Corruption, Elite Contestation, and Parliaments: Why Do Legislatures Become Stronger in Authoritarian Regimes?

IF 1.5 2区社会学 Q2 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Political Research Quarterly Pub Date : 2023-10-03 DOI:10.1177/10659129231205296

Felix Wiebrecht

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Abstract

A growing body of literature studies the personalization of power in authoritarian regimes. Yet, how institutions can become a credible constraint to dictatorial rule is less widely studied. I theorize that corruption is a key factor associated with stronger legislatures in authoritarian regimes. By engaging in corruption, authoritarian elites in ruling coalitions can build up networks of support and influence and ultimately, use their elevated position to impel more legislative powers vis-à-vis the executive. Examining panel data on the strength of legislatures in authoritarian regimes between 1946 and 2010, I show empirically that authoritarian parliaments are stronger when levels of corruption in a given regime are high. The link between corruption and legislative strength is especially strong in the Middle East and Africa, and primarily applies to party-based and military dictatorships. More competitive electoral and legislative processes, however, do not uniformly affect parliaments’ strength. These findings contribute to our understanding of institutional changes in autocracies and highlight the centrality of elite contestations in determining institutional trajectories.

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腐败、精英竞争和议会:为什么立法机构在专制政权中变得更强大?

越来越多的文献研究专制政权中权力的个人化。然而，制度如何能够成为对独裁统治的可信约束却没有得到广泛的研究。我的理论是，在专制政权中，腐败是与更强大的立法机构相关的一个关键因素。通过参与腐败，执政联盟中的专制精英可以建立支持和影响网络，并最终利用他们的高位推动更多立法权相对于-à-vis行政部门。通过对1946年至2010年间威权政体中立法机构实力的小组数据的研究，我从经验上表明，当特定政体的腐败程度较高时，威权议会就会更强大。腐败与立法力量之间的联系在中东和非洲尤为明显，主要适用于以政党为基础的独裁和军事独裁。然而，更具竞争性的选举和立法程序并不一定会影响议会的实力。这些发现有助于我们理解专制国家的制度变迁，并突出了精英之争在决定制度轨迹方面的中心地位。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Political Research Quarterly POLITICAL SCIENCE-

CiteScore

3.60

自引率

4.80%

发文量

109

期刊介绍： Political Research Quarterly (PRQ) is the official journal of the Western Political Science Association. PRQ seeks to publish scholarly research of exceptionally high merit that makes notable contributions in any subfield of political science. The editors especially encourage submissions that employ a mixture of theoretical approaches or multiple methodologies to address major political problems or puzzles at a local, national, or global level. Collections of articles on a common theme or debate, to be published as short symposia, are welcome as well as individual submissions.