The effects of price transparency and debt collection policies on intentions to consume recommended health care: A randomized vignette experiment

IF 1.2 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW
Christopher T. Robertson, Wendy Netter Epstein, Hansoo Ko
{"title":"The effects of price transparency and debt collection policies on intentions to consume recommended health care: A randomized vignette experiment","authors":"Christopher T. Robertson,&nbsp;Wendy Netter Epstein,&nbsp;Hansoo Ko","doi":"10.1111/jels.12368","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>New laws promote price transparency in health care, though effects on patient decision-making are not known. Price disclosure may increase the salience of cost and cause lower-income patients to decline recommended care, worsening inequities in health outcomes. Whether patients perceive a disclosed cost as higher or lower than their expectations may also affect care decisions, but has not been studied. Scholars and policymakers have paid much less attention to the question of whether patients will have to pay the prices charged (whether disclosed or not), and how expectations regarding collections may also affect healthcare consumption. Some hospitals aggressively collect on unpaid medical bills. Others hospitals do not. Actively disclosing collection policies (whether aggressive or protective) could magnify or counteract effects of price disclosures, especially for low-income patients. To test the effect of price disclosure and debt-collection disclosures on willingness to obtain recommended care, we recruited a nationally representative sample (<i>N</i> = 2997) and deployed a full factorial, controlled experiment in a standardized clinical vignette model. We find that disclosing a higher-than-anticipated price increases the probability of declining recommended care (odds ratio = 1.900), with larger effects for low-income individuals. Even more, disclosing aggressive collections increases the risk of declining care (odds ratio = 4.493), at higher rates for low-income patients. Where patients fear collections, but do not know prices, they are most likely to decline care. Disclosure of an aggressive collections policy makes patients feel less informed, harms patient trust in providers, makes them feel that they were not treated fairly, and undermines their confidence in the value of their care. Mediation analysis shows that about half of the effect of collections risk is via these attitudinal variables.</p>","PeriodicalId":47187,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Empirical Legal Studies","volume":"20 4","pages":"941-960"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2000,"publicationDate":"2023-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Empirical Legal Studies","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jels.12368","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

New laws promote price transparency in health care, though effects on patient decision-making are not known. Price disclosure may increase the salience of cost and cause lower-income patients to decline recommended care, worsening inequities in health outcomes. Whether patients perceive a disclosed cost as higher or lower than their expectations may also affect care decisions, but has not been studied. Scholars and policymakers have paid much less attention to the question of whether patients will have to pay the prices charged (whether disclosed or not), and how expectations regarding collections may also affect healthcare consumption. Some hospitals aggressively collect on unpaid medical bills. Others hospitals do not. Actively disclosing collection policies (whether aggressive or protective) could magnify or counteract effects of price disclosures, especially for low-income patients. To test the effect of price disclosure and debt-collection disclosures on willingness to obtain recommended care, we recruited a nationally representative sample (N = 2997) and deployed a full factorial, controlled experiment in a standardized clinical vignette model. We find that disclosing a higher-than-anticipated price increases the probability of declining recommended care (odds ratio = 1.900), with larger effects for low-income individuals. Even more, disclosing aggressive collections increases the risk of declining care (odds ratio = 4.493), at higher rates for low-income patients. Where patients fear collections, but do not know prices, they are most likely to decline care. Disclosure of an aggressive collections policy makes patients feel less informed, harms patient trust in providers, makes them feel that they were not treated fairly, and undermines their confidence in the value of their care. Mediation analysis shows that about half of the effect of collections risk is via these attitudinal variables.

价格透明度和债务催收政策对消费推荐医疗保健意向的影响:一个随机小插曲实验
新的法律促进了医疗保健价格的透明度,但对患者决策的影响尚不清楚。价格披露可能会增加成本的显著性,并导致低收入患者拒绝推荐的治疗,从而加剧健康结果的不公平。患者是否认为披露的成本高于或低于他们的预期也可能影响护理决策,但尚未研究。学者和政策制定者很少关注患者是否必须支付收费(无论是否披露)的问题,以及对收藏的预期如何影响医疗保健消费。一些医院积极收取未付医药费。其他医院则没有。积极披露收费政策(无论是积极的还是保护性的)可以放大或抵消价格披露的影响,特别是对低收入患者。为了检验价格披露和债务催收披露对获得推荐治疗意愿的影响,我们招募了一个具有全国代表性的样本(N = 2997),并在标准化临床小样本模型中进行了全因子对照实验。我们发现,披露高于预期的价格会增加减少推荐治疗的可能性(优势比= 1.900),对低收入个体的影响更大。更重要的是,披露积极的收款增加了护理下降的风险(优势比= 4.493),低收入患者的风险更高。在病人害怕收账,但不知道价格的地方,他们最有可能拒绝接受治疗。披露一项积极的收集政策会使患者感到信息不足,损害患者对提供者的信任,使他们觉得自己没有得到公平对待,并破坏他们对护理价值的信心。中介分析表明,大约一半的催收风险的影响是通过这些态度变量。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
CiteScore
2.30
自引率
11.80%
发文量
34
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信