Anticipatory consent to military intervention: analysis in the wake of the coup d’état in Niger in 2023

Abstract

ABSTRACTFollowing the coup d’état in Niger on 26 July 2023, the situation in Niger remains tense. However, it is not the coup against a democratically elected government itself that attracts attention from an international law perspective, but the threat by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to intervene militarily in Niger to restore the pre-coup balance of power. The international legal assessment of ECOWAS’s threat to use force not only raises common questions within the doctrine of ‘intervention by invitation’, but also highlights the relevance of a problem about which there is little clarity in international legal doctrine – the problem of forward-looking intervention treaties containing anticipatory invitations. Using the case of Niger as a starting point, this article aims to examine the legal concept of anticipatory intervention treaties in the jus ad bellum, before ultimately applying the results of this legal analysis to the case of Niger.KEYWORDS: Use of forceJus ad bellumintervention by invitationanticipatory invitationtreaty-based consentcoup d’état AcknowledgementsThe author would like to thank Claus Kreß for his invaluable comments on previous drafts, as well as James A Green and Marcus Hickleton for their helpful remarks and editorial guidance.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Sarah Dean, Niamh Kennedy and Larry Madowo, ‘Niger soldiers claim power after president’s own guards reportedly seize him’, CNN (27 July 2023) https://edition.cnn.com/2023/07/26/africa/niger-presidency-attempted-coup-intl/index.html.2 Peter Beaumont, ‘Gabon military officers declare coup after Ali Bongo wins disputed election’, The Guardian (31 August 2013) www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/30/gabon-coup-military-takeover-gabonese-election-disputed.3 The coup d’état in Gabon was the first in recent years in a member state of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). ECCAS condemned the coup on 31 August 2023 and announced that an ECCAS Peace and Security Council will be convened soon to discuss the issue: ECCAS, ‘Communique sur la Situation Politique au Gabon’ (30 August 2023) https://ceeac-eccas.org/2023/08/31/communique-sur-la-situation-politique-au-gabon/. The AU has suspended Gabon’s membership in the AU: see African Union, ‘Communique of the 1172nd of the PSC held on 31 August 2023, on the situation in the Republic of Gabon’ (31 August 2023) https://peaceau.org/en/article/communique-of-the-1172nd-of-the-psc-held-on-31-august-2023-on-the-situation-in-the-republic-of-gabon. To the fact, however, that ECCAS’s ability to have an impact on the situation may be limited due to its close ties to Gabon, see Alexander Hudson and David Towriss, ‘Two More Coups in Africa: Similarities, Differences, and What Comes Next’, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (5 September 2023) www.idea.int/blog/two-more-coups-africa-similarities-differences-and-what-comes-next).4 Declan Walsh, ‘Coast to coast, a corridor of coups brings turmoil in Africa’, New York Times (29 July 2023) www.nytimes.com/2023/07/29/world/africa/africa-coups-niger.html.5 See ‘Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security’ (10 December 1999) https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Protocol-Relating-to-the-Mechanism-for-Conflict-Prevention-Management-Resolution-Peace-Keeping-and-Security-1999.pdf (Lomé Protocol).6 Svenja Raube, Die antizipierte Einladung zur militärischen Gewaltanwendung im Völkerrecht (Nomos Verlag, 2023).7 ‘Niger general Tchiani named head of transitional government after coup’, Al Jazeera (28 July 2023) www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/28/niger-general-tchiani-named-head-of-transitional-government-after-coup.8 Paul Melly, ‘Niger’s coup leader General Tchiani: The ex-UN peacekeeper who seized power’, BBC News (10 August 2023) www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66430115.9 ECOWAS Commission, ‘Fifty First Extraordinary Summit of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government on the Political Situation in Niger’ (Final Communique, 30 July 2023) https://ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Final-Communique_ENG-2_230730_161029.pdf.10 ‘Niger coup: Burkina Faso, Mali warn against intervention’, DW (1 August 2023) www.dw.com/en/burkina-faso-mali-warn-against-military-intervention-in-niger/a-66402134.11 ECOWAS Commission, ‘Second Extraordinary Summit of the Ecowas Authority of Heads of State and Government on the Political Situation in Niger’ (Final Communique, 10 August 2023) https://ecowas.int/final-communique-second-extraordinary-summit-of-the-ecowas-authority-of-heads-of-state-and-government-on-the-political-situation-in-niger/.12 Adam Taylor, ‘West African bloc says it is ready for “D-Day” intervention in Niger’, Washington Post (18 August 2023) www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/08/18/niger-ecowas-military-intervention-coup/.13 ‘Niger coup leader proposes a three-year transition of power’, Al Jazeera (20 August 2023) www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/20/niger-coup-leader-proposes-three-year-transition-to-civilian-rule; Peter Beaumont, ‘African Union issues ambiguous view on possible Niger military intervention’, The Guardian (22 August 2023) www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/22/african-union-issues-ambiguous-view-on-possible-niger-military-intervention.14 United Nations, ‘Security Council Press Statement on Situation in Niger’ (Press Release, 28 July 2023) https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15372.doc.htm#:~:text=The%20members%20of%20the%20Security%20Council%20called%20for%20the%20immediate,and%20members%20of%20his%20Government.15 African Union, ‘Communique of the 1164th Meeting of the PSC held on 28 July 2023, on the Situation in the Republic of Niger’ (28 July 2023) www.peaceau.org/en/article/communique-of-the-1164th-meeting-of-the-psc-held-on-28-july-2023-on-the-situation-in-the-republic-of-niger.16 Council of the European Union, ‘Statement by the High Representative on Behalf of the EU on the Situation in Niger’ (28 July 2023) www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/07/28/niger-statement-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-eu/.17 ‘Emmanuel Macron condamne “avec la plus grande fermeté” le coup d’État au Niger’, France 24 (28 July 2023) www.france24.com/fr/afrique/20230728-pour-la-france-la-tentative-de-coup-de-force-au-niger-n-est-pas-d%C3%A9finitive.18 ‘Auswärtiges Amt zu den jüngsten Entwicklungen in Niger’, Auswärtiges Amt (27 July 2023) www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/newsroom/-/2610290#:~:text=Wir%20verfolgen%20die%20Ereignisse%20in,und%20in%20ihre%20Unterk%C3%BCnfte%20zur%C3%BCckzukehren.19 Matthew Miller, ‘Press Statement on Reports of an Attempted Takeover in Niger’, US Department of State (26 July 2023) www.state.gov/on-reports-of-an-attempted-takeover-in-niger/.20 ‘African Union, world leaders condemn “attempted coup” in Niger’, Al Jazeera (26 July 2023) www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/26/african-union-world-leaders-condemn-attempted-coup-in-niger.21 ‘World Bank “strongly condemns” efforts to destabilize Niger’, Reuters (26 July 2023) www.reuters.com/article/niger-security-worldbank-idAFL1N39C3FQ.22 Security Council Press Statement (n 14).23 United Nations, ‘Statement Attributable to the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General – on Niger’ (26 July 2023) www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2023-07-26/statement-attributable-the-spokesperson-for-the-secretary-general-niger-scroll-down-for-french-0#:~:text=The%20Secretary%2DGeneral%20strongly%20condemns,his%20safety%20and%20well%2Dbeing.24 ‘Niger coup: West African leaders suspend ties with junta’, DW (30 July 2023) www.dw.com/en/niger-coup-west-african-leaders-suspend-ties-with-junta/a-66386858; Niamh Kennedy and Pierre Bairin, ‘African Union suspends Niger in crackdown over coup’, CNN (22 August 2023) https://edition.cnn.com/2023/08/22/africa/african-union-suspends-niger-intl/index.html.25 ‘Most of West Africa ready to join standby force in Niger: ECOWAS’, Al Jazeera (17 August 2023) www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/17/most-ecowas-members-ready-to-join-standby-force-in-niger-commissioner.26 ‘Mali and Burkina Faso warn against any foreign military intervention in Niger’, Africa News (1 August 2023) www.africanews.com/2023/08/01/mali-and-burkina-faso-warn-against-any-foreign-military-intervention-in-niger/.27 ‘Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali form military pact’, DW (25 August 2023) www.dw.com/en/niger-burkina-faso-and-mali-form-military-pact/a-66628372#.28 ‘Niger: Army delegation thanks Guinean government for “support” after coup’, Africa News (13 August 2023) www.africanews.com/2023/08/13/niger-army-delegation-thanks-guinean-government-for-support-after-coup/.29 African Union (n 15).30 African Union, ‘Communiqué of the Chairperson of the AU Commission in Support of the 10 August 2023 ECOWAS Decisions Regarding Niger’ (Press Release, 11 August 2023) https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20230811/communique-support-10-august-2023-ecowas-decisions-regarding-niger.31 Beaumont (n 13).32 ‘Algeria delves into Niger crisis, seeks support for compromise initiative’, The Arab Weekly (30 August 2023) https://thearabweekly.com/algeria-delves-niger-crisis-seeks-support-compromise-initiative. The Algerian president stressed that ‘a military intervention could ignite the whole Sahel region and Algeria will not use force with its neighbours’: see Beaumont (n 13).33 France Diplomacy, ‘Niger – Communique issued by the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs’ (10 August 2023) www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/niger/news/article/niger-communique-issued-by-the-ministry-for-europe-and-foreign-affairs-10-08-23.34 Antony J Blinken, ‘ECOWAS Call for Restoration of Constitutional Order in the Republic of Niger’, US Department of State (10 August 2023) www.state.gov/ecowas-call-for-restoration-of-constitutional-order-in-the-republic-of-niger/.35 Russell Buchan and Nicholas Tsagourias, ‘The Niger Coup and the Prospect of ECOWAS Military Intervention: An International Law Appraisal’, Lieber Institute, West Point (21 August 2023) https://lieber.westpoint.edu/niger-coup-ecowas-military-intervention-international-law-appraisal/.36 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (advisory opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226, para 47.37 Buchan and Tsagourias furthermore point to the fact that such an authorisation is rather unlikely in the current moment, noting the fact ‘that the Council’s permanent veto-wielding members are engaged in a bitter and multifaceted competition’: see Buchan and Tsagourias (n 35).38 Buchan and Tsagourias (n 35).39 Claus Kreß and Benjamin Nußberger, ‘Pro-Democratic Intervention in Current International Law: The Case of The Gambia in January 2017’ (2017) 4 Journal on the Use of Force and International Law 239, 244–6.40 For a pledge in favour, however, see W Michael Reisman, ‘Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing Charter Article 2(4)’ (1984) 78 American Journal of International Law 642, 643–4.41 Kreß and Nußberger (n 39); Buchan and Tsagourias (n 35).42 Olivier Corten, The Law Against War, The Prohibition on the Use of Force in Contemporary International Law (Hart Publishing, 2nd edn 2021) 254; Georg Nolte, ‘Intervention by Invitation’ (2010) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law para 16; Chiara Redaelli, Intervention in Civil Wars: Effectiveness, Legitimacy and Human Rights (Hart Publishing, 2021) 67. Within the predominant view, positions diverge as to why intervention upon invitation falls outside the scope of Article 2(4) UN Charter. For a helpful overview of the diverging views, see Laura Visser, ‘May the Force Be with You: The Legal Classification of Intervention by Invitation’ (2019) 66 Netherlands International Law Review 21, 40–2. According to another view in the scholarship, an invitation has justificatory effect: see Florian Kriener, ‘Invitation – Excluding ab initio a Breach of Art. 2 (4) UNCh or a Preclusion of Wrongfulness?’ (2019) 79 Zeitschrift für ausländisches und öffentliches Recht 643; Federica Paddeu, ‘Military Assistance on Request and General Reasons against Force: Consent as a Defence to the Prohibition of Force’ (2020) 7 Journal on the Use of Force and International Law 227.43 Erika de Wet, ‘Military Assistance based on Ex-Ante Consent: A Violation of Article 2(4) UN Charter?’ (2020) 93 Die Friedens-Warte 413, 414–5.44 ‘Niger junta rejects African, UN diplomatic mission’, DW (8 August 2023) www.dw.com/en/niger-junta-rejects-african-un-diplomatic-mission/a-66457424.45 Elise Barthet and Morgane Le Cam, ‘Niger: France was asked to intervene to free President Bazoum’, Le Monde (19 August 2023) www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/08/19/niger-confirms-france-was-asked-to-intervene-to-free-president-bazoum_6098979_4.html.46 Mohamed Bazoum, ‘President of Niger: My country is under attack and I’ve been taken hostage’, Washington Post (3 August 2023) www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/08/03/mohamed-bazoum-coup-niger-democracy/.47 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, para 246; Erika de Wet, ‘The Modern Practice of Intervention by Invitation in Africa and its Implications for the Prohibition of the Use of Force’ (2016) 26 The European Journal of International Law 979, 981.48 Erika de Wet, Military Assistance on Request and the Use of Force (Oxford University Press, 2020) 21.49 Letizia Lo Giacco, ‘“Intervention by Invitation” and the Construction of the Authority of the Effective Control Test in Legal Argumentation’ (2019) 79 Heidelberg Journal of International Law 1.50 Brad Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law (Oxford University Press, 1999).51 Philippe Gerard, ‘Peacekeeping, Politics, and the 1994 US Intervention in Haiti’ (2004) 24(1) Journal of Conflict Studies 20.52 Corten (n 42) 286.53 Benjamin Nußberger, ‘Military Strikes in Yemen in 2015: Intervention by Invitation and Self-Defence in the Course of Yemen’s “Model Transitional Process”’ (2017) 4 Journal on the Use of Force and International Law 110.54 For a detailed analysis, see Kreß and Nußberger (n 39).55 De Wet (n 48) 73.56 Ibid, 67, who inter alia cites the following examples: the Afghan Transitional Authority negotiated under UN auspices in December 2001, the Iraqi Transitional Government of 2004, the Malian Transitional Government of 2012 (under ECOWAS), and the National Transitional Council of the Central African Republic of 2013 (under AU and ECCAS).57 Corten (n 42) 277–80.58 De Wet (n 48) 21.59 Dalal Mawad, Sarah Dean and Sana Noor Haq, ‘Niger army endorses presidential coup plotters despite international condemnation’, CNN (27 July 2023) https://edition.cnn.com/2023/07/27/africa/niger-army-backs-presidential-coup-intl/index.html.60 Press Statement by the Security Council (n 14) (emphasis added).61 Kreß and Nußberger (n 39) 249–50.62 Claus Kreß, ‘Zur Lage des völkerrechtlichen Gewaltverbotes’ (2019) 12 Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik 460; Kreß and Nußberger (n 39) 249–50.63 Omar Hammady, ‘Assessing the legality of ECOWAS planned military intervention in Niger’, EJIL: Talk! (6 September 2023) www.ejiltalk.org/assessing-the-legality-of-ecowas-planned-military-intervention-in-niger/.64 Also, Hammady (n 63) points to the cases of Libya (in which the UNSC supported ‘the Government of National Accord as the sole legitimate government of Libya’ and ‘call[ed] upon Member States to cease support to and official contact with parallel institutions that claim to be the legitimate authority’ (UNSC Res 2259, UN Doc S/RES/2259 (23 December 2015)), and the case of Yemen (in which the UNSC reaffirmed its ‘support for the legitimacy of the President of Yemen, Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi, and reiterat[ed] its call to all parties and Member States to refrain from taking any actions that undermine … the legitimacy of the President of Yemen’ (UNSC Res 2216, UN Doc S/RES/2216 (14 April 2015)).65 UNSC Res 2337, UN Doc S/RES/2337 (19 January 2017) (emphasis added).66 ‘Niger: Coup-instigating general declares himself new leader’, Le Monde (28 July 2023) www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/07/28/niger-coup-instigating-general-declares-himself-new-leader_6070445_4.html.67 ECOWAS Commission, Final Communique (n 9).68 ‘Niger: The future of ECOWAS at stake, according to the President of Guinea-Bissau’, Africa News (10 August 2023) www.africanews.com/2023/08/10/niger-the-future-of-ecowas-at-stake-according-to-the-president-of-guinea-bissau/.69 Delegation of the European Union to Niger, ‘Niger: Statement by High Representative Josep Borrell on the Latest Developments’ (29 July 2023) www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/niger-statement-high-representative-josep-borrell-latest-developments_en?s=113#:~:text=The%20European%20Union%20does%20not,place%20unconditionally%20and%20without%20delay.70 Hammady (n 63).71 See n 26 – n 28.72 De Wet (n 47) 992.73 According to De Wet, this is particularly the case where the ‘competing entity claiming to constitute the de jure government has won elections against the incumbent regime and the election results have been widely endorsed by states and international organizations’, as was the case, for example, in the case of Gambia in 2017, ‘where the newly elected President was recognized as such by ECOWAS, the AU and the UNSC, despite the fact that the incumbent President was still contesting the election results and retained effective control (by refusing to leave office)’: see De Wet (n 48) 71.74 Hammady (n 63).75 The same conclusion is reached by Buchan and Tsagourias (n 35).76 On the fact that a government may also be implicitly recognised by the establishment of diplomatic relations with it, see Stefan Talmon, Recognition of Governments in International Law: With Particular Reference to Governments in Exile (Oxford University Press, 2001) 7.77 Buchan and Tsagourias (n 35).78 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v Uganda) (judgment) [2005] ICJ Rep 168, paras 46–7; Eliav Lieblich, International Law and Civil Wars: Intervention and Consent (Routledge, 2013) 11. Buchan and Tsagourias however rightly point out that the ICJ in the Armed Activities case found an implicit treaty invitation based on an interpretation of the subsequent practice of both states and the absence of contradiction: see Buchan and Tsagourias (n 35).79 Here, the President of Gambia called on ECOWAS, AU and UN ‘to support the government and people of the Gambia in enforcing their will, restore their sovereignty and constitutional legitimacy’: see Ruth Maclean, ‘Troops enter the Gambia after Adama Barrow is inaugurated in Senegal’, The Guardian (19 January 2023) www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/19/new-gambian-leader-adama-barrow-sworn-in-at-ceremony-in-senegal.80 See Gerhard Hafner, Institut de Droit International, ‘Present Problems of the Use of Force in International Law: Sub-Group on Intervention by Invitation’ (10th Commission, Session de Naples, 2009) 73 Annuaire de l'Institut de droit international 299, 402 (stating that another state organ of comparable rank can replace the head of state as the authority to issue consent, ‘in cases where the head of State was arrested by the rebels and prevented from performing its constitutional functions’) (emphasis added).81 For the legal effect of such a declaration, and that such a declaration might mean a revocation of an invitation, see section 3.5.82 The same conclusion is reached by Buchan and Tsagourias (n 35).83 International Law Association, Final Report on Aggression and the Use of Force (2018); see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) 1155 UNTS 331, Article 7(2)(a)), which according to the IDI provides guidance in the identification of the state organ to issue consent: see Hafner, Institut de Droit International (n 80) 402.84 Corten (n 42) 154–5; Georg Nolte, Eingreifen auf Einladung: Zur völkerrechtlichen Zulässigkeit des Einsatzes fremder Truppen im internen Konflikt auf Einladung der Regierung (Springer, 1999) 582.85 Hafner, Institut de Droit International (n 80) 325.86 See n 45.87 Hammady (n 63).88 The cases in which the collective security mechanism shall apply are according to Article 25: ‘a) In cases of aggression or conflict in any Member State or threat thereof; b) In case of conflict between two or several Member States; c) In case of internal conflict: (1) that threatens to trigger a humanitarian disaster, or (2) that poses a serious threat to peace and security in the sub-region; d) In event of serious and massive violation of human rights and the rule of law, e) In the event of an overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically elected government; f) Any other situation as may be decided by the Mediation and Security Council’: see Lomé Protocol (n 5).89 Ibid, Articles 21 and 22.90 Article 26 Lomé Protocol specifies that the bodies authorised to initiate the mechanism, however, include: the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council, a member state, the AU and the UN.91 See Lomé Protocol (n 5) Article 8.92 See, e.g. David Wippman, ‘Treaty-Based Intervention: Who Can Say No?’ (1995) 62 University of Chicago Law Review 607, 615; Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (Oxford University Press, 1963) 317–21; Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law, Vol 1 (Longman, 9th edn 1992) 435, 446–7.93 Lieblich (n 78) 10.94 While the terms ‘anticipated’ or ‘anticipatory consent’, strictly speaking, seem to be a bit more comprehensive, since it is not excluded that an anticipated invitation could theoretically also take the form of a unilateral declaration, the term treaty-based consent is, however, accurate in terms of state practice and might simplify the topic. For a use of these terms in scholarship, see, e.g. Wippman (n 92); Agata Kleczkowska, ‘The Meaning of Treaty Authorisation and Ad Hoc Consent for the Legality of Military Assistance On Request’ (2020) 7 Journal on the Use of Force and International Law 270.95 Georg B Zotiades, Intervention by Treaty Right – Its Legality in Present Day International Law (Nicosia Geka Press, 1965) 32; Brad R Roth, ‘The Illegality of “Pro-Democratic” Invasion Pacts’ in Gregory H Fox and Brad R Roth (eds), Democratic Governance and International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2000) 328, 334, 337; Corten (n 42) 257; W Michael Reisman, ‘The Termination of the USSR’s Treaty Right of Intervention in Iran’ (1980) 74 American Journal of International Law 144, 151–2; for an argument against any normative collision, see Aaron J Thomas and Ann Van Wynen Thomas, Non-Intervention, The Law and its Import in the Americas (Southern Methodist University Press, 1956) 92.96 Brownlie (n 92) 317–21.97 Jennings and Watts (n 92) 446–7.98 Wippman (n 92) 615; Ademola Abass and Mashood Baderin, ‘Towards Effective Collective Security and Human Rights Protection in Africa: An Assessment of the Constitutive Act of the New African Union’ (2002) 49 Netherlands International Law Review 1; Lieblich (n 78) 192–202; Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence (Cambridge University Press, 6th edn 2017) 129.99 The SS Wimbledon [17 August 1923] PCIJ Ser A No 1, 25.100 Lieblich (n 78) 192–7; Visser (n 42) 30.101 De Wet (n 43) 419–27; Kleczkowska (n 94) 270–91.102 M Gerard Hafner, Institut de Droit international, ‘Present Problems of the Use of Force in International Law: Sub-Group C – Military Assistance on Request (Tenth Commission, Session de Rhodes, 8 September 2011) Article 4(3): ‘If military assistance is based on a treaty, an ad hoc request is required for the specific case.’103 Other possible functions would be the deterrence of potential adversaries and the protection of a status quo: for an enumeration of potential functions, see Kleczkowska (n 94) 272–3.104 Such cases of conflict can be, for example, a foreign aggression, an internal conflict, or a humanitarian catastrophe on the territory of the inviting state.105 It should be clarified, however, that such temporal proximity may also exist in the case of an anticipatory invitation, but that such temporal proximity here would seem rather coincidental.106 However, there are also examples of ad hoc invitations issued in international treaties. For one of many examples, see the ‘Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of their Activities during their Temporary Presence in Iraq’ (17 November 2008) www.acq.osd.mil/log/LOG_CSD/.policies.html/SE_SOFA.pdf, in which Iraq requested temporary support from US forces.107 See subsection 3.3. For an extensive study of state practice, see Raube (n 6) 156–311.108 For a classical example, see the London Treaty of Guarantee signed by Britain, France and Russia in 1863 to protect the independence of Greece: cited in Jennings and Watts (n 92) 446.109 For an overview, see Percy Henry Winfield, ‘The Grounds of Intervention in International Law’ (1924) 5 British Yearbook of International Law 159; Zotiades (n 95) 1.110 Treaty of Friendship between Persia and the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic (1921) LONTS 268, 401; Kleczkowska (n 94) 281–3.111 However, it is important to mention that, strictly speaking, the Warsaw Pact was a collective defence treaty, although the Soviet Union arguably used it to justify the existence of an anticipatory invitation: see section 3.4(b).112 Treaty of Guarantee (16 August 1960) 5475 UNTS 4, 4.113 For the Turkish argument, see UNSC Verbatim Record, UN Doc S/PV.1781 (20 July 1974) para 226.114 For the position of Cyprus, already before the invasion, see UNSC Verbatim Record, UN Doc S/PV.1098 (27 February 1964) paras 95–8, 101, 109–41. Even though Cyprus no longer explicitly asserted the invalidity of the treaty after the invasion, an interpretation of its position suggests that Cyprus still considered the Treaty of Guarantee to be invalid and, in the alternative, asserted the argument that in any case, the preconditions of the guarantee treaty were not met: see UNSC Verbatim Record, UN Doc S/PV.1781 (20 July 1974) paras 202–13, 238.115 For this position taken by Greece, for example, see UNSC Verbatim Record, UN Doc S/PV.1781 (20 July 1974) para 218.116 For a more detailed analysis of the Cyprus case, see Raube (n 6) 186–97.117 For the legal justification of the Soviet Union in the Security Council, see UNSC Verbatim Record, UN Doc S/PV.2186 (5 January 1980) para 17. For the treaty, see Afghanistan and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighbourliness and Cooperation (1978) 1145, I-17976 UNTS 333.118 ACR 1978/79B. 684; ARB 1979, 5118: cited in Nolte (n 84) 400.119 United States of America and Panama, Panama Canal Treaty (1977) 21086 UNTS 4; Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal (1977) 1161 UNTS 177.120 George Bush, ‘Address to the Nation Announcing United States Military Action in Panama’, The American Presidency Project (20 December 1989) www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-the-nation-announcing-united-states-military-action-panama. For the press statement, which, however, contained in particular the American justification, see Marian Nash Leich, ‘Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law’ (1990) 84 American Journal of International Law 536, 548.121 For the agreement, see Jeremy Levitt, ‘African Interventionist States and International Law’ in Roy May and Oliver Furley (eds), African Interventionist States (Routledge, 2001) 24.122 Levitt (n 121) 26–7.123 Letter dated 30 October 1991 from the Permanent Representatives of France and Indonesia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc A/46/608 (30 October 1991) annex (Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, Article 6).124 Letter dated 6 August 1993 from the Chargé d' Affaires A.I. of the Permanent Mission of Benin to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc S/26272 (6 August 1993) annex (Cotonou Agreement (25 July 1993), Article 8(3)).125 Letter dated 29 November 1995 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc A/50/790 (30 November 1995) annex (General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina).126 De Wet (n 43) 415.127 Traité destiné à adapter et à confirmer les rapports d'amitié et de coopération entre la République française et la Principauté de Monaco (24 October 2002).128 Bethan McKernan, Julian Borger and Dan Sabbagh, ‘Turkey unleashes airstrikes against Kurds in north-east Syria’, The Guardian (9 October 2019) www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/09/turkey-launches-military-operation-in-northern-syria-erdogan.129 The Adana Agreement came into being in 1998, in response to a Turkish ultimatum by which Turkey demanded that Syria cease its support for the PKK. The international treaty includes provisions for joint cooperation against the PKK. In particular, the treaty obliges Syria not to allow or tolerate PKK activities on its territory, and both sides agreed to establish certain mechanisms to enforce the measures adopted. For a non-official version in English, see Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Minutes of the Agreement signed by Turkey and Syria in Adana’ (20 October 1999) www.mafhoum.com/press/50P2.htm. For further information, see Armenak Tokmajyan and Kheder Khaddour, ‘Border Nation: The Reshaping of the Syrian-Turkish Borderlands’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (March 2022) https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tokmajyan_Khaddour_Syria_Turkey_final.pdf.130 Indeed, the Turkish use of force went far beyond the five-kilometre limit agreed in Annex 4: see also Claus Kreß, ‘A Collective Failure to Prevent Turkey’s Operation “Peace Spring” and NATO’s Silence on International