Da possibilidade de responsabilização moral do agente por resultados não desejados no curso de uma ação intencional: Estudo sobre ações intencionais e ações moralmente imprudentes conscientes no âmbito da filosofia da mente
{"title":"Da possibilidade de responsabilização moral do agente por resultados não desejados no curso de uma ação intencional: Estudo sobre ações intencionais e ações moralmente imprudentes conscientes no âmbito da filosofia da mente","authors":"Antonio Sanches Sólon Rudá","doi":"10.18012/arf.v10i2.63313","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In this work, I investigate some questions pertaining to intentional actions and consciously morally reckless actions, seeking to answer the question whether it is possible to morally hold the agent responsible morally for the unwanted results arising from his intentional actions. The first conclusion reached was that the result of an action that was not the object of the agent's intention is a mere consequence of the main action, however, the action that provoked it can be characterized as a consciously morally reckless action. The second conclusion is that, yes, the unwanted results arising from an intentional action are also the moral responsibility of the causative agent, therefore, it is reasonable to hold him responsible for this.","PeriodicalId":268271,"journal":{"name":"Aufklärung: journal of philosophy","volume":"63 ","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Aufklärung: journal of philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.18012/arf.v10i2.63313","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
In this work, I investigate some questions pertaining to intentional actions and consciously morally reckless actions, seeking to answer the question whether it is possible to morally hold the agent responsible morally for the unwanted results arising from his intentional actions. The first conclusion reached was that the result of an action that was not the object of the agent's intention is a mere consequence of the main action, however, the action that provoked it can be characterized as a consciously morally reckless action. The second conclusion is that, yes, the unwanted results arising from an intentional action are also the moral responsibility of the causative agent, therefore, it is reasonable to hold him responsible for this.