The Peculiarities of the German Uranium Project (1939–1945)

Abstract

An analysis of the peculiarities of the German Uranium Project (1939–1945) reveals that it was, in many ways, different from what one would expect. There was no work at all on a possible bomb, nor on plutonium. The reactor experiments were limited to subcritical systems and did not attempt to achieve the proclaimed goal of a self-sustaining chain reaction. The so-far identified deficits (lack of interest in Nazi circles, mismanagement, scientific mistakes, and deteriorating work conditions during the war) are relevant but not sufficient for explaining the peculiarities. We deduce that the scientists involved, and even the Heereswaffenamt (army ordnance), shied away from making progress, not only towards a bomb but even towards a reactor. They did not fail; they rather renounced a possible success in order not to provoke political interest in the development of a bomb.