Frege’s Theory of Proper Names

Abstract

Gottlob Frege, in order to explain the relationship between language and reality, believes that in addition to the subjective meaning and external reference of words, related to the words and signs in their entirety, there is also a third thing that expresses how the words designate or stand for external references. Frege calls this third phenomenon the sense of words. Sense is the mode of presentation of reference which is designated by a proper name. Sense contrary to meaning, which is subjective and personal, is an objective and external matter that everyone can enjoy or access to it. Frege’s theory will be examined in this article with the aim of showing how the theory is incomplete. Besides the fact that there is an inconsistency in his view concerning the nature of meaning (Frege considers sense sometimes objective and on other occasions something imaginary.), his argument to prove the objectivity of sense is unsuccessful. Even if we accept his assumption of the objectivity of sense, Frege cannot drive the problem of psychologism out of the path of human knowledge. That is, Frege fails to achieve its original objective; proving that psychologism is wrong.