Hume’s Empiricism versus Kant’s Critical Philosophy (in the Times of Artificial Intelligence and the Attention Economy)

IF 0.7 4区 管理学 Q3 INFORMATION SCIENCE & LIBRARY SCIENCE
Jernej Kaluža
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

The article exposes how one of the most fundamental oppositions in the history of modern philosophy – the opposition between Hume’s empiricism and Kant’s critical philosophy – is embedded in the current debate on the impact of artificial intelligence (in particular, the algorithmic selection of content) on human society. Hume’s empiricism – with its deduction of subjectivity based on a process of habituation – corresponds to the functioning of recommending algorithms, while Kant’s idea of autonomous subjectivity corresponds to the ideals underlying today’s ethical attempts towards the regulation of artificial intelligence. According to such ethics, the use of empirical data can endanger humans; whereby our attention can be easily caught by sensationalist content and our autonomy replaced by the agency of machinic intelligence. However, as argued in the present article, such ethical positioning also reproduces the gap between the empirical reality and normative principles, which is why transcendental (Kantian) ethics should be supplemented with Hume’s immanent and practical reasoning.
休谟的经验主义与康德的批判哲学(在人工智能与注意力经济时代)
这篇文章揭示了现代哲学史上最基本的对立之一——休谟的经验主义和康德的批判哲学之间的对立——是如何嵌入到当前关于人工智能(特别是内容的算法选择)对人类社会影响的辩论中的。休谟的经验主义——基于习惯化过程的主体性演绎——对应于推荐算法的功能,而康德的自主主体性理念对应于今天对人工智能监管的伦理尝试的理想。根据这种伦理,使用经验数据会危及人类;我们的注意力很容易被耸人听闻的内容所吸引,我们的自主性被机器智能所取代。然而,正如本文所述,这种伦理定位也再现了经验现实与规范原则之间的差距,这就是为什么先验(康德式)伦理学应该用休谟的内在和实践推理来补充的原因。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Informacios Tarsadalom
Informacios Tarsadalom INFORMATION SCIENCE & LIBRARY SCIENCE-
CiteScore
1.30
自引率
33.30%
发文量
15
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