Options Trading and Earnings Management

IF 2.2 4区 管理学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Xin Dai, Zheng Qiao, Chongwu Xia
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

SYNOPSIS This study examines how options trading plays a unique role in curbing firms’ earnings management. We find that options trading volume deters managers’ earnings manipulations, and the effect can be explained by unique characteristics of the options markets. Our results remain unchanged when using both an instrumental variable approach and difference-in-differences analyses to mitigate endogeneity concerns, and after controlling for investors’ short-selling activities. This study adds to the literature by documenting a real impact of options trading on financial reporting. Our results suggest that the options markets promote price efficiency not only by incorporating private information from informed traders, but also by incentivizing managers to disseminate less manipulated information. Data Availability: The data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon request. JEL Classifications: E44; G3; M41.
期权交易和收益管理
本研究探讨期权交易如何在抑制公司盈余管理中发挥独特作用。研究发现,期权交易量对管理者的盈余操纵具有抑制作用,期权市场的独特特征可以解释这一效应。当使用工具变量方法和差异中之差分析来缓解内生性担忧,并控制投资者卖空活动后,我们的结果保持不变。本研究通过记录期权交易对财务报告的真实影响来补充文献。我们的研究结果表明,期权市场不仅通过纳入知情交易者的私人信息,而且通过激励管理者传播较少被操纵的信息来提高价格效率。数据可得性:支持本研究结果的数据可应要求从通讯作者处获得。JEL分类:E44;G3;M41。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Accounting Horizons
Accounting Horizons BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
3.80
自引率
4.00%
发文量
40
期刊介绍: Accounting Horizons is one of three association-wide journals published by the American Accounting Association AAA. This journal seeks to bridge academic and professional audiences with articles that focus on accounting, broadly defined, and that provide insights pertinent to the accounting profession. The contents of Accounting Horizons, therefore, should interest researchers, educators, practitioners, regulators, and students of accounting.
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