Polanyi’s Razor: The Tacit Antithesis of the Veil of Ignorance

Abstract

Veil of ignorance theories suggest that an appraiser can be (i) completely (focally) aware of and (ii) completely ignorant about the appraisal she is making. This paper argues that Michael Polanyi rejected both of these premises and that he was developing an antithesis to the veil of ignorance model in his concept of tacit knowing. Rather counterintuitively, the latter concept did not refer to one but three kinds of appraisal: making a knowledge claim, making an aesthetic evaluation, and making a moral judgement. This paper shows how the Polanyian concept of tacit knowing clashes with the veil of ignorance model in the case of this third kind of appraisal, making a moral judgement. The first part of the paper portrays how Polanyi’s Budapest years might have influenced his discovery of the tacit. The second part explores the evolution of the tacit knowing concept and identifies four stages in his relevant thought based on how he approached the tacit. The third part explains how the Polanyian concept of tacit knowing might be interpreted as a philosophical razor that is antithetical to the veil of ignorance model. The paper concludes by going into details about this antithetical relation and, by doing so, sharpening the razor.