Honeypot Game Theory against DoS Attack in UAV Cyber

Abstract

A space called Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) cyber is a new environment where UAV, Ground Control Station (GCS) and business processes are integrated. Denial of service (DoS) attack is a standard network attack method, especially suitable for attacking the UAV cyber. It is a robust security risk for UAV cyber and has recently become an active research area. Game theory is typically used to simulate the existing offensive and defensive mechanisms for DoS attacks in a traditional network. In addition, the honeypot, an effective security vulnerability defense mechanism, has not been widely adopted or modeled for defense against DoS attack UAV cyber. With this motivation, the current research paper presents a honeypot game theory model that considers GCS and DoS attacks, which is used to study the interaction between attack and defense to optimize defense strategies. The GCS and honeypot act as defenses against DoS attacks in this model, and both players select their appropriate methods and build their benefit function models. On this basis, a hierarchical honeypot and G2A network delay reward strategy are introduced so that the defender and the attacker can adjust their respective strategies dynamically. Finally, by adjusting the degree of camouflage of the honeypot for UAV network services, the overall revenue of the defender can be effectively improved. The proposed method proves the existence of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium and compares it with the existing research on no delay rewards and no honeypot defense scheme. In addition, this method realizes that the UAV cyber still guarantees a network delay of about ten milliseconds in the presence of a DoS attack. The results demonstrate that our methodology is superior to that of previous studies.