Investor Relations as Strategic Communication: Insights from Evolutionary Psychology

IF 2.3 Q1 COMMUNICATION
Christian Pieter Hoffmann
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

ABSTRACTThe investor relations (IR) function emerged from the need to limit information asymmetries between management and shareholders. As a result, the mandatory disclosure of material information is at the heart of the IR task. Over the years, however, investor relations has evolved into a strategic communication function, responsible for a wide array of voluntary disclosure activities, for relationship management, and executive advisory. Empirical studies document the positive impact of these IR efforts on share prices. Notably, these empirical insights point to tensions emanating from a strategic IR role: According to current regulatory frameworks, voluntary communication beyond mandatory disclosures should not be price-sensitive, and thus should not affect corporate value. To date, there is no authoritative theoretical account for the strategic role of investor relations. Some argue that IR shapes investor perceptions through sensegiving, by fostering social ties, or due to investors’ cognitive biases. This contribution proposes that evolutionary psychology allows for a more comprehensive theoretical account of the strategic role of investor relations. It reviews insights from evolutionary psychology and relates them to established concepts and empirical findings from IR research. It discusses avenues for future research and limitations to an evolutionary psychology perspective on strategic investor relations. Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
投资者关系作为战略沟通:来自进化心理学的见解
摘要投资者关系函数是为了限制管理层与股东之间的信息不对称而产生的。因此,强制披露重大信息是IR任务的核心。然而,多年来,投资者关系已演变为一种战略沟通功能,负责广泛的自愿披露活动、关系管理和执行咨询。实证研究证明了这些IR努力对股价的积极影响。值得注意的是,这些实证见解指出了战略性IR角色所产生的紧张关系:根据目前的监管框架,强制性披露之外的自愿沟通不应该对价格敏感,因此不应该影响公司价值。迄今为止,还没有权威的理论解释投资者关系的战略作用。一些人认为,IR通过感官赋予、通过培养社会关系或由于投资者的认知偏见来塑造投资者的看法。这一贡献表明,进化心理学允许对投资者关系的战略作用进行更全面的理论解释。它回顾了进化心理学的见解,并将它们与IR研究的既定概念和实证结果联系起来。它讨论了未来研究的途径以及进化心理学视角下战略投资者关系的局限性。披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。
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来源期刊
International Journal of Strategic Communication
International Journal of Strategic Communication Social Sciences-Sociology and Political Science
CiteScore
3.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
39
期刊介绍: The International Journal of Strategic Communication examines the philosophical, theoretical, and applied nature of strategic communication, which is “the purposeful use of communication by an organization to fulfill its mission.” IJSC provides a foundation for the study of strategic communication from diverse disciplines, including corporate and managerial communication, organizational communication, public relations, marketing communication, advertising, political and health communication, social marketing, international relations, public diplomacy, and other specialized communication areas. The IJSC is the singular forum for multidisciplinary inquiry of this nature.
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