联合专业军事教育的特殊重点领域”，2019年5月6日。https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/education/jpme_sae_2020_2021.pdf(2021年8月17日访问)教务长办公室，“AY 2020 - 2021课程政策指导”，2020年2月6日，第1.81页国防大学，选修课程目录(华盛顿特区:国防大学，2014-2015年，2016-2017年，2020 - 2021年，2021-2022年)教务长办公室，“AY 2020 - 2021课程的政策指导”，2020年2月6日，第3.83页国防大学，联合教育转型倡议(华盛顿特区:国防大学，2014年)，3。 84教务长办公室，“AY 2020 - 2021课程政策指导”，2020年2月6日，第3.85页关于机构间对国家安全的贡献，特别是行动，见:联合工作人员J7，组织间合作(萨福克，弗吉尼亚州:可部署培训司，2018年4月)。86联合参谋，国防大学政策，A-7.87国防大学，2016-2017学年年度报告(华盛顿特区:国防大学，2017)，27,34,44,51,57。国防大学，2012-2013学年年度报告，6.88国防部副部长鲍勃·沃克，“国防大学毕业典礼”，2014年8月5日。https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Article/605598/national-defense-university-convocation/(2021年9月22日访问)。89JCS，《美国国家军事战略》2018年第3期。90 . https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/UNCLASS_2018_National_Military_Strategy_Description.pdf(2021年9月21日访问)托马斯·a·基恩，“美国的战争学院和联合教育”，《军事教育》，肯尼迪和尼尔森编辑，161.91凯特·埃克斯利和雷格·登尼克，小组教学:教程，研讨会和超越(伦敦:RoutledgeFalmer, 2004)， 3.92 JCS，为明天的战争方式培养今天的联合军官(2020年5月)，6。https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/education/jcs_pme_tm_vision.pdf?ver=2020-05-15-102429-817(访问日期为2021年11月1日)。93与作者的电子邮件通信，2012.10.19,2012.95与作者的访谈，2012.10.18,2012.95国防大学，2016-2017学年度年报，18.96参见国防大学发布的各种年度报告。https://www.ndu.edu/About/Institutional-Data/(2021年9月27日访问)97约翰·t·费舍尔，《美国国家安全政策:权威、机构和案例》(兰厄姆，MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017).98Charles D. Freilich，锡安的困境:以色列如何制定国家安全政策(伊萨卡:康奈尔大学出版社，2012)，3.99 Yaakov Amidror，“以色列的国家安全主义”，2021年7月18日。https://jiss.org.il/en/amidror-israels-national-security-doctrine/(2022年5月12日访问)。其他信息:关于贡献者sanat SternDr。Anat Stern (anatstern1@gmail.com)是以色列开放大学历史、哲学和犹太研究系的一名教师。她专门研究以色列国防军的法律和军事历史。她的研究兴趣和教学主要集中在以色列的军事史、国家安全和军民关系。2012年至2020年期间，Stern博士担任以色列国防学院和以色列国防军指挥与参谋学院的学术顾问和研究主管。她也是威斯康星大学麦迪逊分校历史系的客座教授(2012)。她最近出版的书题为《审判中的战斗人员:1948年战争期间以色列的军事管辖权》(希伯来语)，是以色列研究Yad Ben Zvi-Ish-Shalom最佳第一本书的获奖者，并被以色列研究协会(2021年)授予以色列研究最佳书籍的荣誉称号。伊莱Z.萨尔茨曼博士。伊莱·z·萨尔茨曼(saltzman@umd.edu)，马里兰大学帕克分校吉尔登洪以色列研究所主任。他的学术研究和教学重点是国际安全、以色列外交和安全政策、美国外交政策和政治心理学。Saltzman博士是《权力平衡证券化理论:多态再概念化》(2012)一书的作者。他也是许多学术文章和书籍章节的作者，并在《洛杉矶时报》、《国土报》、《耶路撒冷邮报》和其他著名媒体上发表评论。2010年获得海法大学国际关系博士学位，2009-2010年在哈佛大学肯尼迪政府学院贝尔弗科学与国际事务中心国际安全项目(ISP)担任博士后研究员。

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Comparative Strategy Social Sciences-Political Science and International Relations

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