Post-Truth is Misplaced Distrust in Testimony, Not Indifference to Facts: Implications for Deliberative Remedies

Abstract

How should we deliberate with citizens who entertain post-truth beliefs in democratic societies? This is a central question for those interested in wielding the epistemic potential of democratic deliberation against post-truth. Yet, the strength of proposed deliberative solutions depends on the accuracy with which post-truth is diagnosed. Taking seriously the connection between epistemic diagnosis and deliberative remedy, this paper looks at the motivations provided by non-vaccinating parents for their beliefs and argues for an understanding of post-truth as misplaced distrust in testimony, as against a standard view of post-truth as indifference to fact. Second, the paper argues this new diagnosis of post-truth renders ineffective deliberative strategies aiming to harness the power of impersonal reason and accuracy, of the kind recently defended by Simone Chambers. Instead, combating post-truth as the paper defines it is effectively accomplished through employing bridging rhetoric.