Islamic Headscarves: The Other-Religion Effect and Religious Literacy at the European Court of Human Rights

IF 0.4 2区 哲学 0 RELIGION
Nesrin Ünlü
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Thus, the contours of religious groups, the link between an individual and her associated group, and the positioning of various religious groups vis-a-vis the state require a set of approaches to a religious claim centred on the individual believer. This can be clearly observed in the theoretical underpinnings of the European Convention on Human Rights, which, however, are not pursued adequately in practice because the actual rulings not only involve logic but also include perception.KEYWORDS: Religious freedomArticle 9 of the European Convention on human rightsMuslim women and agencysecularismstate neutralitylaw and religion AcknowledgementI would like to thank Kerstin Wonisch for her comments and suggestions.Disclosure StatementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 See Sullivan et al., Politics of Religious Freedom; Sandberg et al., Research Handbook; Cranmer, et al., Confluence of Law and Religion.2 This article uses ‘Islamic veil’ as a general term referring to all kinds of Islamic modesty choices that Muslim women practise such as headscarves and face veils. The article refers to the particular items (headscarf or face veil) in their respective cases. The four main cases that the article examines involve the headscarf.3 The following ECtHR cases involve pupils in middle and high school: Doğru v France (2008), Köse and Others v Turkey (2006), Kervanci v. France (2008), Aktas, Bayrak, Gamaleddyn and Ghazal v France (2009).4 S.A.S v France, para. 135.5 Ibid.; Lachiri v Belgium, para. 46; see Ringelheim, ‘Lachiri v. Belgium’.6 S.A.S v France, para 122. Similarly, the inadmissibility decision in Al-Morsli v France (2008) concerns only the physical entity of the headscarf in the context of identity checks.7 Kaushik, ‘Lachiri v Belgium’, 51.8 Sahin v. Turkey, para. 17.9 Dahlab v Switzerland, 710 Ebrahimian v France, para. 52; Dahlab v Switzerland, 11; Sahin v Turkey, para. 115; Kurtulmuş v Turkey.11 See, for example, Evans, ‘Islamic Scarf’; Elver, Headscarf Controversy; Brems, ‘Hidden under Headscarves?’; Vakulenko, ‘Islamic Headscarves’; Evans and Petkoff, ‘Separation of Convenience’; Bleiberg,‘Unveiling the Real Issue’; Mahmood and Danchin, ‘Immunity or Regulation?’; Gunn, ‘Religious Symbols in Public Schools’. See also Judge Tulken’s dissenting opinion in Sahin v Turkey (2005). For a more conciliatory perspective, see Howard, Law and the Wearing of Religious Symbols; McGoldrick, Human Rights.12 Brems, ‘Hidden under Headscarves?’, 19.13 Evans, ‘Islamic Scarf’, 52.14 Whistler and Hill, ‘Philosophy, Law, and Religion’.15 Sahin v Turkey, para. 55.16 Öztığ, ‘Turkish Constitutional Court’, 595.17 Quoted in Çınar, Modernity, Islam and Secularism, 81.18 Sahin v Turkey, para. 93.19 Ibid., para. 90–96.20 Turkish Constitutional Court, D. 7/3/1989 (1989).21 Note that the Constitutional Court of Turkey reversed this decision in 2014 with the Tuba Arslan decision. TCC 2014/256.22 Elver, Headscarf Controversy, 18.23 Sahin v Turkey, para. 101.24 Elver, Headscarf Controversy, 78.25 Sahin v Turkey, para. 114.26 Hoopes, ‘Leyla Şahin v. Turkey’, 722; Ringelheim, ‘State Religious Neutrality’, 38.27 Sahin v Turkey, para. 115.28 Ibid., para. 111; Dahlab v Switzerland, 27.29 Sahin v Turkey, para. 111–15.30 Dahlab v.Switzerland, 6–7.31 Ibid., 5.32 Dahlab v Switzerland, 7–8, Evans, ‘Islamic Scarf’, 59.33 McGoldrick, ‘Muslim Veiling Controversies’, 461.34 Dahlab v Switzerland, 1335 Evans, ‘Islamic Scarf’, 62–9.36 Dahlab v Switzerland, 13.37 Kurtulmuş v Turkey.38 Garahan, ‘Right to Discriminate?’, 352.39 Ebrahimian v France, para 37.40 Ibid., 44.41 Ibid., 25.42 Ibid., 44.43 Ibid., 61–4.44 Ibid., 72.45 Ringelheim, ‘State Religious Neutrality’, 32–3.46 Mirza, ‘Second Skin’, 10.47 Mahmood, ‘Feminist Theory’, 15.48 Asad, ‘Trying to Understand’, 501. I should note that I cite Talal Asad and Saba Mahmood as I find that their accounts of how practices can be an integral part of the practitioner very illuminating. However, I do not agree with Asad’s treatment of individuals in his narrative of ‘discursive tradition’. While Asad’s and Mahmood’s seminal work on agency, religion, and the secular is a valuable scholarly contribution in many ways, I also find their analysis limited to a certain type of Muslim experience.49 Ganley, ‘Racial Profiling’.50 Murdock, ‘Dressed to Repress?’, 180.51 Baumgarten, ‘Minority Dress Codes’, 289.52 Ibid., 290–1.53 Murdock, ‘Dressed to Repress?’, 180–93.54 Quataert, ‘Clothing Laws’, 403–7.55 Argıt, ‘Clothing Habits’, 81.56 See Gorski and Altınordu, ‘After Secularization?’.57 Casanova, Public Religions, 212.58 Ertit, Endişeli muhafazakarlar çağı, 101.59 For a similar discussion of accommodation of American Muslim individuals, see Moore, ‘Visible through the Veil’.60 Malik, ‘Complex Equality’, 129; Brems, ‘Hidden under Headscarves?’, 1.61 Karaduman v Turkey, 108; Dahlab v Switzerland, 2–13; Sahin v Turkey, para. 111; Dogru v France, para. 63–4; Aktas, Bayrak, Gamaleddyn, and Ghazal v. France, 2.62 Gürsel, ‘Distinction’, 380.63 ECtHR, Guide on Article 9, 31–2.64 Asad, ‘Trying to Understand,’ 501.65 Mirza, ‘Second Skin’, 10.66 Evans, Manual, 67.67 Ibid., 68.68 In a similar vein, some scholars suggest that the state should respond appropriately, employing the criminal law where necessary, in order to protect women against violence and coercion rather than imposing a blanket ban on headscarves. Although some Muslim girls/women might experience violence or might be coerced by their male relatives into wearing the headscarf, a blanket ban would not solve the problem effectively but rather would oppress autonomous women who choose to wear it. See Malik, ‘Complex Equality’, 143; Evans, ‘Islamic Scarf’, 73.69 Lautsi and Others v Italy, para. 72.70 Gunn, ‘Religious Symbols’, 113.71 Lautsi and Others v Italy; see the Administrative and Supreme Court’s decisions quoted in para. 15–16 and para. 35–6, respectively.72 For a short literature review, see Bhowon and Bundhoo, ‘Perceptions and Reasons’, 33–4. For other accounts, see Mahmood, Politics of Piety; Fernando, Republic Unsettled; Keaton, Muslims Girls; Abu Odeh, ‘Post-Colonial Feminism’; Abu Lughod, ‘Do Muslim Women?’; Hoodfar, ‘The Veil’; Almila and Inglis, Routledge International Handbook.73 Mirza, ‘Second Skin’.74 Peresin and Cervone, ‘Western Muhajirat’.75 Al Wazni, ‘Muslim Women’, 329.76 Rinaldo, Mobilizing Piety, 79; Albayrak, ‘Compressed Identity’.77 For example, see the veil as a symbol of resistance in the Algerian war of independence in El Guindi, Veil. See also, hijab poetry in which veiled women share their experiences of hijab: Amer, What is Veiling?.78 For example, see Huda Shaarawi’s decision regarding hijab in Lanfranchi, Casting off the Veil; Amer, What is Veiling?, 177.79 El Guindi, Veil, 172.80 Almila, Veiling in Fashion, 27 and ch. 1; Okutan, Türkiye’de popüler kültür.81 See Bhowon and Bundhoo, ‘Perceptions and Reasons’, 33–4; Furseth, ‘Hijab’.82 Hidayatullah, ‘Veil’, 702.83 For example, see Read and Bartkowski, ‘To Veil or Not to Veil?’, 400. See also Mernisi, Veil and the Male Elite, 75.84 Evans, Manual, 31.85 Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v Moldova, para. 118.86 I wish to highlight that the essential reason for the protection of religious organizations under the ECHR is to protect individuals, not for other political reasons such as a special agreement between a religious group and the state. In this context, religious groups do not indicate fixed political ties as individuals have free movement in and out of religious organizations, being members by choice. However, I have not referred to possible conflicts between an individual member and her religious organization – a complex subject that is beyond the scope of this article. Depending on the particularities of the cases, the ECtHR recognizes the organizational autonomy and the doctrinal independence of religious organizations when such conflicts occur. See Ferrari, Wonisch, and Medda-Windischer, ‘Tying the Knot’, 689.87 See Evans, Manual, 284–5.88 Eweida and Others v United Kingdom, para. 81.89 Pretty v UK, para 82.90 Evans, Manual, 11.91 Arrowsmith v UK, para 19.92 Evans, Freedom of Religion, 115.93 Hill and Whistler, Right to Wear Religious Symbols, 49–51.94 Jakobski v Poland, para. 45.95 Chaib, ‘Religious Accommodation’, 33.96 Hill and Whistler, Right to Wear Religious Symbols, 107.97 Ibid., 67.98 Ewieda v UK (2013), para. 82.99 Vakulenko, ‘Islamic Headscarves’, 190–6.100 Marshall, ‘Conditions for Freedom?’.","PeriodicalId":45172,"journal":{"name":"Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4000,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09596410.2023.2275423","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"RELIGION","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

ABSTRACTIslamic headscarves continue to be one of the most controversial issues concerning Muslims across Europe. In order to analyse how the headscarf is evaluated through the prism of human rights values and moral principles in Europe, this article revisits some headscarf cases heard at the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The weaknesses in the rulings have been widely examined but this article will focus on the religious individual, her agency, and the link between her and her associated group, which have been less discussed in the literature. The article highlights that the modern socio-political structure of the Council of Europe countries is strikingly different from that of their pre-modern counterparts. Thus, the contours of religious groups, the link between an individual and her associated group, and the positioning of various religious groups vis-a-vis the state require a set of approaches to a religious claim centred on the individual believer. This can be clearly observed in the theoretical underpinnings of the European Convention on Human Rights, which, however, are not pursued adequately in practice because the actual rulings not only involve logic but also include perception.KEYWORDS: Religious freedomArticle 9 of the European Convention on human rightsMuslim women and agencysecularismstate neutralitylaw and religion AcknowledgementI would like to thank Kerstin Wonisch for her comments and suggestions.Disclosure StatementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 See Sullivan et al., Politics of Religious Freedom; Sandberg et al., Research Handbook; Cranmer, et al., Confluence of Law and Religion.2 This article uses ‘Islamic veil’ as a general term referring to all kinds of Islamic modesty choices that Muslim women practise such as headscarves and face veils. The article refers to the particular items (headscarf or face veil) in their respective cases. The four main cases that the article examines involve the headscarf.3 The following ECtHR cases involve pupils in middle and high school: Doğru v France (2008), Köse and Others v Turkey (2006), Kervanci v. France (2008), Aktas, Bayrak, Gamaleddyn and Ghazal v France (2009).4 S.A.S v France, para. 135.5 Ibid.; Lachiri v Belgium, para. 46; see Ringelheim, ‘Lachiri v. Belgium’.6 S.A.S v France, para 122. Similarly, the inadmissibility decision in Al-Morsli v France (2008) concerns only the physical entity of the headscarf in the context of identity checks.7 Kaushik, ‘Lachiri v Belgium’, 51.8 Sahin v. Turkey, para. 17.9 Dahlab v Switzerland, 710 Ebrahimian v France, para. 52; Dahlab v Switzerland, 11; Sahin v Turkey, para. 115; Kurtulmuş v Turkey.11 See, for example, Evans, ‘Islamic Scarf’; Elver, Headscarf Controversy; Brems, ‘Hidden under Headscarves?’; Vakulenko, ‘Islamic Headscarves’; Evans and Petkoff, ‘Separation of Convenience’; Bleiberg,‘Unveiling the Real Issue’; Mahmood and Danchin, ‘Immunity or Regulation?’; Gunn, ‘Religious Symbols in Public Schools’. See also Judge Tulken’s dissenting opinion in Sahin v Turkey (2005). For a more conciliatory perspective, see Howard, Law and the Wearing of Religious Symbols; McGoldrick, Human Rights.12 Brems, ‘Hidden under Headscarves?’, 19.13 Evans, ‘Islamic Scarf’, 52.14 Whistler and Hill, ‘Philosophy, Law, and Religion’.15 Sahin v Turkey, para. 55.16 Öztığ, ‘Turkish Constitutional Court’, 595.17 Quoted in Çınar, Modernity, Islam and Secularism, 81.18 Sahin v Turkey, para. 93.19 Ibid., para. 90–96.20 Turkish Constitutional Court, D. 7/3/1989 (1989).21 Note that the Constitutional Court of Turkey reversed this decision in 2014 with the Tuba Arslan decision. TCC 2014/256.22 Elver, Headscarf Controversy, 18.23 Sahin v Turkey, para. 101.24 Elver, Headscarf Controversy, 78.25 Sahin v Turkey, para. 114.26 Hoopes, ‘Leyla Şahin v. Turkey’, 722; Ringelheim, ‘State Religious Neutrality’, 38.27 Sahin v Turkey, para. 115.28 Ibid., para. 111; Dahlab v Switzerland, 27.29 Sahin v Turkey, para. 111–15.30 Dahlab v.Switzerland, 6–7.31 Ibid., 5.32 Dahlab v Switzerland, 7–8, Evans, ‘Islamic Scarf’, 59.33 McGoldrick, ‘Muslim Veiling Controversies’, 461.34 Dahlab v Switzerland, 1335 Evans, ‘Islamic Scarf’, 62–9.36 Dahlab v Switzerland, 13.37 Kurtulmuş v Turkey.38 Garahan, ‘Right to Discriminate?’, 352.39 Ebrahimian v France, para 37.40 Ibid., 44.41 Ibid., 25.42 Ibid., 44.43 Ibid., 61–4.44 Ibid., 72.45 Ringelheim, ‘State Religious Neutrality’, 32–3.46 Mirza, ‘Second Skin’, 10.47 Mahmood, ‘Feminist Theory’, 15.48 Asad, ‘Trying to Understand’, 501. I should note that I cite Talal Asad and Saba Mahmood as I find that their accounts of how practices can be an integral part of the practitioner very illuminating. However, I do not agree with Asad’s treatment of individuals in his narrative of ‘discursive tradition’. While Asad’s and Mahmood’s seminal work on agency, religion, and the secular is a valuable scholarly contribution in many ways, I also find their analysis limited to a certain type of Muslim experience.49 Ganley, ‘Racial Profiling’.50 Murdock, ‘Dressed to Repress?’, 180.51 Baumgarten, ‘Minority Dress Codes’, 289.52 Ibid., 290–1.53 Murdock, ‘Dressed to Repress?’, 180–93.54 Quataert, ‘Clothing Laws’, 403–7.55 Argıt, ‘Clothing Habits’, 81.56 See Gorski and Altınordu, ‘After Secularization?’.57 Casanova, Public Religions, 212.58 Ertit, Endişeli muhafazakarlar çağı, 101.59 For a similar discussion of accommodation of American Muslim individuals, see Moore, ‘Visible through the Veil’.60 Malik, ‘Complex Equality’, 129; Brems, ‘Hidden under Headscarves?’, 1.61 Karaduman v Turkey, 108; Dahlab v Switzerland, 2–13; Sahin v Turkey, para. 111; Dogru v France, para. 63–4; Aktas, Bayrak, Gamaleddyn, and Ghazal v. France, 2.62 Gürsel, ‘Distinction’, 380.63 ECtHR, Guide on Article 9, 31–2.64 Asad, ‘Trying to Understand,’ 501.65 Mirza, ‘Second Skin’, 10.66 Evans, Manual, 67.67 Ibid., 68.68 In a similar vein, some scholars suggest that the state should respond appropriately, employing the criminal law where necessary, in order to protect women against violence and coercion rather than imposing a blanket ban on headscarves. Although some Muslim girls/women might experience violence or might be coerced by their male relatives into wearing the headscarf, a blanket ban would not solve the problem effectively but rather would oppress autonomous women who choose to wear it. See Malik, ‘Complex Equality’, 143; Evans, ‘Islamic Scarf’, 73.69 Lautsi and Others v Italy, para. 72.70 Gunn, ‘Religious Symbols’, 113.71 Lautsi and Others v Italy; see the Administrative and Supreme Court’s decisions quoted in para. 15–16 and para. 35–6, respectively.72 For a short literature review, see Bhowon and Bundhoo, ‘Perceptions and Reasons’, 33–4. For other accounts, see Mahmood, Politics of Piety; Fernando, Republic Unsettled; Keaton, Muslims Girls; Abu Odeh, ‘Post-Colonial Feminism’; Abu Lughod, ‘Do Muslim Women?’; Hoodfar, ‘The Veil’; Almila and Inglis, Routledge International Handbook.73 Mirza, ‘Second Skin’.74 Peresin and Cervone, ‘Western Muhajirat’.75 Al Wazni, ‘Muslim Women’, 329.76 Rinaldo, Mobilizing Piety, 79; Albayrak, ‘Compressed Identity’.77 For example, see the veil as a symbol of resistance in the Algerian war of independence in El Guindi, Veil. See also, hijab poetry in which veiled women share their experiences of hijab: Amer, What is Veiling?.78 For example, see Huda Shaarawi’s decision regarding hijab in Lanfranchi, Casting off the Veil; Amer, What is Veiling?, 177.79 El Guindi, Veil, 172.80 Almila, Veiling in Fashion, 27 and ch. 1; Okutan, Türkiye’de popüler kültür.81 See Bhowon and Bundhoo, ‘Perceptions and Reasons’, 33–4; Furseth, ‘Hijab’.82 Hidayatullah, ‘Veil’, 702.83 For example, see Read and Bartkowski, ‘To Veil or Not to Veil?’, 400. See also Mernisi, Veil and the Male Elite, 75.84 Evans, Manual, 31.85 Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v Moldova, para. 118.86 I wish to highlight that the essential reason for the protection of religious organizations under the ECHR is to protect individuals, not for other political reasons such as a special agreement between a religious group and the state. In this context, religious groups do not indicate fixed political ties as individuals have free movement in and out of religious organizations, being members by choice. However, I have not referred to possible conflicts between an individual member and her religious organization – a complex subject that is beyond the scope of this article. Depending on the particularities of the cases, the ECtHR recognizes the organizational autonomy and the doctrinal independence of religious organizations when such conflicts occur. See Ferrari, Wonisch, and Medda-Windischer, ‘Tying the Knot’, 689.87 See Evans, Manual, 284–5.88 Eweida and Others v United Kingdom, para. 81.89 Pretty v UK, para 82.90 Evans, Manual, 11.91 Arrowsmith v UK, para 19.92 Evans, Freedom of Religion, 115.93 Hill and Whistler, Right to Wear Religious Symbols, 49–51.94 Jakobski v Poland, para. 45.95 Chaib, ‘Religious Accommodation’, 33.96 Hill and Whistler, Right to Wear Religious Symbols, 107.97 Ibid., 67.98 Ewieda v UK (2013), para. 82.99 Vakulenko, ‘Islamic Headscarves’, 190–6.100 Marshall, ‘Conditions for Freedom?’.
伊斯兰头巾:欧洲人权法院的其他宗教影响和宗教素养
伊斯兰头巾仍然是欧洲穆斯林最具争议的问题之一。为了分析头巾是如何通过欧洲人权价值观和道德原则的棱镜来评估的,本文回顾了在欧洲人权法院(ECtHR)审理的一些头巾案件。裁决中的弱点已被广泛研究,但本文将重点关注宗教个人,她的代理,以及她和她的相关群体之间的联系,这些在文献中讨论较少。文章强调,欧洲委员会国家的现代社会政治结构与它们的前现代同行有着显著的不同。因此,宗教团体的轮廓,个人与其相关团体之间的联系,以及各种宗教团体相对于国家的定位,都需要一套以个人信徒为中心的宗教主张的方法。这一点在《欧洲人权公约》的理论基础中可以清楚地看到,但是在实践中没有得到充分的贯彻,因为实际的裁决不仅涉及逻辑,而且还包括感知。关键词:宗教自由;《欧洲人权公约》第9条;穆斯林妇女和机构;世俗主义;国家中立性;法律与宗教;披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。注1参见Sullivan et al.,《宗教自由的政治》;Sandberg et al., Research Handbook;本文使用“伊斯兰面纱”作为一个总称,指的是穆斯林妇女所做的各种伊斯兰谦虚选择,如头巾和面纱。该条款是指在各自情况下的特定项目(头巾或面纱)。本文考察的四个主要案例都涉及到头巾3 .下列欧洲人权法院案件涉及中学生:Doğru诉法国(2008年)、Köse和Others诉土耳其(2006年)、Kervanci诉法国(2008年)、Aktas、Bayrak、Gamaleddyn和Ghazal诉法国(2009年)s.a.s.诉法国,第2段。135.5出处同上;Lachiri诉比利时,第2段。46个;见Ringelheim,“Lachiri诉比利时案”s.a.s.诉法国,第122段。同样,Al-Morsli诉法国案(2008年)的不可受理决定只涉及身份检查背景下头巾的实体Kaushik, ' Lachiri诉比利时',51.8 Sahin诉土耳其,第1段。17.9 Dahlab诉瑞士,710 Ebrahimian诉法国,第17段52个;达拉布诉瑞士,11分;萨欣诉土耳其,第2段。115;kurtulmukov土耳其。11例如,参见埃文斯的“伊斯兰头巾”;埃尔弗,头巾争议;布雷姆斯,“藏在头巾下?”Vakulenko,“伊斯兰头巾”;Evans和Petkoff,《便利的分离》;布莱伯格,《揭开真正的问题》;Mahmood和Danchin:“豁免还是管制?”Gunn,“公立学校的宗教符号”。另见图尔肯法官在Sahin诉土耳其案(2005年)中的反对意见。要了解更温和的观点,请参阅霍华德的《法律与宗教符号的佩戴》;麦戈德里克,《人权》,布雷姆斯,《隐藏在头巾下?》19.13埃文斯,“伊斯兰围巾”,52.14惠斯勒和希尔,“哲学,法律和宗教”萨欣诉土耳其,第2段。55.16 Öztığ,“土耳其宪法法院”,595.17引自Çınar,现代性,伊斯兰教和世俗主义,81.18 Sahin诉土耳其,第1段。93.19同上,第7段。1990 - 96.20土耳其宪法法院,1989年7月3日(1989).21请注意,土耳其宪法法院在2014年通过Tuba Arslan案推翻了这一决定。TCC 2014/256.22 Elver,头巾争议,18.23 Sahin v Turkey,第18段。101.24 Elver,头巾争议,78.25 Sahin诉土耳其,第1段。114.26 Hoopes, ' Leyla Şahin诉土耳其',722;Ringelheim,“国家宗教中立”,38.27 Sahin v Turkey,第2段。115.28同上,第7段111;Dahlab诉瑞士,27.29 Sahin诉土耳其,第2段。112 - 15.30 Dahlab诉瑞士,6-7.31同上,5.32 Dahlab诉瑞士,7-8,Evans,“伊斯兰头巾”,59.33 McGoldrick,“穆斯林面纱争议”,461.34 Dahlab诉瑞士,1335 Evans,“伊斯兰头巾”,62-9.36 Dahlab诉瑞士,13.37 kurtulmuul v土耳其,38 Garahan,“歧视权利?”’,352.39 Ebrahimian v France,第37.40同上,44.41同上,25.42同上,44.43同上,61-4.44同上,72.45 Ringelheim,“国家宗教中立”,32-3.46 Mirza,“第二皮肤”,10.47 Mahmood,“女权主义理论”,15.48 Asad,“试图理解”,501。我应该指出,我引用了Talal Asad和Saba Mahmood,因为我发现他们对实践如何成为实践者不可分割的一部分的描述非常有启发性。然而,我不同意阿萨德在他的“话语传统”叙述中对个人的处理。
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期刊介绍: Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations (ICMR) provides a forum for the academic exploration and discussion of the religious tradition of Islam, and of relations between Islam and other religions. It is edited by members of the Department of Theology and Religion, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, United Kingdom. The editors welcome articles on all aspects of Islam, and particularly on: •the religion and culture of Islam, historical and contemporary •Islam and its relations with other faiths and ideologies •Christian-Muslim relations. Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations is a refereed, academic journal. It publishes articles, documentation and reviews.
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