{"title":"From later to sooner: exploring compliance with the global regime of anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing in the legal profession","authors":"Doron Goldbarsht, Katie Benson","doi":"10.1108/jfc-08-2023-0201","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Purpose The legal profession is vulnerable to abuse for the purposes of money laundering and terrorist financing. According to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), that vulnerability justified updated global recommendations that urge countries to require lawyers, notaries and other independent legal professionals – including sole practitioners, partners and employed professionals within law firms – to identify, assess and manage the money laundering and terrorist financing risks associated with their services and to ensure that they have appropriate mechanisms in place to provide risk assessment information to competent authorities. Those recommendations proved contentious, with concerns raised by both legal academics and legal professional bodies about the implications of certain aspects of the requirements for the principle of lawyer–client confidentiality. Despite those concerns, many countries have introduced or amended regulatory regimes to extend their application to the legal sector to comply with the FATF’s standards. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the debate surrounding the extension of AML/CTF obligations to the legal profession. Design/methodology/approach This paper considers three jurisdictions – the UK, Israel and Australia – at different stages in their journey towards compliance with the FATF’s anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CTF) standards for the legal profession. While the UK has a long-established and well-embedded AML regulatory framework for legal professionals, Australia remains non-compliant with the FATF standards. Israel occupies a position between these two ends of the spectrum: following criticism of the omission of lawyers from its AML/CTF regime, Israel implemented due diligence rules for the profession. In 2018, Israel was found to be partially compliant with the relevant FATF recommendations. Findings It argues that although there are challenges involved, there are also important benefits. Therefore, Australia should act to implement its proposed changes sooner rather than later. Its persistent failure to appropriately address globally recognised areas of vulnerability leaves Australia open to integrity abuse. In addition, if the government delays addressing this issue until pressure from the FATF (such as deadlines for compliance and, if necessary, a finding of non-compliance) forces it to comply, this may tarnish Australia’s reputation, threaten its access to international financial markets and adversely affect the legitimacy and effectiveness of its AML/CTF regime. Originality/value Originality in this context refers to the distinctiveness and uniqueness of a paper’s content and approach. In this case, the originality lies in the fact that there is no other existing paper that addresses the topic of three common-law jurisdictions at various stages of their progression towards aligning with the FATF AML/CTF standards, specifically within the context of the legal profession. Furthermore, the timeliness of this paper is underscored by the fact that multiple jurisdictions are currently deliberating their positions on the focus of this paper. This adds to its originality and relevance, as it addresses a gap in the literature while also contributing to the ongoing discourse surrounding compliance with FATF’s standards.","PeriodicalId":38940,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Crime","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Financial Crime","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1108/jfc-08-2023-0201","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"Social Sciences","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Purpose The legal profession is vulnerable to abuse for the purposes of money laundering and terrorist financing. According to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), that vulnerability justified updated global recommendations that urge countries to require lawyers, notaries and other independent legal professionals – including sole practitioners, partners and employed professionals within law firms – to identify, assess and manage the money laundering and terrorist financing risks associated with their services and to ensure that they have appropriate mechanisms in place to provide risk assessment information to competent authorities. Those recommendations proved contentious, with concerns raised by both legal academics and legal professional bodies about the implications of certain aspects of the requirements for the principle of lawyer–client confidentiality. Despite those concerns, many countries have introduced or amended regulatory regimes to extend their application to the legal sector to comply with the FATF’s standards. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the debate surrounding the extension of AML/CTF obligations to the legal profession. Design/methodology/approach This paper considers three jurisdictions – the UK, Israel and Australia – at different stages in their journey towards compliance with the FATF’s anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CTF) standards for the legal profession. While the UK has a long-established and well-embedded AML regulatory framework for legal professionals, Australia remains non-compliant with the FATF standards. Israel occupies a position between these two ends of the spectrum: following criticism of the omission of lawyers from its AML/CTF regime, Israel implemented due diligence rules for the profession. In 2018, Israel was found to be partially compliant with the relevant FATF recommendations. Findings It argues that although there are challenges involved, there are also important benefits. Therefore, Australia should act to implement its proposed changes sooner rather than later. Its persistent failure to appropriately address globally recognised areas of vulnerability leaves Australia open to integrity abuse. In addition, if the government delays addressing this issue until pressure from the FATF (such as deadlines for compliance and, if necessary, a finding of non-compliance) forces it to comply, this may tarnish Australia’s reputation, threaten its access to international financial markets and adversely affect the legitimacy and effectiveness of its AML/CTF regime. Originality/value Originality in this context refers to the distinctiveness and uniqueness of a paper’s content and approach. In this case, the originality lies in the fact that there is no other existing paper that addresses the topic of three common-law jurisdictions at various stages of their progression towards aligning with the FATF AML/CTF standards, specifically within the context of the legal profession. Furthermore, the timeliness of this paper is underscored by the fact that multiple jurisdictions are currently deliberating their positions on the focus of this paper. This adds to its originality and relevance, as it addresses a gap in the literature while also contributing to the ongoing discourse surrounding compliance with FATF’s standards.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Financial Crime, the leading journal in this field, publishes authoritative, practical and detailed insight in the most serious and topical issues relating to the control and prevention of financial crime and related abuse. The journal''s articles are authored by some of the leading international scholars and practitioners in the fields of law, criminology, economics, criminal justice and compliance. Consequently, articles are perceptive, evidence based and have policy impact. The journal covers a wide range of current topics including, but not limited to: • Tracing through the civil law of the proceeds of fraud • Cyber-crime: prevention and detection • Intelligence led investigations • Whistleblowing and the payment of rewards for information • Identity fraud • Insider dealing prosecutions • Specialised anti-corruption investigations • Underground banking systems • Asset tracing and forfeiture • Securities regulation and enforcement • Tax regimes and tax avoidance • Deferred prosecution agreements • Personal liability of compliance managers and professional advisers