Game Analysis of Different Source Disclosure Model for Genetic Resources and Implications for China

Abstract

Inventions that rely on genetic resources are subject to different source disclosure models in the domestic laws of different countries. Different source disclosure models can indirectly affect the quantity and quality of patents issued in a country, thus resulting in different social benefits. Therefore, an analysis of which source disclosure model is applicable to the patent protection of genetic resources is of great importance. The economic approach of game theory is used to analyse the game of interests between patent applicants and the patent examination authority. It is found that the patent examination authority is required to introduce source disclosure rules and that the optimal equilibrium for patent applications can be achieved by requiring companies to comply with a voluntary source disclosure model under intense examination pressure. Based on this, the legislative policies of typical resource-rich countries are selected for analysis to verify the validity of the game conclusions. Finally, policy recommendations for source disclosure requirements for genetic resources in China are proposed based on the game conclusions. genetic resources, source disclosure, patent law, game theory, mandatory model, voluntary model, patent applications, regulatory bodies, cost-benefit perspective