{"title":"Decolonising Philosophy","authors":"Dylan B. Futter","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2023.2248410","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"AbstractIn its attempt to deflate of the pretensions of ‘Western knowledge’, the epistemic decolonisation movement carries on the work of Socrates, who sought to persuade those who thought that they were wise but were not, that they were not. Yet in its determination to recover and elevate indigenous systems of thought, decolonisation seems opposed to this very work, which is always corrosive of inherited belief. Decolonisation both expresses and contradicts the spirit of Socratic philosophy. Notes1 Matolino Citation2020, p. 215.2 I sometimes use the term ‘decolonisation’ as shorthand for ‘the decolonisation movement’ and cognate phrases; context will make this clear. On the wrongs of colonialism, see, for example, Pillay Citation2015 and Matolino Citation2020, p. 213.3 On epistemicide, see Grosfoguel Citation2013 and Tobi Citation2020. See also Táíwò Citation2019, pp. 141–142 and, more generally, Valentini Citation2015.4 See wa Thiong’o Citation1986; Hountondji Citation1995; and Táíwò Citation2019. See also Wiredu Citation1998, pp. 17 and 22.5 Mitova Citation2020, p. 191. See also Mbembe Citation2015 and Etieyibo Citation2016.6 wa Thiong’o Citation1986, p. 87, as paraphrased by Mbembe Citation2015.7 Plato, Apology of Socrates, 38a and passim.8 Plato, Republic, book VII, 537e ff. For more on the relationship between inquiry and detachment, see section 6. On the conflict between philosophy and traditional belief, see also Oruka Citation1990, p. 44.9 This account is compatible with the analysis of Tobi Citation2020, pp. 259 ff.10 Cf. Táíwò Citation2019, p. 149.11 Matolino Citation2020, p. 221. I use the term ‘intellectual’ to mean ‘relating to ideas’ in the sense defined in the text.12 See Wiredu Citation2002, p. 58 and Ramose Citation2016. For Wiredu, decolonisation means ‘divesting African philosophical thinking of all undue influences emanating from our colonial past’ (Citation1998, p. 17).13 See Emmanuel Citation2019, pp. 1–3. I do not take a position on the merits of free trade or protectionism in economics.14 Plutarch, Life of Cato the Elder, 22, and Nasr Citation1968.15 Emmanuel Citation2019, pp. 3 and 14.16 See Wiredu Citation2002, pp. 17 and 20. See also Etieyibo 2016, pp. 404–405.17 I do not claim that African philosophy is to be identified with traditional belief, only that it must begin with this. As Wiredu puts the point, decolonisation seeks to recover an African ‘philosophic inheritance in its true lineaments’ (Citation2002, p. 58); he speaks also of bringing ‘oneself to a vantage point for viewing African thought materials in their true light’ (ibid.). Cf. also Wiredu Citation1984, p. 34 and Eze Citation2001, p. 207. To be sure, the difficulty of reconciling a historical account of intellectual ownership with the demand for philosophical self-examination is a primary concern of this paper.18 See Wiredu Citation2002, p. 17.19 See Ndlovu-Gatsheni Citation2017, p. 51. Similarly, Eze remarks that ‘[t]heories … should be able to flow from one place to another precisely because no one culture or tradition of inquiry has a monopoly on the production of knowledge’ (Citation2001, p. 209). Compare also Wiredu’s claim that it is ‘the responsibility of contemporary African philosophers to delve beneath the communal beliefs to find their underlying reasons wherever possible’ (Wiredu Citation2002, p. 26).20 Emmanuel Citation2019, p. 4. See also Etieyibo 2016 and Matolino Citation2020, p. 213. Fanon’s work, which seeks to ‘liberate the black man from the arsenal of complexes that germinated in the colonial situation’ (Citation2008, p. 14) is, of course, seminal.21 Wiredu Citation2002, p. 22.22 Wiredu Citation1998; Citation2002, p. 56. For a detailed discussion of Wiredu’s position on decolonisation, see Futter Citation2023.23 See Wiredu Citation2002, pp. 54 and 58. See also Wiredu Citation2004, p. 4.24 According to Emmanuel, there is in Wiredu’s account ‘no privileging of African ideas simply because they are of African origin’ (op. cit., 8). I don’t believe that this is true, for reasons given in the text. Certainly, Wiredu is committed to the critical evaluation of African ideas after they have been excavated, on which see section 6 below. See also Hountondji Citation1995.25 Wiredu 1996, p. 136.26 As noted above, decolonisation is on my view committed to an account of African philosophy as ethnophilosophy. There are, of course, different of what this means (see Agada Citation2020) On the rehabilitation and redefinition of ethnophilosophy in response to Paulin Hountondji’s well-known criticisms, see Hallen Citation2010.27 But see Eze Citation2001.28 According to Plutarch, Cato held that Socrates was ‘as a mighty prattler, who attempted, as best he could, to be his country’s tyrant, by abolishing its customs, and by enticing his fellow citizens into opinions contrary to the laws’ (Life of Cato the Elder, 23).29 Ndlovu-Gatsheni Citation2017, p. 51.30 See Lear Citation2003.31 Cf. Táíwò Citation1998, p. 4.32 See Plato, Phaedo 65d–66a and Republic 514a–517c and wa Thiong’o Citation1986, p. 87.33 Wiredu Citation1998, p. 20.34 I discuss the idea of laying claim to ancestral methods later on in this section.35 These questions, slightly reframed, are borrowed from Wiredu Citation1998, p. 23. Similar questions can be asked at the level of doctrines and arguments.36 Cf. Wiredu Citation2002, p. 61.37 See Wiredu Citation1984, p. 33.38 For further discussion of this point, see Futter Citation2016a.39 See Metz Citation2007 and Ramose Citation2007. See also Futter Citation2016b.40 See Hadot Citation1995; Citation2002.41 Hadot Citation1995, p. 73.42 Cf. Hountondji Citation1970, p. 122.43 I here bypass the debate between philosophical universalists and particularists. See Eze Citation2001 and the responses by Jones Citation2001 and Matolino Citation2015. Compare also Hountondji’s claim that ‘philosophy everywhere must carry the stamp of criticality and analyticity if it must count as philosophy (quoted in Agada Citation2020, p. 7).44 Lear Citation1998, p. 5. I would like to thank two anonymous referees for Philosophical Papers for comments that have helped me to improve this paper. My research is supported by the National Research Foundation of South Africa.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5000,"publicationDate":"2023-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"7","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Philosophical Papers","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2023.2248410","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
Abstract
AbstractIn its attempt to deflate of the pretensions of ‘Western knowledge’, the epistemic decolonisation movement carries on the work of Socrates, who sought to persuade those who thought that they were wise but were not, that they were not. Yet in its determination to recover and elevate indigenous systems of thought, decolonisation seems opposed to this very work, which is always corrosive of inherited belief. Decolonisation both expresses and contradicts the spirit of Socratic philosophy. Notes1 Matolino Citation2020, p. 215.2 I sometimes use the term ‘decolonisation’ as shorthand for ‘the decolonisation movement’ and cognate phrases; context will make this clear. On the wrongs of colonialism, see, for example, Pillay Citation2015 and Matolino Citation2020, p. 213.3 On epistemicide, see Grosfoguel Citation2013 and Tobi Citation2020. See also Táíwò Citation2019, pp. 141–142 and, more generally, Valentini Citation2015.4 See wa Thiong’o Citation1986; Hountondji Citation1995; and Táíwò Citation2019. See also Wiredu Citation1998, pp. 17 and 22.5 Mitova Citation2020, p. 191. See also Mbembe Citation2015 and Etieyibo Citation2016.6 wa Thiong’o Citation1986, p. 87, as paraphrased by Mbembe Citation2015.7 Plato, Apology of Socrates, 38a and passim.8 Plato, Republic, book VII, 537e ff. For more on the relationship between inquiry and detachment, see section 6. On the conflict between philosophy and traditional belief, see also Oruka Citation1990, p. 44.9 This account is compatible with the analysis of Tobi Citation2020, pp. 259 ff.10 Cf. Táíwò Citation2019, p. 149.11 Matolino Citation2020, p. 221. I use the term ‘intellectual’ to mean ‘relating to ideas’ in the sense defined in the text.12 See Wiredu Citation2002, p. 58 and Ramose Citation2016. For Wiredu, decolonisation means ‘divesting African philosophical thinking of all undue influences emanating from our colonial past’ (Citation1998, p. 17).13 See Emmanuel Citation2019, pp. 1–3. I do not take a position on the merits of free trade or protectionism in economics.14 Plutarch, Life of Cato the Elder, 22, and Nasr Citation1968.15 Emmanuel Citation2019, pp. 3 and 14.16 See Wiredu Citation2002, pp. 17 and 20. See also Etieyibo 2016, pp. 404–405.17 I do not claim that African philosophy is to be identified with traditional belief, only that it must begin with this. As Wiredu puts the point, decolonisation seeks to recover an African ‘philosophic inheritance in its true lineaments’ (Citation2002, p. 58); he speaks also of bringing ‘oneself to a vantage point for viewing African thought materials in their true light’ (ibid.). Cf. also Wiredu Citation1984, p. 34 and Eze Citation2001, p. 207. To be sure, the difficulty of reconciling a historical account of intellectual ownership with the demand for philosophical self-examination is a primary concern of this paper.18 See Wiredu Citation2002, p. 17.19 See Ndlovu-Gatsheni Citation2017, p. 51. Similarly, Eze remarks that ‘[t]heories … should be able to flow from one place to another precisely because no one culture or tradition of inquiry has a monopoly on the production of knowledge’ (Citation2001, p. 209). Compare also Wiredu’s claim that it is ‘the responsibility of contemporary African philosophers to delve beneath the communal beliefs to find their underlying reasons wherever possible’ (Wiredu Citation2002, p. 26).20 Emmanuel Citation2019, p. 4. See also Etieyibo 2016 and Matolino Citation2020, p. 213. Fanon’s work, which seeks to ‘liberate the black man from the arsenal of complexes that germinated in the colonial situation’ (Citation2008, p. 14) is, of course, seminal.21 Wiredu Citation2002, p. 22.22 Wiredu Citation1998; Citation2002, p. 56. For a detailed discussion of Wiredu’s position on decolonisation, see Futter Citation2023.23 See Wiredu Citation2002, pp. 54 and 58. See also Wiredu Citation2004, p. 4.24 According to Emmanuel, there is in Wiredu’s account ‘no privileging of African ideas simply because they are of African origin’ (op. cit., 8). I don’t believe that this is true, for reasons given in the text. Certainly, Wiredu is committed to the critical evaluation of African ideas after they have been excavated, on which see section 6 below. See also Hountondji Citation1995.25 Wiredu 1996, p. 136.26 As noted above, decolonisation is on my view committed to an account of African philosophy as ethnophilosophy. There are, of course, different of what this means (see Agada Citation2020) On the rehabilitation and redefinition of ethnophilosophy in response to Paulin Hountondji’s well-known criticisms, see Hallen Citation2010.27 But see Eze Citation2001.28 According to Plutarch, Cato held that Socrates was ‘as a mighty prattler, who attempted, as best he could, to be his country’s tyrant, by abolishing its customs, and by enticing his fellow citizens into opinions contrary to the laws’ (Life of Cato the Elder, 23).29 Ndlovu-Gatsheni Citation2017, p. 51.30 See Lear Citation2003.31 Cf. Táíwò Citation1998, p. 4.32 See Plato, Phaedo 65d–66a and Republic 514a–517c and wa Thiong’o Citation1986, p. 87.33 Wiredu Citation1998, p. 20.34 I discuss the idea of laying claim to ancestral methods later on in this section.35 These questions, slightly reframed, are borrowed from Wiredu Citation1998, p. 23. Similar questions can be asked at the level of doctrines and arguments.36 Cf. Wiredu Citation2002, p. 61.37 See Wiredu Citation1984, p. 33.38 For further discussion of this point, see Futter Citation2016a.39 See Metz Citation2007 and Ramose Citation2007. See also Futter Citation2016b.40 See Hadot Citation1995; Citation2002.41 Hadot Citation1995, p. 73.42 Cf. Hountondji Citation1970, p. 122.43 I here bypass the debate between philosophical universalists and particularists. See Eze Citation2001 and the responses by Jones Citation2001 and Matolino Citation2015. Compare also Hountondji’s claim that ‘philosophy everywhere must carry the stamp of criticality and analyticity if it must count as philosophy (quoted in Agada Citation2020, p. 7).44 Lear Citation1998, p. 5. I would like to thank two anonymous referees for Philosophical Papers for comments that have helped me to improve this paper. My research is supported by the National Research Foundation of South Africa.
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Philosophical Papers is an international, generalist journal of philosophy edited in South Africa Original Articles: Articles appearing in regular issues are original, high-quality, and stand-alone, and are written for the general professional philosopher. Submissions are welcome in any area of philosophy and undergo a process of peer review based on initial editor screening and refereeing by (usually) two referees. Special Issues: Topic-based special issues are comprised of both invited and submitted papers selected by guest editors. Recent special issues have included ''Philosophy''s Therapeutic Potential'' (2014, editor Dylan Futter); ''Aging and the Elderly'' (2012, editors Tom Martin and Samantha Vice); ''The Problem of the Criterion'' (2011, editor Mark Nelson); ''Retributive Emotions'' (2010, editor Lucy Allais); ‘Rape and its Meaning/s’ (2009, editor Louise du Toit). Calls for papers for upcoming special issues can be found here. Ideas for future special issues are welcome.