Responsive Constitutional Law Strategy For Preventing Political Corruption Done By Local Political Dynasties

IF 0.8 Q2 LAW
Agus Riwanto, Sukarni Suryaningsih
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Abstract

This article aims to examine corruption practices in the regions carried out by political dynasties and prevention efforts from the perspective of responsive constitutional law. It will examine the motives of political dynasties, forms of corruption by dynasties, factors that cause dynasties and efforts to prevent. This article uses a socio-legal method that is an interdisciplinary approach in the study of law by combining social sciences or humanities. Secondary data mainly comes from case, regulations and library. The results of the study show that the dynasties tend to practice the forms of corruption in the regions: corruption in the buying and selling of regional government positions and corruption in regional infrastructure projects originating from the Regional Budget Revenue. Factors causing political dynasties: the high cost of regional head elections and the absence of laws prohibiting dynastic practices in regional head elections. Efforts to prevent the practice of political dynasties for regional head elections from the perspective of responsive constitutional law are in the form of policies to regulate the regional head election system that prioritizes the principle of responsibility for public demands and provides alternative solutions through: reducing the cost of regional head elections, lowering the threshold for candidacy, changing the financing of regional head elections from the Regional Revenue Expenditure Budget to the State Expenditure Budget, separating local and national elections, a political culture that educates the people in voting, and policies for the welfare of the people in order do not elect dynastic candidates in regional head elections.
防止地方政治王朝政治腐败的应诉性宪法策略
本文旨在从回应性宪法的角度审视政治王朝在地区的腐败行为及其预防措施。它将研究政治王朝的动机、王朝的腐败形式、导致王朝的因素和预防措施。本文采用社会法学方法,这是一种跨学科的方法,通过结合社会科学或人文科学来研究法律。二手资料主要来源于案例、法规和图书馆。研究结果表明,朝代倾向于在区域内实践腐败的形式:地方政府职位买卖中的腐败和源于地方预算收入的区域基础设施项目中的腐败。造成政治王朝的因素:地方首长选举的高成本和没有法律禁止地方首长选举中的王朝行为。从顺应宪法的角度出发,防止地方自治团体长选举的政治王朝现象,主要表现为以国民要求的责任原则为优先,并通过以下方式提供替代方案的地方自治团体长选举制度规制政策:降低区长选举费用、降低候选人门槛、将区长选举经费由“地区收支预算”改为“国家收支预算”、地方选举与全国选举分开、教育人民投票的政治文化、为人民的福祉而制定的政策,以避免在区长选举中选出王朝候选人。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
自引率
25.00%
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24
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