The contestation of international ties and regime transitions: evidence from the former Soviet republics

Abstract

Studies of noncooperative transitions find that domestic balances of power shaped postcommunist regime trajectories in favor of the powerful. Then, what determined the balance of power during a transition? Drawing on relational-network analysis in IR, I argue that the configuration of international ties determined the relative strength of democrats and Soviet-era elites. States with diversified ties between the US and the Soviet Union - that occupy a brokerage position- were more likely to democratize. Their ties with the US funneled material and non-material assistance into democrats in postcommunist states. However, states deeply integrated into the Soviet order resisted democratization to a greater extent. Their extensive ties to the Soviet order resulted in stronger Sovietization and Soviet legacies impeding democratization. The interplay of states' ties with the US and the Soviet Union, as a function of brokerage and integration, shaped the domestic balance of power, conditioning postcommunist political changes. Empirical analysis using medium-N analysis and case studies on the former Soviet Union republics lends support to the argument. The finding contributes to the literature on international determinants of regime changes by highlighting how underlying global power structures frame the domestic balance of power.