Schrödinger’s Fetus and Relational Ontology: Reconciling Three Contradictory Intuitions in Abortion Debates

IF 1 2区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Pub Date : 2023-10-17 DOI:10.1007/s10677-023-10422-z

Stephen R. Milford, David Shaw

{"title":"Schrödinger’s Fetus and Relational Ontology: Reconciling Three Contradictory Intuitions in Abortion Debates","authors":"Stephen R. Milford, David Shaw","doi":"10.1007/s10677-023-10422-z","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Pro-life and pro-choice advocates battle for rational dominance in abortion debates. Yet, public polling (and general legal opinion) demonstrates the public’s preference for the middle ground: that abortions are acceptable in certain circumstances and during early pregnancy. Implicit in this, are two contradictory intuitions: (1) that we were all early fetuses, and (2) abortion kills no one. To hold these positions together, Harman and Räsänen have argued for the Actual Future Principle (AFP) which distinguishes between fetuses that will develop into persons and those that will never develop into persons. However intellectually ingenious their solutions are, they fail to account for a third intuition: that the death of a wanted fetus – e.g. through termination or miscarriage – is of moral significance. Not only is this practically important, but it is also supported by public opinion. The authors of this paper argue that relational ontology can modify the AFP to better account for all three intuitions. Furthermore, it further emphasizes the pivotal role of the pregnant person who relates to their own fetus in either personal or impersonal ways. Addressing the fundamental challenges of relational ontology, the authors defend the position that human personal identity is ultimately relational.","PeriodicalId":47052,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Theory and Moral Practice","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Ethical Theory and Moral Practice","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-023-10422-z","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Abstract

Abstract Pro-life and pro-choice advocates battle for rational dominance in abortion debates. Yet, public polling (and general legal opinion) demonstrates the public’s preference for the middle ground: that abortions are acceptable in certain circumstances and during early pregnancy. Implicit in this, are two contradictory intuitions: (1) that we were all early fetuses, and (2) abortion kills no one. To hold these positions together, Harman and Räsänen have argued for the Actual Future Principle (AFP) which distinguishes between fetuses that will develop into persons and those that will never develop into persons. However intellectually ingenious their solutions are, they fail to account for a third intuition: that the death of a wanted fetus – e.g. through termination or miscarriage – is of moral significance. Not only is this practically important, but it is also supported by public opinion. The authors of this paper argue that relational ontology can modify the AFP to better account for all three intuitions. Furthermore, it further emphasizes the pivotal role of the pregnant person who relates to their own fetus in either personal or impersonal ways. Addressing the fundamental challenges of relational ontology, the authors defend the position that human personal identity is ultimately relational.

查看原文本刊更多论文

Schrödinger的胎儿和关系本体论:调和堕胎辩论中三个矛盾的直觉

反堕胎和支持堕胎的支持者在堕胎辩论中争夺理性优势。然而，公众投票(和一般法律意见)表明公众倾向于中间立场:堕胎在某些情况下和怀孕早期是可以接受的。这隐含着两个相互矛盾的直觉:(1)我们都是早期的胎儿，(2)堕胎不会导致任何人死亡。为了把这些观点结合起来，哈曼和Räsänen提出了实际未来原则(AFP)，该原则区分了将发育成人的胎儿和永远不会发育成人的胎儿。无论他们的解决方案多么聪明，他们都无法解释第三种直觉:一个想要的胎儿的死亡——例如通过终止妊娠或流产——具有道德意义。这不仅在实践上很重要，而且也得到了公众舆论的支持。本文的作者认为，关系本体可以修改AFP，以更好地解释这三种直觉。此外，它进一步强调怀孕的人谁涉及到自己的胎儿在个人或非个人的方式的关键作用。针对关系本体论的基本挑战，作者捍卫了人类个人身份最终是关系的立场。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

求助全文

约1分钟内获得全文求助全文

来源期刊

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

1.90

自引率

10.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Ethical Theory and Moral Practice is a double-anonymous peer-reviewed philosophical journal which aims to publish the best work produced in all fields of practical philosophy. It welcomes high-quality, rigorous and original, submissions regardless of the traditions or schools of thought from which they derive. As an editorial priority, however, published papers should be accessible to the philosophical community at large and as free as possible of unnecessary jargon. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice publishes work on ethical theories that address practical problems, as well as work that presents or examines empirical findings regarding moral practices relevant for ethical theorizing. The journal therefore actively seeks to promote cross-fertilization across areas of practical philosophy—such as moral, political, legal, and social philosophy—and more empirical disciplines, such as medicine, economics, sociology, political science, and psychology. It welcomes work in applied ethics provided that it can offer theoretical or normative contributions to larger philosophical debates. The journal also considers historically-oriented contributions provided they are not mainly exegetical and can offer insights for current debates in practical philosophy. The journal endorses the BPA/ SWIP-UK Good Practice for Journals. Further details are available in our Review Policy document.