You want me, but I no longer want you. The punishment-reward mechanism and institutional quality in Italian regions

IF 2.2 Q2 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Contemporary Italian Politics Pub Date : 2023-09-24 DOI:10.1080/23248823.2023.2258470

Marzia Ippolito, Salvatore Ercolano, Lorenzo Cicatiello

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Abstract

ABSTRACTFollowing the principal theory concerning the foundations of voting behaviour it is possible to assert that citizens hold politicians and their parties accountable through their votes. From this perspective, if citizens perceive the quality of local institutions to be a result of the policies enacted by local authorities they may punish or reward the incumbent parties. By means of a quantitative approach, our results, based on the analysis of 15 different election rounds, show that various dimensions of institutional quality impact voting behaviour in Italian provinces. The punishment-reward mechanism suggests that political preferences change because local institutions lack quality.KEYWORDS: Punishment-reward mechanismquality of institutionsvoting behaviourItalian provinces Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Compliance with ethical standardsThe authors have no conflicts of interest to declare. All co-authors have seen and agree with the contents of the manuscript and there is no financial interest to report. We certify that the submission is original work and is not under review for any other publication.Additional informationNotes on contributorsMarzia IppolitoMarzia Ippolito is a research fellow at the University of Basilicata - Department of Mathematics, Computer Science and Economics. Her research focuses on public economy; data analysis and quantitative methods; economic inequality, and political and economic trends in the European Union.Salvatore ErcolanoSalvatore Ercolano is Associate Professor of political economy at the University of Basilicata. His research focuses on political economy; public economics; environmental economics; cultural economics, and the evaluation of public policies.Lorenzo CicatielloLorenzo Cicatiello is Assistant Professor of economics in the Department of Human and Social Sciences, University of Naples L’Orientale. His research focuses on transparency, institutions and political participation.

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你需要我，我却不再需要你。意大利地区奖惩机制与制度质量

摘要根据有关投票行为基础的主要理论，可以断言公民通过投票对政治家及其政党负责。从这个角度来看，如果公民认为地方机构的质量是地方当局制定的政策的结果，他们可能会惩罚或奖励现任政党。通过定量方法，我们的结果基于对15轮不同选举的分析，表明制度质量的各个维度影响意大利各省的投票行为。奖惩机制表明，由于地方制度缺乏质量，政治偏好发生了变化。关键词:奖惩机制机构质量投票行为意大利各省披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。作者无利益冲突需要声明。所有共同作者都看过并同意稿件内容，没有经济利益需要报告。我们保证提交的作品是原创作品，没有被任何其他出版物审查过。作者简介:marzia Ippolito是巴西利卡塔大学数学、计算机科学和经济系的一名研究员。她的研究重点是公共经济;数据分析和定量方法;经济不平等，以及欧盟的政治和经济趋势。Salvatore Ercolano是巴西利卡塔大学政治经济学副教授。他的研究重点是政治经济学;公共经济学;环境经济学;文化经济学，以及公共政策的评估。Lorenzo Cicatiello，那不勒斯东方大学人文与社会科学系经济学助理教授。他的研究重点是透明度、制度和政治参与。

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来源期刊

Contemporary Italian Politics Social Sciences-Political Science and International Relations

CiteScore

4.40

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Contemporary Italian Politics, formerly Bulletin of Italian Politics, is a political science journal aimed at academics and policy makers as well as others with a professional or intellectual interest in the politics of Italy. The journal has two main aims: Firstly, to provide rigorous analysis, in the English language, about the politics of what is one of the European Union’s four largest states in terms of population and Gross Domestic Product. We seek to do this aware that too often those in the English-speaking world looking for incisive analysis and insight into the latest trends and developments in Italian politics are likely to be stymied by two contrasting difficulties. On the one hand, they can turn to the daily and weekly print media. Here they will find information on the latest developments, sure enough; but much of it is likely to lack the incisiveness of academic writing and may even be straightforwardly inaccurate. On the other hand, readers can turn either to general political science journals – but here they will have to face the issue of fragmented information – or to specific journals on Italy – in which case they will find that politics is considered only insofar as it is part of the broader field of modern Italian studies[...] The second aim follows from the first insofar as, in seeking to achieve it, we hope thereby to provide analysis that readers will find genuinely useful. With research funding bodies of all kinds giving increasing emphasis to knowledge transfer and increasingly demanding of applicants that they demonstrate the relevance of what they are doing to non-academic ‘end users’, political scientists have a self-interested motive for attempting a closer engagement with outside practitioners.