Machine-checked proofs of privacy against malicious boards for Selene & Co1

IF 0.9 Q4 COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS
Constantin Cătălin Drăgan, François Dupressoir, Ehsan Estaji, Kristian Gjøsteen, Thomas Haines, Peter Y.A. Ryan, Peter B. Rønne, Morten Rotvold Solberg
{"title":"Machine-checked proofs of privacy against malicious boards for Selene & Co1","authors":"Constantin Cătălin Drăgan, François Dupressoir, Ehsan Estaji, Kristian Gjøsteen, Thomas Haines, Peter Y.A. Ryan, Peter B. Rønne, Morten Rotvold Solberg","doi":"10.3233/jcs-230045","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Privacy is a notoriously difficult property to achieve in complicated systems and especially in electronic voting schemes. Moreover, electronic voting schemes is a class of systems that require very high assurance. The literature contains a number of ballot privacy definitions along with security proofs for common systems. Some machine-checked security proofs have also appeared. We define a new ballot privacy notion that captures a larger class of voting schemes. This notion improves on the state of the art by taking into account that verification in many schemes will happen or must happen after the tally has been published, not before as in previous definitions. As a case study we give a machine-checked proof of privacy for Selene, which is a remote electronic voting scheme which offers an attractive mix of security properties and usability. Prior to our work, the computational privacy of Selene has never been formally verified. Finally, we also prove that MiniVoting and Belenios satisfies our definition.","PeriodicalId":46074,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Computer Security","volume":"74 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9000,"publicationDate":"2023-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Computer Security","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.3233/jcs-230045","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

Privacy is a notoriously difficult property to achieve in complicated systems and especially in electronic voting schemes. Moreover, electronic voting schemes is a class of systems that require very high assurance. The literature contains a number of ballot privacy definitions along with security proofs for common systems. Some machine-checked security proofs have also appeared. We define a new ballot privacy notion that captures a larger class of voting schemes. This notion improves on the state of the art by taking into account that verification in many schemes will happen or must happen after the tally has been published, not before as in previous definitions. As a case study we give a machine-checked proof of privacy for Selene, which is a remote electronic voting scheme which offers an attractive mix of security properties and usability. Prior to our work, the computational privacy of Selene has never been formally verified. Finally, we also prove that MiniVoting and Belenios satisfies our definition.
针对Selene &恶意板的机器检查隐私证明Co1
在复杂的系统中,尤其是在电子投票方案中,隐私是一个众所周知的难以实现的属性。此外,电子投票方案是一类需要非常高的保证的系统。文献中包含许多选票隐私定义以及通用系统的安全证明。一些机器检查的安全证明也出现了。我们定义了一个新的选票隐私概念,它捕获了更大类的投票方案。考虑到许多方案中的验证将在或必须在统计公布之后进行,而不是像以前的定义那样在此之前进行,这一概念在目前的技术水平上得到了改进。作为一个案例研究,我们为Selene提供了一个机器检查的隐私证明,这是一个远程电子投票方案,它提供了一个有吸引力的安全属性和可用性组合。在我们的工作之前,Selene的计算隐私从未得到正式验证。最后,我们也证明了MiniVoting和Belenios满足我们的定义。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
Journal of Computer Security
Journal of Computer Security COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS-
CiteScore
1.70
自引率
0.00%
发文量
35
期刊介绍: The Journal of Computer Security presents research and development results of lasting significance in the theory, design, implementation, analysis, and application of secure computer systems and networks. It will also provide a forum for ideas about the meaning and implications of security and privacy, particularly those with important consequences for the technical community. The Journal provides an opportunity to publish articles of greater depth and length than is possible in the proceedings of various existing conferences, while addressing an audience of researchers in computer security who can be assumed to have a more specialized background than the readership of other archival publications.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信