Updated Theory and New Evidence on the Effect of Information System Precision on Managerial Reporting

IF 1.4 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Management Accounting Research Pub Date : 2023-10-01 DOI:10.2308/jmar-2022-050

Jeremy Douthit, Michael Majerczyk, Lisa McLuckie Thain

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引用次数: 0

Abstract

ABSTRACT Information asymmetry is fundamental to participative budgeting. Hannan, Rankin, and Towry (2006, “HRT”) develops a nuanced theory regarding the effect of information asymmetry on slack. The authors provide evidence that suggests increasing the precision of a superior’s information system, thereby reducing information asymmetry, can increase slack. We develop a refined version of HRT’s theory by incorporating evidence of how nonpecuniary incentives affect subordinates’ reporting slack from research subsequent to HRT. Our updated theory predicts that slack decreases as information system precision increases, opposite to the results in HRT. To test our refined theory, we replicate HRT’s experiment and find results consistent with our theory. Our results support HRT’s general theory but highlight the importance of establishing regularities of how nonpecuniary incentives affect behavior in accounting. Specifically, our updated theory and new evidence suggest that improving information system precision decreases budgetary slack, contrary to the results suggested in HRT. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request. JEL Classifications: D82; M41; M52.

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信息系统精确性对管理报告影响的最新理论和新证据

信息不对称是参与式预算的基础。Hannan, Rankin, and Towry(2006，“HRT”)提出了一个关于信息不对称对懈怠影响的微妙理论。作者提供的证据表明，提高上级信息系统的精确度，从而减少信息不对称，可能会增加懈怠。在HRT之后的研究中，我们通过纳入非金钱激励如何影响下属报告懈怠的证据，开发了HRT理论的改进版本。我们最新的理论预测，随着信息系统精度的提高，松弛会减少，这与HRT的结果相反。为了验证我们完善的理论，我们重复了HRT的实验，并找到了与我们理论一致的结果。我们的研究结果支持HRT的一般理论，但强调了建立非金钱激励如何影响会计行为的规律的重要性。具体而言，我们更新的理论和新的证据表明，提高信息系统精度可以减少预算松弛，这与HRT的结果相反。数据可用性:数据可根据要求从作者处获得。JEL分类:D82;M41;M52。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Journal of Management Accounting Research BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

2.90

自引率

5.90%

发文量

期刊介绍： The mission of the Journal of Management Accounting Research (JMAR) is to advance the theory and practice of management accounting through publication of high-quality applied and theoretical research, using any well-executed research method. JMAR serves the global community of scholars and practitioners whose work impacts or is informed by the role that accounting information plays in decision-making and performance measurement within organizations. Settings may include profit and not-for profit organizations, service, retail and manufacturing organizations and domestic, foreign, and multinational firms. JMAR furthermore seeks to advance an understanding of management accounting in its broader context, such as issues related to the interface between internal and external reporting or taxation. New theories, topical areas, and research methods, as well as original research with novel implications to improve practice and disseminate the best managerial accounting practices are encouraged.