Would an unapportioned US federal wealth tax be constitutional, and what does that mean?

Abstract

Abstract To assess the constitutionality of an unapportioned federal wealth tax, and/or of a federal income tax provision reaching wealthy taxpayers’ unrealized gains, one needs an underlying framework for making judgements about legal claims. While no such framework can be entirely specified, at least to general agreement, this does not support nihilistically rejecting all comparative judgements about better versus worse, or more versus less convincing, instances of legal analysis. While it appears nearly certain that the Supreme Court’s current right-wing majority would strike down an unapportioned federal wealth tax, the ‘correct’ answer to this constitutional question cannot be proven to general agreement. I myself would disagree with such a holding by the Court. An important variable in resolving the issue for oneself is how much continuing precedential weight one should give to Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co.—a case that itself blatantly disrespected precedent, but that did so more than a century ago, and that (on the other hand) some argue has already ceased to be good law. The principle of respecting precedent both has instrumental value and has been long (if fitfully) honoured within the American legal system, but all agree that its weight is not absolute. An unapportioned minimum income tax on the wealthiest Americans that included in income their unrealized capital gains would likely be constitutional under currently prevalent legal doctrine. It is true, however, that Eisner v. Macomber (1920), if it were held to remain good law beyond its immediate facts, would support holding it unconstitutional. The prospect that the current Supreme Court’s six right-wingers will decide to revive Macomber provides only one reason for suspecting that they might strike down such a provision, perhaps while also launching a broader constitutional war against central tenets of the current regime for taxing wealthy individuals and capital income. However, it lies beyond the power of conventional legal analysis to predict either what form such a war would take, or on what terms it might end up being resolved.